


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Japan in Defeat



*Published under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs*

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JAPAN IN DEFEAT

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Japan in Defeat

A REPORT BY A CHATHAM HOUSE
STUDY GROUP



*Issued under the auspices of the
✓ Royal Institute of International Affairs*


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PREFACE

THE defeat of the Axis Powers will present the United Nations with problems of unusual difficulty. The very completeness of defeat itself may entail domestic consequences both in Germany and Japan of a different order from any which have arisen in the past ; and in the case of Japan there is little or no evidence to be drawn from history. Since the opening of the Meiji era three quarters of a century ago, modern Japan has had to face no predicament comparable to that which is now in store for her. Therefore the probable reaction of the Japanese people, in the imminent emergency, can only be gauged by those who can make an intelligent guess based upon intimate knowledge of Japanese psychology and institutions.

A forecast of this kind is given in this book which is the product of co-operative study by a group of experts, all personally acquainted with Japan by long residence. The personnel of this study group have each and all had long contact with public affairs in the country, either in the political, military and diplomatic sphere, or in education, religion, commerce and economics. In presenting it to the public, the Council of Chatham House believe that the reader will find in these pages an authoritative appreciation of the changes likely to be engendered in Japan by defeat.

The study itself was undertaken by Chatham House as a contribution to the international inquiry into the future of Japan initiated by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

ASTOR

Chairman of the Council

June, 1945

Chatham House,
10 St. James's Square,
London, S.W.1.

NOTE :—The delay in the publication of this Report is due to prevailing conditions, and though the defeat of Japan has been accomplished since it went to press the Council is satisfied that the substance of the study remains unaffected.

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INTRODUCTION

THREE generations ago Japan emerged from more than two centuries of seclusion. Culturally too self-centred to realize that the progress which had passed her by had other than material value, she regarded herself as equipped twenty-six years later to set forth upon what has proved to be one of the most sensational and short-lived imperialist careers in history. In the intervening half century, she has been involved in five major wars and two military 'incidents'. Formosa, Korea, the Mandated Islands, Manchuria, a great part of China, and finally South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific have been subjected, in rapid succession, to her control. Only for one half of that half century has this restless Power remained at peace. Yet, during this tempestuous progress in which war, preparation for war and natural calamities have strained her energies and resources, she has contrived to build up a State with the material attributes, and a complete veneer, of modern civilization, and to reach the acknowledged status of a great industrial Power. The final phase of a meteoric episode now seems to be approaching. Before long this precocious Empire will pass into dissolution, and Japan herself will make her exit, permanently or temporarily, from the international stage in a manner no less spectacular than that of her original appearance.

This will constitute the material of history. The scope of the present survey is restricted, and its purpose immediate and practical. It is an attempt to forecast the reactions of the Japanese nation to defeat and unconditional surrender. In doing so, it is hoped to make some contribution towards an understanding of the complex problem of Japan which, since the climax of the Pacific War is unlikely to be long delayed after the defeat of Germany, now demands the urgent attention of the Governments and peoples of the democracies. For there could be no more dangerous fallacy than to assume that the mere fact of defeat will dispose of this problem. Unless a regenerate Japan can be induced to regard herself as a nation among fellow-nations, and offered the opportunities which that relationship entails, her dynamic and highly disciplined people will continue to be a source of unrest in a continent which still lacks the pillars of stability.

Japan in Defeat is the outcome of the discussions of a small group, all the members of which have either worked in the

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Japanese Empire in various representative capacities, or have made a special study of Japanese problems. Half of them have the advantage of a knowledge of the spoken and written Japanese language. The procedure adopted in its preparation has been to examine what are believed to be the fundamental elements and aspects of Japanese life; and to each of these a chapter is devoted which constitutes, in a sense, an essay complete in itself. Lack of uniformity of style in the various chapters is explained by the fact that some are the work of individual authors, while others are more in the nature of composite productions (the chapter on women was not written by a member of the group but has been contributed by a Japanese woman now resident in England). This method has made some repetition unavoidable; and in most cases a certain amount of historical background has been included in order to support and elucidate the inferences drawn as to the post-war situation. In the closing chapter, the conclusions reached are summed up in consecutive form.

The survey is intended primarily for readers with special knowledge of Japan and of Far Eastern political conditions, but, within this limitation and that of space, an effort has been made to present it in a form which will interest a wider public. It will be realized, however, that since the factual field upon which the forecast is based is very extensive, much condensation has been necessary.

The group has been precluded under its terms of reference from putting forward recommendations as to the policies relating to Japan which should be adopted by the Allied Governments. This has increased the complexity of the task, since the first comment which a proposal for such a study at the present time must provoke is that the attitude of the defeated Japanese will depend very largely upon the conditions imposed by the victors.

The territorial intentions towards Japan of Great Britain, the United States and China have, however, been expressed in broad outline in the Declaration issued after the Cairo Conference in November 1943, an extract from which follows:

"It is their (the three great Allies) purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

"Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

"The aforesaid three great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of

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the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”¹

This Declaration has been assumed to represent the settled policy of these three Powers. It has been considered, moreover, that the Declaration may legitimately be read in conjunction with the Atlantic Charter (notwithstanding the fact that its benefits may not be claimed as of right by the enemies of the United Nations), the fourth point of which contemplates the furtherance of “the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”² No less applicable to a defeated Japan, it has been felt, are the ‘Four Freedoms’ propounded by the President of the United States in January 1941: freedom of speech, freedom from religious persecution, freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Aspects of Japanese history, policy and national character have been examined not only in the cold light of Occidental logic, but also (in so far as such an attitude is possible for non-Japanese to achieve) in what must often seem to be the distorted mirrors of Japanese psychology, custom and religion. Observation of events and of development of thought in Japan during the critical period of hostilities has naturally been impeded by the sealing of the country’s communications with the outside world, which was initiated with the ‘China Incident’ in 1937 and has become more complete since the outbreak of the Pacific War.

While an endeavour has been made to avoid anything which might be construed as advocacy of the adoption of any particular policy by the Allied Governments, it has still been necessary to take into account the degree to which tendencies might be strengthened or modified, in the event of those Governments following one or another of several alternative courses. This applies to most aspects of the problem; as, for instance, the ability of the Throne to survive the stresses of disaster and disillusionment; the preservation of whatever latent democratic forces may still exist and their future influence in the State; and the solution of both short and long-term economic problems, including the central problem of Japan’s capacity to provide her present population with a reasonable standard of living under the terms of the Cairo Declaration. In considering alternative political systems which might be developed in post-war Japan,

¹ *International Conciliation*. January 1944, No. 396, p. 119.

² *Declaration by United Nations*, Cmd. No. 6388 (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1942.)

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it has been recognized that circumstances may compel the Allies to assume control of the internal administration of the country. Nevertheless, the survey has been based upon an assumption that (subject to reservations in the interests of security), the Japanese people will be left free to select and develop the conditions under which they will attempt to reconstruct their national life.

It has also been necessary, in some instances, to weigh the influence upon Japan of possible post-war developments in China, and of the attitude of Russia, both during and after hostilities. Nor could the post-war condition of East Asia as a whole be disregarded.

The survey is an attempt to set the Japanese scene in perspective, giving its various features their appropriate emphasis and position; and, against this background, to suggest the consequences which seem likely to arise when the 'peerless national polity' of Japan has been destroyed, and her hitherto invincible forces have suffered overwhelming defeat. In this process, it has been impossible to avoid the conclusion that there are certain stabilizing institutions in Japan for which, although in their present form they have contributed directly to the aggressive past, adequate substitutes are unlikely to be forthcoming in the present immature stage of Japanese development. Instances of such institutions are the Throne, the Army, the great business families and the educational system. All merit varying degrees of condemnation; all will need modification or must disappear before Japan can progress far along the democratic road. But the premature disappearance of any of them, in the critical interim period after the war, would be likely to increase the political, social and economic confusion which must probably arise even under the least unfavourable conditions; but which, if unduly prolonged, would be prejudicial to Far Eastern security, even though this might not be immediately apparent.

The obvious objections to the retention of these institutions, combined with the confusion which their disappearance would cause, will strengthen the arguments in favour of foreign administration. Japanese psychology, and the difficulties of the Japanese language, would make this a far more complex undertaking than in the case of a European country, such as Germany, but it would be possible to represent it as preferable, even in the interests of the Japanese people, to the consequences of non-intervention. All that can be said here is that foreign administration would put Japanese reactions to defeat, in a spontaneous

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and general sense, temporarily into the background. It would undoubtedly provoke widespread and violent guerrilla resistance in a country ideally adapted to this form of warfare, and maintenance of order would require very large forces.

The route explored in *Japan in Defeat* has been one with few landmarks. Japan has never in her history suffered invasion; and in her aggressive career of the past half century, she has not sustained so much as a temporary check. When the outcome of this war is realized by the Japanese as inevitable and imminent, the effect may be to shatter their national life and to falsify all preconceived notions of their reactions. In these unusual circumstances, research of this nature, however securely based upon substantial knowledge of fact, must entail a large element of speculation.

CHAPTER I

THE THRONE AND THE CONSTITUTION

The Throne before the Restoration

IT is questionable whether the Emperors of Japan, since the opening of authentic history about the sixth century A.D., have ever exercised effective secular authority, except for brief intervals. In the earlier Nara and Heian periods they were frequently manipulated by noble families such as the Soga and Fujiwara, but until the establishment of the Shōgunate at Kamakura in 1185, the administration was conducted at least with a semblance of Imperial authority. Between 1185 and the Restoration in 1868, on the other hand, the temporal power of the Emperors was in complete eclipse, and even their sacerdotal functions were exercised in such deep seclusion that they ceased to influence the national spirit. It follows that the Emperors were afforded little or no opportunity to display outstanding abilities, even if heredity, long seclusion and the trivial round of the mediaeval Japanese Court did not preclude their development in most cases.

Notwithstanding the veneration with which they are supposed to be regarded, no nation has treated its sovereigns so cavalierly as the Japanese. Enforced abdication, often at an early age, was a common phenomenon for centuries; Emperors have been murdered; others have been exiled and died in exile; and from the late sixteenth century onwards, it was the rule rather than the exception for the Kyōto Court to be condemned to direst poverty. No strong protest is recorded as having been made by any class of the Imperial subjects against the indignities heaped upon generation after generation of the Sons of Heaven. The history of Japan was punctuated for centuries by uprisings and revolts; one after another noble families seized power and relapsed into obscurity; vassals in their thousands died in battle or by their own hand in loyalty to a clan or factional leader.

Loyalty, so-called, and indiscipline were the alternating key-notes in this history. Sir George Sansom remarks: "To promote the fortunes of his own unit, the warrior would freely sacrifice a wider loyalty".¹ He adds elsewhere that feudal discipline depended upon the power of an overlord to reward or

¹ G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (Cresset Press, London, 1936), p. 341.

punish. In these centuries, how did the habitually oppressed peasantry, always the mainstay of Japan, regard this situation? There were frequent peasant uprisings, sometimes reaching formidable proportions; but the stimulus to revolt was their own miseries and the oppression of overlords, not the plight of the Emperors. In general, devotion has always been to the dynasty, rather than to individual sovereigns, and the authors of rebellion have never contemplated the overthrow of the dynasty and its replacement by another.

As to the priestly functions of the Emperors, notwithstanding their position as Manifest God, proclaimed in Imperial Rescripts as early as 700 A.D., they would seem between the eighth and the nineteenth centuries to have had little practical significance in the life of the nation. Sir George Sansom, in his book, also remarks that the religious was perhaps always the most important aspect of the Imperial functions; and that even in its darkest days, Shintō (and still less the primitive animism in which it had its roots) never completely decayed. Nevertheless, the Way of the Gods was overshadowed by Buddhism for many centuries, and perhaps maintained a precarious existence only through the Japanese propensity for compromise, manifesting itself in the synthesis of Shintō, Buddhism and, to some extent, Confucianism.

Even allowing for this tolerant religious attitude, the Emperors themselves, by their fervent adoption of Buddhism between the sixth and the twelfth centuries, must have undermined their position as Deity and High Priest. The great shrines at Isé became essentially the family shrines of the Imperial House, and long ceased to be the repository of the national faith. This decay of the national faith, in whose pantheon the Emperors held high rank, brought the loss of temporal power as a natural consequence. The Japanese people ceased to rely, in seed time and harvest, upon the forlorn Manifest God.

It was not until the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the social order of the Tokugawa Shōguns was tottering to its fall, that political reformers like Motoori and Yoshida Shōin discovered that successive dynasties of Shōguns had been guilty of usurping the Imperial prerogative, and reaffirmed after seven hundred years the divinity of the Emperors and the divine mission of the Japanese race. In the Restoration that followed in 1868, the Imperial cause was carried to victory by the Satsuma and Choshu clans, ancient families who had never forgiven the presumption of the upstart Tokugawas or acquiesced unreservedly in their autocratic authority. The belated loyalty of these two clans paid them handsome dividends in prestige and authority which

remained unchallenged until quite recent years and is still a powerful factor in the State. Instead of effecting a genuine re-establishment of Imperial power, they manipulated its divine attributes to secure for their clans a power far greater and more intoxicating than that of the Tokugawas; the stakes they played for were world empire instead of dominion over an obscure feudal State.

In spite of what has been written above of the decay of Shintō during the Shōgunates, there can be little doubt that the continued existence through the centuries of thousands of wayside Shintō shrines and the daily worship before the *kamidana* in countless peasant homes, kept open a channel for the revival of the spiritual and temporal influence of the divine Emperors. Even Confucianism played a part in this renewal of long-dormant tribal instincts by providing in the doctrine of Wangtao (Kingly Way) a thesis since elaborated as Kodō (Imperial Way).

Post-Restoration Statesmanship

The events of the years immediately preceding 1868 have been described as an 'incomplete revolution'.¹ The Emperor was brought from the shadows of Kyōto by the victorious Satsuma and Choshu clans, and restored in Tokyo to the position of temporal and spiritual head of the State which had been so long in abeyance that it had become legendary. This restoration was facilitated by the resignation of the fifteenth Tokugawa Shōgun and the accession in 1867 of the Emperor Meiji at the plastic age of sixteen. It was inevitable that the young Emperor should come under the control of the two clans to which he owed his restoration; and that those clans should arrogate to themselves all substance of power in the Government and armed forces. No doubt in the first instance, Imperial restoration appeared as little more than a handle for securing clan ascendancy. But the concentration of authority in these two clans was confirmed by the very high level of ability and strength of character revealed by the statesmen and soldiers they produced at a great crisis of Japanese history. It is remarkable that, after two centuries of complete seclusion and a millennium of restricted intercourse with the outer world, Japan should have been able to face internal and external emergency with a galaxy of statesmen. And it is a phenomenon which may prove to have deep significance for the future. The greatest of the figures were Prince Itō and Prince Yamagata, though Marshal Ōyama was to defeat the Russians at Mukden and Count Inouyé, close supporter of Itō, was perhaps

¹ Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1943), p. 12.

Japan's most successful Foreign Minister. After the conclusion of his active career, General Nogi was manoeuvred by adroit propaganda into the position of a symbol of the high destiny and military valour of Japan; and his action in following his Imperial master through suicide to the grave in obedience to the austere dictates of Japanese feudalism, exercised a profound influence upon the popular attitude towards the Throne and contributed to the establishment of the Meiji legend.

Prince Itō was the first and most conspicuous of those Statesmen round the Throne whose enjoyment of Imperial confidence was to provoke Japanese 'patriots' to successive deeds of assassination. By contrast, Yamagata was the militarist prototype, and even in co-operation the two men represented opposing policies. That Itō was, like all Japanese statesmen, an Imperialist is certainly true; and the Constitution which he framed reveals him as a strong supporter of the Imperial prerogative, with only very qualified faith in the application to Japan of democratic principles. In the early days of the Diet, he consistently contrived its dissolution whenever it came in conflict with his conception of the larger interests of the State; and he never hesitated to invoke censorship of press or speech. But within these limits, he possessed a sense of moderation and good timing. His ambitions and those of his school of thought were probably more limited in scope and more extended in period than those of the militarists, and he did not take the militarist view of war as an end in itself. His conviction that Japan should endeavour to pursue her national destiny without resort to war or excitement of international suspicion, may have been responsible for his strong advocacy in 1901 of alliance with Russia instead of Great Britain, notwithstanding the British atmosphere in which he had studied as a young man and his admiration for British political institutions. This detailed examination of Itō's political faith is dictated by his great influence with the Emperor Meiji, who was accustomed to take no important decision without his advice.

If Itō formed the pattern for the succession of personal advisers to the Emperors, such as Count Chinda, Prince Saionji, Admiral Viscount Saito, Count Makino and Mr. Matsudaira; Prince Yamagata was the fore-runner of a hierarchy of soldier-politicians. Among them were General Count Terauchi, first Governor-General of Korea and responsible as Prime Minister for the Siberian Expedition in 1918; General Baron Tanaka, Prime Minister and alleged author of the *Tanaka Memorial*; and finally the notorious General Tojo. Yamagata also fostered the type of political thuggery for which Japan has since become infamous, an instance being the murder of the Korean Queen in 1895. It is

worth recording that the Navy usually supported more moderate civilian policies, and only joined forces with their traditional military rivals after the London Naval Conference of 1930.

Except during the abortive flowering of democratic ideals and party government in the nineteen-twenties, the forces of military aggression and reaction steadily gained ground at the expense of moderate civilian statesmanship from the death, in 1909, of Prince Itō onwards. This had a number of causes, such as the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, the decline of democracy in the West, the world depression and the debasement of Japanese political morality, but the fact that Itō predeceased his militarist Genrō colleague by twelve years should also not be discounted. By the time the paramount influence of the two clans began to wane after the last war, the Meiji Emperor was dead and succeeded by an imbecile, and it was too late for the reassertion of Imperial authority. No one would question the devotion of the Emperor's personal advisers (proved as it has so often been by courageous indifference to assassination or threat of assassination), but the loyalty of the militarists followed the historic Japanese pattern, in that it usually attached to an immediate superior, or to the Army, rather than to the Emperor to whom fulsome lip service was habitually paid. The Young Officers claimed to be moved by the 'highest loyalty', and justified their insubordinate actions on the ground that the Emperor was being misled by his advisers. For instance, at his trial in 1936 for the murder of Major-General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Office, Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa declared that the rebellious Young Officers placed the Emperor above all, but the fact remains that they repeatedly attacked and murdered his most trusted advisers. And in this indiscipline they had the tacit, often indeed explicit, support of some of the highest officers in the Army, and the hysterical sympathy of a large element of the public. This resistance to supreme and hallowed authority, this devotion to a factional leader and cause, as opposed to the State and its head, is the strand which runs through recent Japanese history, as it did in past ages.

Post-Restoration Emperors

Turning now to the political influence and character of the post-Restoration Emperors, it must be recognized that the Meiji legend was to some degree of deliberate and posthumous creation. During the lifetime of the Emperor Meiji the official inculcation of Emperor-worship had made very rapid headway with the masses. But the conception now generally held in Japan of this Emperor as a great and enlightened ruler, and the religious

veneration paid to his Rescripts and poems, has been heightened by an elaborate official build-up since his death; the task of the propagandists being much facilitated by the victorious wars against China and Russia and the amazing advance in national prosperity and prestige achieved in his name by the statesmen of whom an account has been given above. It was patent also to intelligent Japanese that only intensive militarization and highly centralized authority had saved the nation from the fate of China or subjugation by Tsarist Russia. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to assume that, during a reign of forty-five years throughout which he was in constant consultation on affairs of great moment with talented and experienced statesmen such as Itō, Inouyé and Yamagata, the Emperor Meiji did not acquire appreciable political ability; and there are indications that he was permitted on some occasions to influence important policies.

The physical and mental disabilities of the Emperor Taisho (1912-1926) were such that his reign may be passed over with the comment that the existence in an Emperor of those disabilities during fifteen critical years did much to confirm the subjection of the Throne to militarist dictation and increased the difficulties of his personal advisers.

Coming then to the present reign, the Emperor Hirohito grew to manhood in an epoch when British political ideals were popular in Japan. In this period also (the first two decades of this century) the influence of the personal advisers had not yet been seriously challenged. Japan was respected by, and valued the respect of foreign Powers, and democratic ideals seemed to be slowly gaining ground. It is probably true that the Emperor's education was designed to equip him to occupy a position more strictly constitutional than those of his predecessors. Thus the Emperor seems to be hard-working, methodical and with a high sense of duty, but there is no indication that he possesses outstanding ability or originality of mind. In view of the relatively moderate personal influences to which he has been exposed, and the repeated and violent reaction against those influences of the militarists and extremists who instigated Japan's present orgy of aggression and expansion, it seems reasonable to suppose that he disapproved of the policies which brought Japan into conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Other internal evidence also supports this supposition. While his disposition towards the earlier Manchurian adventure is less clear, there is good reason to believe that he opposed the military coercion of China which led to war in 1937; and on more than one occasion prior to that date, he is said to have intervened to prevent the headstrong Kwantung Army from crossing the Great Wall. The

Emperor is, however, a Japanese, and no doubt shares the imperialist obsessions of his subjects, even if unconvinced of his own divine attributes.

Imperial Divinity

An intensive campaign has been conducted since the Restoration, rising sharply in tempo since the Manchurian Incident, to establish as an article of faith in the Japanese people the myth of Imperial divinity. Correspondingly, the sacerdotal functions of the Emperor have been emphasized. Numerous instances of this could be cited, such as compulsory worship before the Imperial portrait in schools and public offices; the tendency to give the Meiji Rescripts the character of Holy Writ; the punctilious attendance of statesmen and generals (and also of the public) at the Imperial shrines at Isé in time of emergency or upon accepting office; and the appearance of pseudo-scientific treatises bolstering up the Imperial myth. Associated with this campaign from a somewhat different angle is the establishment in great sanctity of the Yasukuni Shrine, hallowing the souls of those who have given their lives for the State and thus joined the throng of its protecting deities. Militarists and members of reactionary societies have been particularly assiduous in detecting and denouncing acts or words remotely capable of being twisted into a sense derogatory to the Throne.

In this connection it is of interest to recall the case of Dr. Minobé, the distinguished constitutional jurist, and member of the House of Peers by Imperial nomination, who as far back as 1923 had published a treatise propounding the theory that although the Emperor is the embodiment of the State, his sovereignty is to be regarded as power, rather than right in the legal sense, and must be exercised under the safeguards of the Constitution. This was opposed to the orthodox view of Japanese sovereignty as residing in the Emperor, who is above and independent of the organs of State. Under this orthodox interpretation the Constitution was granted to the nation not as of right, but as an act of divine benevolence on the part of the Emperor. For twelve years these views had not hindered Dr. Minobé from being regarded with the highest esteem by the Emperor and his fellow-countrymen, until in 1935 reactionary peers and officers of the General Staff discovered that his teachings were disloyal and made him the victim of judicial persecution.¹

Intelligent Japanese do not accept the tribal myths of a divine Emperor and racial mission at their face value but, like the rest

¹ See A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* 1935, vol. I (Oxford University Press, London, 1936), pp. 314-315.

of their fellow-countrymen, they have now learned by harsh experience to conform outwardly lest worse betide. No popular protest seems to have been raised in 1908 when Professor Kumé compiled a more rational Imperial chronology, in which the birth of the first Emperor Jimmu was advanced from 660 B.C. to 24 B.C. and a number of the more glaring inconsistencies in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* were ironed out. In recent years the professor would have laid himself open to criminal proceedings. The attitude of the semi-educated may be described as *credo quia absurdum*. To this one might add the Japanese propensity for accepting any official parrot-cry provided it was repeated with sufficient frequency. So far as the peasants and other unsophisticated classes are concerned, there is little doubt that the myths are often sincerely accepted. In general, it may be said of the Japanese that, even where belief in the tribal myths officially foisted upon them is insincere or artificial, they accept as an article of faith the supreme importance and superiority of their race; and the Emperor at its head is the highest living being of whom they can conceive. The question thus arises whether, if the Emperor were divested of his halo and the militarist pretensions of an aggressive and divine racial mission were destroyed by defeat, the dynasty would still retain its hold upon the affections and imagination of the people. So far as the association of the Throne with militarism is concerned, it is only in modern times that the Emperor has been built up as a military figure, and the conception of the head of the State as Commander-in-Chief is in the European rather than the Japanese tradition. It might, therefore, not be difficult to destroy. As to Imperial divinity, the word has not the same significance in Japan as in the West: it connotes connection and kinship with the life that lies behind all material manifestations, but it has little moral significance. The herd-mentality of the Japanese leads to the impression that this belief might not long survive an abandonment of the official policy of shackling national thought which has fostered it. The sacerdotal functions of the Emperor were only revived at the Restoration after remaining in abeyance for seven hundred years. Given favourable conditions and astute advisers, therefore, it seems that the Throne might survive this process of rationalization. The disappearance of the tribal myths, however, would probably leave in its wake a profound sense of disillusionment which would have to be kept in mind in estimating the post-defeat situation.

It is unquestionable that these officially fostered delusions, by feeding the inordinate vanity of a people already unbalanced and bewildered by too sudden emergence from feudalism to the

status of a great Power at a critical period in history, have been one of the main causes of Japan's hectic career of aggression. They have manifested themselves in a raucous assertion of superiority and, combined with long seclusion and the barriers presented by language and geography, have brought about a dangerous sense of 'apartness' from the fellowship of mankind. They have enabled militarist reactionaries to stifle the feeble voice of democracy and national conscience and screen their crimes behind a divine prerogative. Before Japan can become a sane and regenerate member of the family of nations, these incompatible delusions must disappear in the humiliation of military defeat and fresh air of free speech and thought.

The Emperor's Personal Advisers

The function of the Emperor's personal advisers is to ensure that he receives an unprejudiced view on matters of State, which may not be submitted to him except in the presence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or some other senior member of his staff. Their moderating influence explains the fury with which they have been attacked by the Young Officers. The present Emperor's advisers have not equalled those of his grandfather in political sagacity, and their ranks have been thinned by assassination and advancing age. In the strict sense of the term, the personal advisers include the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Master of the Ceremonies, and perhaps the President of the Privy Council; but there are indications that the circle tends to widen, and in practice it may now include some other members of the Privy Council and former Prime Ministers who have acquired some degree of Genrō status.

It is well to reflect, however, that the 'makers of modern Japan' were probably not flood-lighted during the last years of the Shōgunate. The emergency (and to contemporary observers it may have appeared scarcely less formidable than that which will confront Japan after defeat) produced the men. It may be, therefore, that, undaunted by the catastrophe that has overtaken their country, an entirely new group of statesmen will take the stage; and since the Japanese tendency is likely to be to discard what has failed them and adopt what has proved stronger, this group may even have an extreme socialist complexion, but their brand of socialism would probably be indigenous to Japan and bear little resemblance to Western models.

The Throne after Defeat

The prospect of the Emperor coming forward as the *de facto* saviour of his people seems to be rendered remote by the latter's

traditional conception of the Throne, and the influence of heredity and personality of that conception. Nevertheless, it seems justifiable to believe that, though himself of only mediocre attainments, the Emperor might under favourable circumstances appear after defeat as a constitutional monarch. Defeat may cause the glutinous mass of the Japanese people, frightened and forlorn in the face of a hostile world, to coalesce round the dynasty. It is possible, too, that the present Emperor may be constrained to abdicate, following the precedent which has so often been set in earlier crises in Japanese history, and make way for some other member of the Imperial family. Such an innovation (the institution of a constitutional monarchy) could only succeed if the Emperor or his successor were advised and supported by a group of statesmen approaching in ability those of the Meiji era, but with a chastened and democratic conception of Japan's place in world affairs. One of the tasks of such statesmen would be the presentation of the Emperor to his subjects in a human instead of a divine aspect; and of the future before the nation as one of painful reconstruction from the foundations and peaceful international co-operation, rather than the implementation of *hakkō ichiu* principles. For it would be hard to exaggerate the difficulties which Japan must face irrespective of the policy of the victor Powers: the humiliation and chaos of defeat, loss of overseas possessions and their food supplies, disorganization of industry; in fact the destruction of the foundations upon which this small island nation of limited natural resources could hope to support her eighty odd millions;¹ all these causes are likely to bring untold distress. This distress may be only temporary if international policies, particularly those relating to trade, are framed upon liberal lines; but under the most favourable circumstances rehabilitation will demand great and exhausting sacrifices from the Japanese.

The changed presentation of the Emperor and of the future before Japan might be less difficult than appears at first sight, in view of the mental and spiritual gymnastics of which the Japanese have shown themselves capable in recent years. Some spectacular juggling would be necessary with Imperial 'infallibility' no less than with Imperial 'divinity'. To the logical Western mind, an infallible being who is so affected by misrepresentation or bad advice as to commit, or to permit the commission in his name of

¹ The estimated population of Japan Proper in 1939 was 72.876 million. (*The Far East Year Book* 1941, The Far East Year Book Inc. Tokyo, 1941, p. 44.) On the basis of an estimated annual increase of one million, the population is taken to be approximately 79 million in 1945.

the most crashing blunders, is a contradiction in terms. Not thus does it appear to the Japanese, whose Emperor (in addition to assuming no political responsibility in the exercise of his prerogatives) must be protected, by unstinted resort to assassination, from well-intentioned but deluded advisers. In theory the Japanese regard infallibility as an attribute of the dynasty rather than of the individual Emperor; but, in practice, and among the masses, the Emperor himself probably is thought to possess this attribute, subject always to the receipt of good or bad advice.

A constitutional monarchy with a liberal administration as outlined above, might indeed be the most favourable solution in the interests of Japan and the world; though under capable democratic government, this dynamic and readily organized nation of eighty millions could scarcely fail to become once more a power in Asia within a few decades. On the whole, however, such a development seems unlikely, at least in the immediate post-war period, when armed power and organization may still be the monopoly of the militarists and their satellites of the patriotic societies. It seems more probable that there will intervene a longer or shorter period of social and political confusion. In this interlude the Throne itself might disappear.

A few words about the Imperial Household Department seem here in place. The annual Civil List of yen 4.5 million has remained unchanged for the last fifty years, but the Household Department is in fact a capitalist business organization, controlling vast forests and estates and large investments in Japanese enterprises, ranging from the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo to the Yawata Steel Works. It seems justifiable to assume that the Imperial fortunes have benefited financially through Japanese aggressions.

The Constitution

This survey would not be complete without a reference to the Japanese Constitution. This was the creation of Prince Itō (himself a staunch upholder of Imperial divine status and prerogative) on the model of the archaic Prussian Constitution of 1850, and at a time when the political education of the Japanese people was even more immature than at present. A most important provision is embodied in the preamble to the effect that amendment to the Constitution can only be initiated by the Emperor¹, and the influence of reaction has, in fact, precluded any amendment during the sixty years since its promulgation. It is, however, highly important that the Diet should have the

¹ See N. Matsunami, *The Constitution of Japan* (Tokyo, 1930), p. 18.

power to initiate and approve amendments. Article XI invests the Emperor with supreme command of the Army and Navy; and Article XII provides that he shall determine the organization and peace standing of the forces¹. These prerogatives have been much extended and abused in practice, and the existing system under which they are exercised through the Chiefs of Staff and Service Ministers has no express sanction in the text of the Constitution. In the opinion of Dr. Takeuchi "... the system constitutes an important exception to, if not a violation of, the basic principles of constitutional government, and ... a new system of civilian control of military affairs might be instituted without amendment of the Constitution."²

In the London Naval Agreement of 1930, Mr. Hamaguchi's Cabinet actually had the temerity to assert this civilian control, and the precedent might have led to the natural death of a pernicious system, had not the Manchurian Incident supervened shortly afterwards. Similarly, the 'dual system' whereby the two Chiefs of Staff (and by later extension the Service Ministers) have direct access to the Emperor, without the necessity of consulting or even informing the Cabinet, does not rest on the Constitution and has from time to time been the target of strong public criticism. Other extra-Constitutional and reactionary excrescences are the system which prescribes that the Service Ministers must be Generals or Admirals on the active list; and the power gradually acquired by the Privy Council to override the Diet and interfere in the execution of policy.

These causes, combined with the political immaturity of the Japanese electorate (to which manhood suffrage was nominally extended in 1925), reduced the Diet to virtual impotence in the nineteen-thirties, and its reconstitution upon democratic lines will be impossible until they are eliminated, and even then will be a slow process. As already noted, Dr. Minobé (who was by no means alone in his criticisms of the Constitution) wrote a book in 1923 contending, in opposition to the school of Imperial absolutism founded by Prince Itō, that sovereignty resides in the State, and that the Emperor is an organ of the State. The facts that the Emperor bestowed high honours upon the author of these views, and that the public only discovered after a lapse of twelve years, and under the stimulus of nationalist propaganda that they were disloyal, suggests that the opposition evoked was somewhat artificial. On repeated occasions during this century, the operation of the Constitution has demonstrated that its

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

² Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1935), p. 15.

revision and re-interpretation are essential if a satisfactory relationship is to be created between Japan and foreign States, and if the Japanese people are to be given an opportunity to develop the institutions of freedom. Revision would, of course, be opposed by the armed forces and the reactionary societies; but once these are reduced to their appropriate influence in the State, or liquidated (processes which, one may hope, will be expedited by defeat), it may not prove too difficult to accomplish, since there was public criticism of the Constitution prior to 1930 and educated opinion sometimes came out quite strongly in favour of reform.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMED FORCES

THE Army and Navy of Japan enjoy a degree of prestige and power for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in other countries. Elsewhere, decisions of high national importance may rest with Parliament or a dictator, with financial or labour interests; in Japan it is those in control of the armed forces of the Emperor who have the final word, and their fiat is accepted without question by the nation. This pervading influence has recently been more conspicuous in the case of the Army owing to its wider popular basis of recruitment, and its exploits in Manchuria and China during the decade preceding the Pacific War, but traditionally the power of the Navy has been scarcely less strong, and has been applied to the furtherance of the same ideals.

The Feudal Background

Although, in the feudal age preceding the Restoration of 1868, there existed in Japan no national Army and Navy owing allegiance to the Emperor, popular veneration for martial qualities was fostered during the centuries of isolation through the samurai code. With the recognition of the bearing of arms as an aristocratic privilege, the cleavage deepened between the submissive masses and the few whose title it was to command. Superiority of the military caste thus became part of the national structure long before clan allegiance gave place to allegiance to the Emperor, and while military exploits were still tribal, rather than patriotic in character. The qualities of courage and implicit loyalty to a leader, and the duty of the warrior to sell his life dearly rather than surrender, were exalted at the same early stage into a mystical code.

The doctrines of Motoori and Yoshida Shōin in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries thus had no novelty for the Japanese, in so far as they related to the military virtues. For the soldier, clan loyalty was to be merged in a more comprehensive national loyalty, and allegiance was to be transferred from the feudal lord to the divine successor in an eternal and unbroken line of Commanders-in-Chief. In their call for recognition of the Imperial prerogative over the armed forces, and their emphasis on territorial expansion, these doctrines were the seed which yielded the militarism and imperialism of the post-Restoration epoch. After

periods of struggle and occasional set-backs, it was destined to bear fruit in a succession of predatory adventures on the adjacent mainland; and finally (as we believe) to wither in an abortive and megalomaniac attempt to establish Japanese hegemony throughout eastern Asia.

The Genesis of the Imperial Forces

Intimate association of the armed forces with the Emperor and the national Shintō cult, and the enforcement of conscription, were the means through which the Kōgun (Imperial Army and Navy) was raised to a unique position in Japanese national life during the fifty years following the Restoration. In adopting the conscript system which had proved its efficiency in the German victory over France in 1870-71, the Meiji statesmen showed that traditional respect for material success which has been characteristic of Japan's expansionist career. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to ascribe this militarist innovation purely to aggressive design. Without the creation of strong Imperial armaments, the Restoration Government might have found it difficult either to liquidate the lingering semi-independent pretensions of the feudal chiefs, or to preserve the national integrity in a period when European Powers were energetically expanding their territorial and other interests in Asia.

The new military system was only four years old when, in 1877, its strength was demonstrated by the victory of the Imperial Army over the rebel Satsuma clan. This served to establish the Kōgun in popular estimation, and to secure for it recognition as an institution more intimately linked to the Imperial virtue, and consequently less subject to criticism, than other organs in the State. The Meiji Emperor's *Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors* of 1881, the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, and an uninterrupted series of victories abroad, watered the soil in which this seed was sown, until the seed itself flowered in the emotion approaching worship with which the Emperor's Army and Navy came in later years to be regarded by his subjects.

Fifty Years of Victory

The military and naval successes (or successes due directly to the possession of armed might) which followed the establishment of Imperial forces on a conscript basis, convinced even the less chauvinist among the Japanese that the policy of adopting the militarist features of Western civilization had been amply justified. By grace, as it seemed, of a divine leader and a divine mission combined with transcendent racial characteristics, Japanese fighting men surpassed those of the West in courage, devotion

and efficiency. This conviction deepened as triumph over Russia followed triumph over China, as Formosa and Korea were won for the Empire, and as participation in the first World War yielded rich dividends unattended by sacrifice.

Though the prestige of the Services receded to some extent during the brief flowering of liberal ideals in the nineteen-twenties, foreign opposition to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China stimulated a xenophobic resolution to substitute force for pacific diplomacy, and enabled the military leaders to arouse popular enthusiasm for a programme of territorial expansion which culminated in 1941 in the Pacific War. In the sixty-eight years between the introduction of conscription and the attack on Pearl Harbour, Japan had sustained no purely military reverses; and, although by the end of this period the recalcitrance of the unmartial Chinese may have aroused vague misgivings, it had become a settled Japanese conviction that military operations overseas must necessarily prove a paying proposition. Suggestions from the democratic West that imperialist nationalism was out of harmony with modern tendencies could be countered by Japanese militarists with accusations of Western 'insincerity', and their arguments gained strength from the obstacles which had been placed in the way of Japanese trade and emigration, and from the political developments abroad of the decade following Japan's resignation from the League of Nations.

Relation of the Armed Forces to the Emperor

For more than sixty years the conception of the Emperor as the fountain-head of military virtue and as the father of the soldiers and sailors, which is the theme of the Rescript of 1881, has been preached incessantly in and out of the forces. It has been adopted as the basis of the *seishin kyoiku* (spiritual training) of the soldier and sailor and extended to the relationship between every officer and his subordinates, with the object of convincing the latter that they have for General the earthly representative of the Godhead, and for Captain a divinely appointed leader. Without the impetus provided by this association of the services with the divine virtue of which the Emperor is the earthly custodian, it is improbable they would have become, as they have, an obsession of the national imagination. Such ideals could not thrive where a democratic spirit existed, but the degree to which they are sincerely held and acted upon in Japan can hardly be overestimated. It is perhaps for this reason that, although uneasiness at military encroachment upon the sphere of civil authority did exist among the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, and in business circles in the early nineteen-thirties, there has never

been in Japan the widespread popular fear of that encroachment which has constituted such a powerful deterrent to military pretensions in the Western democracies. To the same cause may be ascribed the traditional military attitudes of opposition to representative institutions, and of aloofness from the civil powers, which have been such a fertile source of reaction.

The Supreme Command

The prerogative of the Emperor as the supreme commander of the Army and Navy is defined in Articles XI and XII of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. No mention is made there of the channels through which that prerogative is to be exercised, but the general form of the Constitution, as well as contemporary evidence, indicate that its framers had no intention of placing control over military matters in the hands of the civil government. The Imperial ordinances which accord to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs the right of direct access to the Emperor (on matters of grave importance within their competence) are contemporaneous with the Constitution. The other mainstay of military independence from civil control (the rule that the Ministers of War and Marine shall be general officers or admirals on the active list) was not embodied in an ordinance until 1894; but the practice had always been followed before that date, and, in spite of a temporary modification in 1912 to include officers on the reserve list, it has never been deviated from since. The other channels of advice to the Emperor (the Board of Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet, the Supreme Military Council, and in wartime, Imperial General Headquarters) are all composed of military and naval officers, though their deliberations are by no means confined to service affairs.

The Influence of State Shintō

The association of the State Shintō cult, and of the Emperor as its High Priest, with the armed forces is to some extent a political device designed to exalt the prestige of the latter in popular imagination. But the Shintō religion above all embodies those principles upon which Japanese soldiers and sailors are taught, and which are intended to be exemplified by their conduct in battle. Through the doctrines of the supreme importance of loyalty and obedience, of the insignificance of the individual life, of the undying shame of surrender, and of the immortality among the tutelary spirits of Japan reserved for those who die in battle, the fighting man has been provided with a unique ethical background. It is with the object of impregnating the national imagination with these doctrines that the Yasukuni Shrine in

Tokyo has been sedulously enveloped in the hallowed atmosphere of a national pantheon. This extravagant code of moral principles, which finds no parallel in other countries, protects the Japanese soldier from the moral conflicts which are apt in war to beset the believer in a universal religion. Rigid training in these beliefs, together with a life of great austerity, has produced the type of valour ('human bombs', deliberate crashing of aircraft on enemy targets, suicide in preference to surrender, and so forth) which has come to be regarded as typical of the Japanese conscript.

The close integration of the conscript forces with the national structure ensures acceptance of their ideals of military virtue by a great majority of the people. These ideals are upheld by the three million members of the Ex-Servicemen's Association and taught intensively in all schools throughout the Empire. Propaganda, either carried out directly by the military authorities (in the form of pamphlets, films and lectures, ceremonies accompanying the entrance of recruits into military life and enshrinements of fallen heroes in the national pantheon), or indirectly by the stream of time-expired conscripts returning each year to their homes, assists this process of indoctrination. It is not too much to suppose, therefore, that neither defeat in the present war nor the application of sanctions and a physical system of Far Eastern security, will suffice to solve the problem of Japanese militarism so long as this mentality persists.

Political and Popular Influence

Frequent use has been made by the armed forces of their privileged constitutional position to impose their views on military or quasi-military matters upon Japanese Cabinets, and to secure the approval of the Diet for expenditure which they have regarded as necessary in the national interest. For some time, it is true, the Meiji Edict restricting the intervention of military men in politics was generally respected; but dissatisfaction with the maintenance by diplomatic means of Japanese prestige abroad, and sympathy with the economic plight of the peasantry, have provoked an increasing degree of political agitation by military groups during the past two decades, and the Edict has now been ingeniously explained away. Though the Navy has in general been more restrained than the Army in political intervention, its influence is constantly at work behind the scenes and was forcefully exerted in connection with the London and Washington Naval Treaties. It is noteworthy, however, that in most of the instances in which the constitutional conflict between the civil powers and the Services has come to the surface, the issues have been solved by compromise. By adopting the device of demand-

ing in the first instance more than they actually expected to obtain, or by accepting formal modifications provided they gained the substance of their demands, the Service authorities have usually avoided endangering their position by a stubborn exercise of their power which would dislocate the machinery of government.

Agitation and assassination have been the methods by which a maze of reactionary civilian leagues and officers' associations have given expression to the Army's political aspirations. It is sufficient to say here of these organizations that in general the less extreme have tended to give way to the more extreme; and that their members have combined muddled economic theory and high ideals with a practice or toleration of violence and murder which has never been equalled in the West. In fact these societies exemplify the Japanese national conviction that the 'pure heart' justifies the means. Some of their political beliefs, however (notably the advocacy of a restoration of primitive Imperial rule and of the creation of a kind of peasant aristocracy), are probably representative of the desires of the inarticulate majority in the armed forces.

The design of such factions has been to discredit the Western democracies for their alleged 'insincerity', the advisers of the Throne for their short-sighted timidity, the zaibatsu for their cupidity, and the professional politicians for their venality. This has proved an effective appeal to the public, who have shown readiness to tolerate indiscipline and outrage on the part of members of the armed forces provided they are concealed under an idealistic cloak, and to ignore the instances of corruption revealed from time to time within those forces themselves.

The series of political outrages which began with the murder of the Premier, Hamaguchi, in 1930 and ended with the mutiny of 1936, appears never seriously to have weakened the hold of the Services and their doctrines upon the nation. This, like the success of the militarists in diverting to their own ends such things as the development of the labour movement and the communist appeal, may be due to the political inertia and the respect for the warrior class which long tradition has made typical of the Japanese people. Any tendency to oppose the military has also been weakened by the fact that Servicemen in general practice the austerity, frugality and devotion to the Emperor which their leaders preach. For this reason, they are less susceptible to public criticism than other sections of Japanese society.

With the disappearance of the samurai tradition of feudal times the officer class has been much diluted, and commissions in the Services are now mainly held by men from small bourgeois and farming circles. The officers are paid very little and their lives

are almost as austere and frugal as those of their men. These facts lend colour to a superficial notion that a spirit of democracy exists in the forces which is lacking elsewhere. Closer examination, however, seems to lead to the conclusion that this idea is mistaken, for the conditions mentioned exist within an elaborate hierarchy which is the reverse of democratic, and which is based upon the conception of a paternal relationship between each individual and his immediate inferior.

It is true that the poverty of the officers, and the extent to which they, like the men under their command, are recruited from the peasantry, has induced a strong sympathy in the Army and Navy with the agrarian community. But negative control of 'dangerous thought' (which includes democratic thought in the Western sense) has long been enforced in the Services as a parallel to positive spiritual training in loyalty and obedience. It follows that, although in the conditions likely to arise after defeat the Japanese soldier or sailor could probably be relied upon for greater stability and discipline than his fellow citizens, he would not necessarily display greater powers of adaptability to new political ideas. The relationship between officers and men is, in fact, not of such a nature as would in itself assist the establishment of a democratic régime.

Centralization of Military Control

Foreign observers have sometimes thought that the apparent independence of the General Staff and War Department in Tokyo, which has been shown on occasions by Japanese forces in Manchuria and elsewhere overseas, is indicative of a tendency towards decentralization and of a reversion to factional allegiance in the Army. Cases of independent action have undoubtedly occurred, and at crucial times. Instances are the Manchurian border warfare with the Russians between 1934 and 1939 and the earlier developments in the 'Manchurian Incident' in 1931 and the war with China in 1937. It seems probable, however, that these incidents resulted not from any lack of unity of control, but from a recourse by the Army as a whole to the expedient (characteristic both of Japan in her dealings with foreign countries and of her Army in its dealings with the Government) of taking a desired but unorthodox step in the hope that, at the worst, only partial withdrawal would be necessary, and that, at the best, force of circumstances might render any withdrawal impossible. In the instances mentioned above, it was no doubt convenient for the military authorities in Tokyo to be able to assure the Cabinet (and for the latter to feign belief) that the local commanders had exceeded their powers. The whole procedure is typically and

mischievously Japanese. So far as the Kwantung Army is concerned, frequent transfers of units and changes of command have always taken place, and the possibility of the force becoming divorced in sympathies and action from the rest of the Japanese Army is not one that has ever been seriously considered by the military leaders in Tokyo. Indeed, most of the latter have themselves served for the usual short period in Manchuria.

Prospects after Defeat

The reaction of the Japanese armed forces to defeat must depend, not only upon the circumstances of that defeat and the terms imposed by the victors, but also upon the type of government which may emerge in Japan and their own relations with that government. The conjectures which follow are therefore highly speculative in character. When defeat finally stares the people of Japan in the face, various excuses are likely to be made for the disaster. Scapegoats may be sought, but the leaders of the Army and Navy will hardly figure among them. Eventually, the people may reach the conviction that their political, and even their military, leadership has been defective, but their faith in the armed forces, like their faith in the Emperor, will not be easily shaken. The families and the villages from which men have gone forth to fight will continue to believe in the 'Holy War', and to reverence the valour of resistance against desperate odds.

The Army and Navy are highly centralized in their organization. For this reason, although resistance might possibly be continued after the official capitulation, for instance by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria (and this might be justified on the familiar ground that the Emperor, in sanctioning surrender, had been misled), it seems probable that the struggle could only be continued in the Emperor's name. It is even conceivable that the Army might make the Emperor a virtual prisoner when defeat became imminent. Dissension within the Services, or between Army and Navy, is not unlikely; leaders returning from overseas commands may quarrel with the survivors among those officers in Japan who countenanced the surrender. Patriotic suicides may be very numerous but are unlikely to dispose of more than a small fraction of the officers; among the rank and file they will be proportionately rarer. In the absence of any immediate rallying-point (such as the Emperor, an Imperial Prince, or a leader who can convincingly claim to interpret the Imperial will) disintegration in the Army may set in; most would return to their homes, but large bands of guerrillas and patriotic swashbucklers would come into existence. In this connection, it is of interest to consider the prospects of absorbing the large officer class into civil life after

defeat. Demobilized and unemployed officers are certain to provide a fertile source of unrest for some time after the war, but if economic equilibrium can be re-established, the agricultural and middle-class connections of Japanese officers should make the long-term solution of the problem less difficult than that of the German Junker.

In domestic emergencies of the past, the Services have shown themselves to be a stable element in the nation. This may prove to be the case also in the internal crises which will follow defeat, provided there is acceptable national leadership. It is, indeed, difficult to see what force within Japan could replace the military in maintaining order and organizing the essentials of national life, such as food supplies and transport, in the period of confusion immediately after capitulation.

An administration set up without Imperial sanction, or one which depended for its existence upon a foreign army of occupation, would probably not be able to command the support of what was left of the Army and Navy. On the other hand, a constitutionally appointed Government of Imperial-socialist, agricultural, or even liberal tendencies might receive unobtrusive military backing, irrespective of its compliance with the conditions of capitulation. In such circumstances, the herd mentality of the Japanese (particularly marked among soldiers) should induce the bulk of the Army to follow the course set by high-ranking officers. Opposition to an advanced liberal régime might, it is true, develop amongst the regimental officers. The latter are, as a class, narrow-minded and ignorant of world conditions, and they would be disinclined by tradition and disposition to support any genuinely democratic administration. As a general principle, Japanese political conditions suggest that something more than a mere absence of military opposition would be necessary in order to enable any post-war government to survive. Essential maintenance of authority and discipline would demand a degree of active military support, especially in view of the weakness of all civilian political groups and the general tendency to shirk responsibility. If the Army should refuse its support to whatever Government is established, large and influential military factions might make common cause with extremist groups of the population, with results which would be serious both for Japan and the outside world.

An attempt by the victors to deprive the armed forces of their national prestige would almost inevitably defeat its own ends and lead to their being acclaimed as martyrs. Popular belief in the transcendent merits of the Imperial forces is part of the militarist obsession of the Japanese imagination. It is very doubtful

whether these symptoms of a national disease could be removed by external pressure, though they might disappear in process of time, or assume rational proportions through a programme of re-education carried out under a constitutional government presided over by the present Emperor or some other member of the Imperial family. It would be too optimistic to expect much change of heart in the present generation, but eventually the unbalanced fanaticism of the armed forces might be eradicated and the qualities of discipline and devotion which they possess might be diverted to constructive purposes in the national life.

Experience of attempts in other parts of the world to re-mould national characteristics by the application of pressure from without, and the relationship peculiar to Japan between the armed forces and the national structure, make it doubtful whether the elimination of militarism, which is essential if the Japanese are not to remain a dangerous source of unrest in Asia, can be accomplished through a foreign effort to destroy the influence of those forces, and to discredit them in the eyes of a nation by which they have been regarded for almost three generations with almost religious emotion. Rather is it probable, if the Japanese are not to be deprived in the stress of defeat of the qualities of stability and discipline which the armed forces alone may prove to possess, that success may lie along some intermediate path between this uncompromising attitude and a toleration of their hitherto exaggerated influence.

CHAPTER III

NATIONALIST SOCIETIES

Categories and Activities of Nationalist Organizations

NATIONALIST societies and organizations of varying patterns have been a disturbing element in Japanese political life ever since the Restoration. They are in keeping both with the characteristic herd-structure, and with the tendency to anonymity in the direction of public and private affairs. Operating in a dual direction they have constantly been employed as agencies for whipping up public opinion to the requisite enthusiasm in support of militarist designs; and as the medium through which militarist or reactionary pressure has been brought to bear upon a civil administration inclined to appeasement abroad or popular reform at home. It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree to which, through intrigue, propaganda, terrorism and espionage, these organizations have influenced Japanese policy during the sixty years of her imperialist career.

The organizations which may conveniently be grouped under the heading of nationalist societies cover a wide range and differ greatly in character. At one end of the scale, out in the open, are respectable though reactionary political bodies such as the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society), which has had distinguished patronage and a long connection with the Tokyo Imperial University; shrouded in obscurity at the other end are definitely terrorist groups, such as the Hakuro-kai (Society of the White Wolf) and the Sekisei-kai (League of the Single Heart). Between these two extremes is the vast network of the Ex-Servicemen's Association which, in addition to serving the purposes of similar organizations in other countries, constitutes the eyes and ears of the Army in every town and village of the Empire. The Japan Youth Federation, under the leadership of the notorious reactionary, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, was formed as recently as 1938 to forge from the rising generation an instrument of nationalist fanaticism on the Nazi model. Finally, there is the maze of gangs and cliques, sometimes loosely described as 'secret', which form the stronghold of extreme Nipponism.

It is these latter entities and the terrorist groups with which this chapter is principally concerned. They merit the description 'secret' in so far as most of them have an inner or esoteric section, the tenets of which are known only to elected members, but in many cases their official histories and the biographies of their

leaders have been published. In fact, since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, some of these societies have sought, rather than shunned, the limelight.

Although the Restoration of 1868 brought the collapse of the feudal system and with it the disfranchisement of the privileged samurai class, the Japanese tendency to change the form and retain the substance resulted in many of the features of the old society being carried over into the new. Thus, the new political leadership was almost exclusively samurai in character, and was largely recruited from the two clans of Satsuma and Choshu, which had been responsible for the revival of Imperial authority. Outside this privileged circle of power were the mass of dispossessed samurai of the three hundred odd clans, who chafed at their loss of privilege and at their impecunious circumstances, and for whom the new order seemed to hold out no prospects of advancement. For the only calling these men knew was that of arms and, even after the introduction of conscription, the standing army was at first too small to give employment to more than a fraction of them. To these material discontents, and to jealousy of the power of Satsuma and Choshu, opposition to the Meiji programme of social reform and to the spread of Western influence added ideological causes of unrest. From this hotbed of political agitation a shifting pattern of cliques and gangs began to emerge; and since the worst crimes are condoned in Japan so long as the fiction of the 'pure heart' is preserved, they adopted a variety of 'patriotic' cloaks for disreputable and self-seeking activities. The earliest of these cliques appeared in Fukuoka, which is incidentally the birthplace of Mitsuru Toyama, to whom must be accorded high rank in the gangster hierarchy of history. Later on, when Japan acquired a Constitution and a Diet, these organizations allied themselves with one or other of the political parties (in whose election campaigns gangster support seldom came amiss), or espoused for a consideration some dubious aspect of the cause of political emancipation. Leaders of these societies have been ever since the lords of the Japanese under-world (with its focus in the licensed quarters) and while blackmail and pimping were among their normal sources of revenue, they were usually ready to bump off a politician if it was made worth their while. At this early stage the societies seem to have had little connection with the Army.

Empire-building by Societies

The earliest of the post-Restoration societies was the Genyosha (Blue Ocean Society) formed in 1881;¹ but it was destined soon

¹ See E. H. Norman, 'The Genyosha: Origins of Japanese Imperialism', *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1944, p. 246.

to be overshadowed by a more notorious offspring, the Kokuryukai (picturesquely rendered in English as 'Black Dragon Society' but more accurately translated as 'Amur Society'), under the ægis of Ryohei Uchida. The fortunes of these societies and of their numerous later imitators waxed and waned with political trends at home and abroad. Their members have never shown signs of possessing either constructive political ideas or the courage for which the Japanese fighting man is distinguished.

From the outset, the societies were anti-foreign and took active, if unorthodox, interest in Japan's foreign policy (into which it was their constant endeavour to inject an aggressive element by unscrupulous and even criminal devices); they were intriguing to bring about the annexation of Korea as early as 1874 and had a part in precipitating both the war with China in 1894, and that with Russia in 1904. Neither Prince Itō nor Prince Yamagata hesitated to employ the societies in political intrigue in Korea and China, and Uchida's 'China Ronin' were conspicuous on the Asiatic continental scene for twenty years. Drug traffic, prostitution, smuggling and blackmail have been habitually employed in Japanese Imperial interests adroitly combined with illicit private profit. Political unrest in China and India also excited their hardly altruistic sympathies, and both Toyama and Uchida befriended Chinese and Indian revolutionary leaders who sought refuge in Japan. At home they continued to dabble profitably in internal politics, and party politicians have frequently reached Cabinet rank through their support. On the other hand, the societies were wont to contract violent political antipathies and, either directly or indirectly, were involved in most of the political assassinations which have habitually disfigured Japanese political life. Notwithstanding their thinly veiled criminal record, the societies (and especially the more notorious among their leaders), were regarded with mingled fear and respect by responsible Japanese statesmen, and they secured immunity from official interference to a degree inconceivable in Western countries. The nonagenarian Mitsuru Toyama, for instance, has long been a revered and patriarchal figure. Cabinet Ministers obey his admonitions or invite him to dine, and he often figures in the list of guests attending Imperial garden parties.

This was roughly the position up to the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The tempest of aggressive nationalism which engulfed Japan after that year carried patriotic gangsterdom to its heyday. There came into being a spate of reactionary societies, too numerous, kaleidoscopic and ephemeral to mention by name, though their influence in creating the background against which the China War and the attack upon

Great Britain and the United States were staged, must not be underrated. Civilian gangs allied themselves with extremist, Young Officer, factions in the Army and Navy; and in some instances exclusively military societies were formed. Together they formed a maze of interlocking organizations, the membership of which fluctuated from month to month and defies attempt to estimate. Trimming their sails to prevailing ideological winds, some assumed a national-socialist, others a pseudo-proletarian complexion; and the tempo of assassination and terrorism kept pace with the artificially stimulated 'national emergency'. By 1939 they had served their purpose and presumably achieved their objectives; when the Army took charge they moved back-stage.

Extremist Societies after the War

As to the future after defeat, two observations are called for. The first is that gangs, cliques, clubs and societies are a national institution in Japan; they exist in the armed forces, in labour organizations, in schools and universities, and in politics. They are a part of the pyramidal Japanese structure; whereas from one Japanese little emerges, from a group of Japanese much may emerge. Loyalty, though theoretically attaching to the Throne, in practice attaches to the section leader. Secondly, it is possible to foresee, in the political and social atmosphere of defeat, close approximation to the situation at the time of the Restoration, which caused the evolution of the latter-day patriotic society from the dispossessed samurai. Just as unemployment and unadaptability to changed social conditions among the samurai class were sources of unrest after the Restoration, so after the present war and on a far larger scale, tens of thousands of officers, civilian hangers-on of militarism and unemployed university graduates may present a serious social problem, unless (which seems improbable) they can be rapidly absorbed into useful occupations. For instance, a breakdown of central authority, by depriving the Japanese of the paternal guidance upon which they have been taught to rely, would give the existing societies (or new ones formed to meet the emergency) an opportunity which their past record suggests that they would not be slow to exploit. It may be that the most serious danger of civil conflict will lie in a clash of interests between a destitute urban population and a less unfortunate peasantry with control over the sources of food supply. The irresponsibility of the reactionary societies makes it difficult to predict which side they would take in this anarchy, but the officer class would be likely to throw in their lot with the peasantry whose origins so many of them share. In the event of the

emergence of a government unacceptable to the Army (as, for instance, a régime not based upon Imperial authority or one imposed upon Japan by foreign pressure), the military opposition might find its focus in the purely Service societies, such as the Kozakura-kai (Little Cherry Society), an organization of junior officers which was implicated in the mutiny of February 1936, and the Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei (Imperial League of Young Officers).

The part that the nationalist societies may play in maintaining resistance within Japan in the last stages of the war and in exploiting the turmoil of defeat, is one that it would be unsafe to ignore. The more promptly a stable government, acceptable to the Japanese people and with military means of enforcing its authority, is restored after defeat, the less opportunity will be afforded for those dangerous elements to make mischief. But the removal of the causes of unrest seems to lie in the re-absorption of demobilized officers into civil life and the provision of unemployment for the many thousands of graduates turned out year after year by the universities, among whom there has been chronic under-employment even in times of prosperity and imperialist expansion.

CHAPTER IV

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND POLICE

Centralized Civil Administration

JAPAN possesses a highly centralized civil administrative system which forms in some respects a counterpoise to the power of the armed forces within the State. This system was modelled in the main on that of France, for, whereas in regard to the relations between the Throne and the Diet the example of Germany was considered most suitable for adoption by the Meiji reformers, the rights retained by the component States in the old German Empire as established in 1871 were contrary to the thorough-going centralism which they desired to substitute for the feudal structure of Tokugawa Japan. For this purpose the French system of prefectures strictly controlled from the capital by a Ministry of the Interior was preferred. The extreme centralization of government in Japan is in fact quite well suited to the country, not only because of its relatively small area, but also because of the homogeneity of the people, and it cannot be said that there is any known movement for local autonomy in Japan; on the other hand, the change from the old feudal particularism to the system imposed during the Meiji period was very drastic and abrupt, and it is possible that, if the latter were to break down under the strain of national defeat, local traditions and loyalties, especially in Kyūshū, Shikoku and the Chugoku, would prove to have an unsuspected latent strength.

Japan Proper is divided into forty-six prefectures; under these there were in 1938, 9,524 villages (*mura*), 1,711 towns (*machi*) and 146 cities (*shi*).¹ The prefectural governors are appointed and controlled by the Home Minister, though the Prime Minister also has a certain power of supervision over them; they are assisted by elected prefectural assemblies which are called once a year to deliberate on the annual budget of the prefecture and on the general policies of the governor. These prefectural assemblies date from 1878; they are thus twelve years older than the national Diet and they should not be overlooked in estimating Japan's capacity either for democratic self-government or for setting up local centres of resistance to an Allied occupation. In normal times their activities are confined within fairly narrow limits and

¹ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941 (The Far East Year Book Inc., Tokyo, 1941), p. 71.

the prefectural governor, acting on instructions from Tokyo, has the deciding voice in most matters of local administration.

Cities, towns and villages have their elected councils with mayors or headmen indirectly elected through the councils. The mayors and city councils of places such as Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya are of considerable importance, but they are kept strictly subordinate to the prefectural governors and do not control the police forces within the city limits.

The Civil Police Force and the Kempeitai

Control of the police is perhaps the most important factor in Japanese civil administration because they have far-reaching powers in regulating and supervising the lives of citizens, and deference is paid to them by the masses as the immediate representatives of the authority of the State. The civil police (who numbered 67,000 in 1938)¹ do not belong to local authorities, but are a national force directly controlled by the Home Ministry, the Chief Police Inspector being an official of the Home Ministry directly responsible to the Minister. The police of Tokyo are specially linked with the Home Ministry and are separately organized from those of the rest of the country.

The special characteristics of the Japanese police are largely due to the historical origins of the force. Under the Tokugawa, both in the territories directly ruled by the Shōgun, and in the fiefs, there was an elaborate police system, of which espionage on the private affairs of the people was a prominent feature; the remarkable stability and order achieved by the régime stands to the credit of the system, but it was undoubtedly oppressive and arbitrary in operation. In the Meiji period the system inherited from the Tokugawa was used to establish central control against local feudal recalcitrance; it was thus regarded for a long time as a semi-military organization auxiliary to the newly-formed national Army, and its military character was accentuated by the fact that after the samurai were disbanded as a privileged military caste, many of them took service either with the police or in the Army and brought into both forces their traditions and habits of mind. The Japanese police have retained this stamp ever since and the centralized control to which they are subject—similar to a system of military command—intensifies their military outlook.

The civil police are nevertheless to be distinguished from the gendarmerie or kempeitai, who form part of the Army and are under the control of the War Ministry. The latter have—at least in peace time—only a very restricted scope within Japan itself,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

but, as they are empowered to deal with cases of espionage, they have been conspicuous in some recent episodes involving foreigners. The main activity of the gendarmerie, however, has been outside Japan in territories under Japanese colonial rule or military occupation, and there they have made for themselves a name rivalling that of the Gestapo in infamy. They use torture freely and do not appear to be bound by any rules of procedure or administrative regulations; they rely on the protection of the Army against all civilian claims for redress. It is probable that the victorious Allies will insist on the abolition of the gendarmerie as now constituted; at any rate, it will no longer have populations of Chinese, Koreans, Formosans and others on which to work its will. As compared with the gendarmerie, the civil police in Japan are relatively well-behaved; nevertheless, their attitude towards the public is essentially authoritarian and they use judicial torture to a certain extent, though probably not more than it is used in most other Asiatic countries.

The Civil Service

The Japanese civil service is elaborately organized and forms a single system for the whole country; it is based on competitive examinations and draws much of the best talent from the universities into official life. Its most striking feature is the existence of official ranks which are attached to offices, but are partly distinct from them; the highest rank is that of *shinnin*, below which come the grades of *chokunin*, *sonin* and *hannin*. This system of ranks is really an inheritance from pre-Meiji Japan, though its form is modern; as it includes all those who serve the Emperor in an official capacity, the ranking applies to Cabinet Ministers and Privy Councillors as well as to civil servants in the narrower sense, and this tends to merge the Government in the bureaucracy—the more so as civil servants frequently obtain Cabinet office.

Although the Japanese civil servant can thus enter politics, the 'spoils system' has in the past been successfully kept out of the civil service by regulations which have given civil servants great security of tenure and prevented changes of administrative personnel due to political favour. This, however, has had the adverse effect of inducing excessive routinism and a disposition to obstruct new measures which the bureaucracy as a whole finds distasteful. The bureaucracy has a strong esprit de corps; it has little or no sense of responsibility to the Diet, but it has always been strongly averse to being subjected to control by the Army, and co-ordination between the Civilian and Service Departments seems to be even more difficult to achieve in Japan than elsewhere.

The Army, for their part, continually show an exasperated impatience with the civil authorities; in their ideal, military discipline provides a pattern for all spheres of life and all problems can easily be solved if someone barks out orders and sees that everybody obeys them. These opinions of 'our soldier friends' are regarded by the civilian bureaucrats as the illusions of unteachable children.

The Administrative Services in Defeat

Military defeat will not affect the civil service and police in the way that it will affect the Army, and there will be many officials who will no doubt be ready to carry on in their posts and do their best to keep the administration functioning effectively. Their cohesion, discipline and habits of State service would make them a strong force of national unity and stability, even if the monarchy were to be overthrown, while the high standard of education characteristic of their upper grades would make it tolerably easy for Allied occupation authorities to establish working relations with them. On the other hand, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the whole of the official superstructure has so artificial a character that it might go to pieces with startling suddenness, giving way to new organs of authority formed locally in the midst of utter chaos and confusion. There is a danger that any Government which appeared too obviously to be acting under the control of Allied occupying forces would be repudiated by Japanese patriotic sentiment and that a formidable maquis would nullify its authority over the greater part of the country.

CHAPTER V

JAPANESE LIBERALS¹

The Japanese Outlook

THE Japanese are realists; they accept the world as it is. Man is viewed as an animal among animals. The aims of life are threefold: to perpetuate the race and achieve its greater glory; to order society so as to achieve the maximum of harmony between individuals (whence springs the importance of appearances and the inordinate emphasis on 'face'); and to achieve social conformity with the laws of nature. Confucius set out to sum up the wisdom of the ancients and to regulate society in the most perfect manner possible. The regulation of society was an end in itself: it was civilization. The Emperor of China was the keystone of this philosophic system. He summed up the nation and he was also its High Priest; his task was to perform correctly the rites and ceremonies. National disaster indicated that the Emperor had failed in his task and that the virtue had departed from him. In such circumstances the Chinese were right in doing away with him.

The Japanese in borrowing the Chinese system of philosophy did not discard their own strong biological tradition. Their isolation led them to regard themselves as different from others; tradition assigned their origins to gods, while the head of their race claimed direct descent from the Sun Goddess herself. In their acceptance of the world the Japanese accept their own intrinsic difference from others. They argue that they cannot alter their parentage nor the physiological peculiarities of their race. They are a people apart and the highest being among them, the Emperor, is the highest living being of whom they can conceive and he is to them the living representative of the heroes of Japan and of the gods who brought forth the Japanese islands and race.

Loyalty to this being is in theory the highest virtue. In practice, loyalty to the head of the family, to the head of the clan, to the head of whatsoever association the individual finds himself in, replaces, in normal circumstances, loyalty to the Throne. This loyalty is limited in that it attaches to a superior—or rather loyalty to a superior cancels out loyalty to equals or inferiors.

¹ The term 'Japanese Liberal' is applied to those Japanese who are attracted by Western European democratic principles (the sovereignty of the people and the rights of man) and are willing to evolve a Japanese variant of them.

The Japanese conceive of their State as a pyramid at the head of which is the Emperor. The pyramid is itself composed of lesser pyramids at the apex of each of which are the heads of families, corporations, schools, etc. The cement which binds the whole together is loyalty. They view themselves as one cohesive whole. The function of government is to protect this cohesive mass, to regulate it, to ensure that harmony prevails, and to prevent as far as possible the individual from leaving the straight and narrow path which he is supposed to follow. In prescribing this path much is stated to be which in fact is not.

The exhortative method of government, developed to a fine art by the Chinese, demands that perfection be presumed to exist, although few in point of fact attain to it. Thus in Japan loyalty to a superior is set forth as the pattern and presumed to be the guiding motive: close examination of Japanese history and practice may lead to the conclusion that it is largely bogus. Nevertheless lip service is paid to it and the more docile conform. From this follows regimentation by the police and through spies. The individual has little choice of right and wrong: custom and the police force him into the requisite mould.

In practice, individuals rarely stand out from this cohesive mass. From one Japanese little emerges: from two or three much comes. This 'committee-mindedness' (which is accompanied by a national unwillingness to accept individual responsibility) is probably the basis of their marked capacity for organization. It is extremely difficult to put a finger on the persons who at any given moment exercise authority or influence the whole, nor is it profitable to reckon with the influence of individuals. Only a rare individual by virtue of some deed of reckless heroism exercises a personal influence on the Japanese mass.

Perhaps by reason of their position as 'Manifest Gods' the Emperors seldom exerted any influence whatsoever; being gods it was awkward for them to act (unless as gods abdicant), since action implies a possibility of failure, and failure is fatal to a god. In fact there has never been an Emperor of outstanding ability in the history of Japan. Others ruled for them. It might be said that those who controlled their persons exercised all authority. From 1185 until 1868 the series of families of military dictators ruled, paying little or no attention to the Emperor. Seven hundred years of military rule, through a feudal system, accustomed the Japanese mind to the association of 'military' and 'government'. Dissatisfaction with the policy of the Tokugawa family in closing the country to intercourse with the world, coupled with a renewed understanding of the position theoretically occupied by the Emperor in the past, enabled the American naval

missions to Japan in 1853 and 1854 to be instrumental in pushing over the military Government, and brought about the restoration of the Emperor to his theoretical position in 1868.

The restoration of the Emperor gave back to the pyramid its pure form. The ideas behind the State did not change: it was a revolution, but from our Western point of view an incomplete revolution. Then, as before, it was a question of committees controlling the Emperor and ruling in his name. These committees had as their aim the greater glory of the Japanese race and Emperor. Their deliberations were upon methods of achieving this constant aim.

After the opening of the country to intercourse with the rest of the world in 1868, Great Britain and Germany seemed the most successful European nations. The example of the former appealed to the civilians, while the authoritarian principles of Bismarck's Reich impressed the military by their resemblance to Japanese traditional notions: German reliance on the military accorded well with the past seven hundred years of Japan's history.

The Constitution bears the mark of both influences. It afforded a loophole to the military in that the Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff had direct access to the Throne—an honour shared only by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Imperial Household. Shortly afterwards the principle became established whereby the Army and Navy ministers had to be generals and admirals on the active list (for a time this was extended to include generals and admirals on the retired list), and thus at the beck and call of the High Command. Further, the removal of the Army or Navy Minister by the High Command meant the resignation of the entire Cabinet. This revealed clearly the Japanese 'committee mentality'. The High Command agreed upon policy and then placed its spokesmen in the position to express to the people in the Diet the policy which had been agreed between them.

The whole Japanese Diet was coloured by the same principle: policy was agreed beforehand and expressed for the enlightenment of the people by the representatives of the groups ruling Japan. Which these groups are, or were, is not so easily settled. Certainly the Genrō or Elder Statesmen, the High Command, the Privy Council, the Statesmen round the Throne and the Imperial Household Department. They were composed of cynical and well-informed statesmen, who judged domestic or international problems in a spirit of realism, and whose solutions were carefully calculated and beautifully timed. To the above groups of statesmen must be added the zaibatsu (or great business houses),

members of which controlled the major political parties until their dissolution.

Perhaps in every country motives of patriotism come first. It is probably wrong to speak of, say, a French statesman as a friend of England; he is first and foremost a French statesman, but one who is susceptible to the argument that good relations with Britain are conducive to the interests of France. This is true in a far higher degree in Japan, since patriotism is for the Japanese a religion in itself. A European statesman is aware of the brotherhood of man, of the principles of right and wrong, universal in their application, and has an abstract sense of justice before which all men are alike. He may not always act upon these principles. He may turn them to the patriotic end in view, but he is aware of them and influenced by them the whole time. The Japanese, on the other hand, have little conception of right and wrong as standards by which the conduct of all mankind is judged; to them whatever conduces to the greater glory of Japan is right. The Japanese statesman is therefore unencumbered by the scruples which beset European statesmen. He comes direct to the point and any means to achieve the end in view are justified, provided they show some probability of success.

The Japanese is therefore influenced by other countries in so far as he is convinced that they have something to add to the Japanese scheme. Thus there is no doubt that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance won over many Japanese persons of distinction, and it is not to be doubted that for two decades British example did modify the Japanese outlook to a great extent. The intense devotion to the Throne and to its occupant, which the Restoration of 1868 resuscitated (before 1868, the person of the Emperor, as distinct from the idea of the Throne, appears to have inspired feelings of devotion only in the Kuge, or court nobility, and possibly in the breasts of the citizens of Kyōto), found a parallel in British affection for the persons of the Royal Family. It was advantageous to Japan to be Britain's friend, and therefore those committees who take decisions placed in prominent positions statesmen who were sincerely devoted to the cause of British friendship.

Japan and Democracy

Following British example, the nucleus of a liberal party came into being in 1871, and eventually Prince Itō himself became President of the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) which was founded in 1881. But to a realist nation the argument of success always has final say; democracy triumphed over authoritarianism in 1918, and it was not until then (despite military misgivings and the feeling

that Germany had not been finally beaten) that it seemed expedient to try democracy in Japan.

The decade following the last war therefore saw the emergence in Japan of democratically-minded statesmen. Such statesmen were picked for their sincere advocacy of democracy, by the committees behind the scenes, and in particular by the Genrō, in order to try out this experiment. The scene to be presented to the world was to be in conformity with the prevailing democratic lines. The façade was to be democratic; the interior was at the same time to remain true to Japanese traditional conceptions. The politicians themselves were probably sincere, but they were manipulated and never did they sink the aims of Japan in visions of the brotherhood of man or the comity of nations. They attempted to see how democracy would work; they attempted to probe the possibilities of peaceful penetration as opposed to military aggression.

Unfortunately democratic principles not only had against them the weight of Japanese authoritarian tradition and the seven centuries of military rule, but also it was hard for a democrat to fit in with the ascetic conception of life, to which the Japanese had paid lip service (and occasionally practised) for so long. The methods whereby Japanese, or groups of Japanese, gain the approval of their fellows were and are repulsive to those believing seriously in the rights of men. The insistence upon loyalty as the paramount motive in life demands the sacrifice of self in the interests of a superior, and theoretically, in the interests of the Emperor and of the Japanese race. The man, therefore, who thinks nothing of self, but only of duty, is the Japanese ideal. The man who thinks of his own rights is denoted as all that is bad in human life. The creation of selfless individuals existing on a bare minimum of money, fanatical in devotion to the head of the family and in attention to duty, is the aim of Japanese education. (In parenthesis let it be mentioned that this ideal, although widely proclaimed, is not strictly adhered to; in feudal times daimyō squabbled openly for land; Hideyoshi indulged in reckless extravagance and outward show; and modern warriors have enriched themselves at the expense of Japan's good name.)

Loyalty is a motive, and to the Japanese the motive is more important than the deed. To prove the sincerity or purity of his motive or 'heart' seems essential to every Japanese. The reformer or the fanatic finds no more perfect way of proving the sincerity of his motive than by expressing his protest and then disembowelling himself. The act of suicide proves to the Japanese realistic mind beyond a shade of doubt that the interests of self did not enter into the protest of the individual. The

reformer, therefore, who would win the sympathy of the people must be prepared for violent action. Democratic principles—in so far as they partake of European Christian morality—are directly opposed to such action.

The success of democracy won over authoritarian circles in Japan to experiment with it, but the adoption of traditional methods of winning popular favour by the military—always waiting for their opportunity—combined with the comparative lack of success of the democrats from a national point of view, convinced the Japanese people in the long run that democracy was not for them. Moreover, economic conditions since the end of the World War had been unfavourable to liberalism, and the depression of the late nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties often placed insuperable obstacles in the way of social reform.

The abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the lower ratio accorded to the Japanese Navy by the Washington Naval Treaty, and the American Exclusion Act appeared to the Japanese people, or were presented to them by the military, as slaps in the face for the democrats. The depression came and that too was used to foster discontent: the military offered a way out. Military success in Manchuria, and the impunity with which Japan flouted the League of Nations were used to prove that the military succeeded where democrats failed.

The traditional veneration for asceticism was brought into play. The poor soldier, valiant in his duty, was contrasted with the wealthy democrat feathering his own nest. The gunbatsu and their alleged selflessness were contrasted with the avarice of the zaibatsu.

Further the Japanese people, used to being regulated and kept on the right path from above, and educated to be members of a group rather than distinct persons, never understood the democratic appeal to the rights of the individual. The influence of the individual on the whole seemed the hall-mark of chaos. Only in the cities intellectuals, students and an industrial proletariat, divorced from the traditions which bind the behaviour of the Japanese peasant, did embrace to a certain extent these new Western conceptions. An isolated people are particularly susceptible to the charms of novelty. It titivated the senses of the wealthy: to be a democrat was to taste new pleasures. With the flippant it enjoyed a fashion and like fashions faded.

Japanese policy with regard to China became less and less compatible with that of the democratic countries. Japan wished to control China in her own interests and feared that the realization of China's national unity might prevent this. The democratic

countries wished to see a strong China with whom all foreign countries could trade on equal terms. Even the Japanese business men, who had been open, through their association with foreign countries, to the charms of democracy (while it remained potent and before Nazi Germany proved the might of fascism), found it against their business interests. Monopoly in Manchuria proved so attractive that soon the zaibatsu and the gunbatsu merged their differences.

Shidehara, Ozaki, Hamaguchi or Takahashi were figures placed before the public eyes by those committees controlling Japan's destiny. They were sincere men, but sincere believers in their policies came largely to be misfits in the Japanese scheme of life. Finally the National Government Aid Association left few Japanese in doubt of this. It sought to restore the cohesion aimed at in the Japanese machine. The democrat, with his insistence on the rights of the individual, found there was no place for him in that machine. The very term 'jiyu-shugi' (liberalism) became associated with individualism in its bad sense of selfishness.

The democrat was associated in the Japanese popular mind with foreign ways and foreign pleasures. It had seemed delightful to certain Japanese to throw over the reins of tradition and to do exactly as they pleased (in fact for a decade the Japanese began to enjoy themselves, a thing they had never been allowed to do before). It was easy for the opposition to emphasize the undermining effect of such behaviour. The Japanese conception of the State demands the regulation of all things: even vice has its proper place. The prostitute is saved from complete degradation by the belief that filial piety and loyalty to the interests of her family drove her to her mode of life.

The democrats therefore were un-Japanese; they were associated with foreign ways of thought and life, inimical to the structure of the Japanese State. They were therefore persecuted. Students and professors tainted with democratic thoughts spent weary years in prison and emerged convinced that it would be prudent in future to conceal political ideas in opposition to those of the régime. The democratic façade was adjudged useless, since democracy abroad appeared to be reeling before authoritarian strength. Democratic thoughts had long been deemed 'dangerous thoughts': they were now less dangerous than unsuccessful—and therefore, to a realist State, useless.

Liberals and Defeat

An attempt has been made to view democracy through Japanese eyes: it merited serious attention when it succeeded in overcoming authoritarian Germany in 1918, although the German

system and German views on the position of the State remained fundamentally more akin to Japanese traditional conceptions.

When the democracies seemed to be weakening before the authoritarian States, its influence in Japan waned. It was no longer necessary to use Japanese liberals. Nevertheless a certain number of liberals remained, who might, if necessary, be used. Such liberals are among those attracted by Western European democratic principles, such as the rights of man and the sovereignty of the people. (The influence of Christianity must here be reckoned with: the Christian insistence on the intrinsic worth of the individual, and the fact that most Protestant missionaries came from democratic countries may have encouraged Japanese converts to view democracy with favour.) Such principles, it has been suggested, do not exist in the Japanese scheme of things: they are indeed a reversal of the Japanese pattern. Japanese liberals, struck by what they found in the European and American democratic States, wished to evolve Japanese variants, or to fit democracy to the Japanese pattern: they did not generally wish to reverse that pattern.

Japanese liberals in the above sense come, therefore, from certain well-defined elements of Japanese society: those who, at educational establishments in Japan or abroad, have studied the philosophy, literature, politics and history of the democracies; civil servants whose official duties have led them to spend some time in democratic countries; business men whose trade has given them associations with democratic countries; and industrial workers. Although recently it has gone over to the militarist side, the Social Mass Party was considered dangerous by the authorities as recently as 1937, when many of its members were imprisoned, and it should be noted that this party was young and promising and seemed generally progressive in outlook; it may have a large part to play in post-war Japan.

Of the above, the most considerable in influence are in the first category. Most students in Japanese universities during the democratic decade after the last war were affected more or less by enthusiasm for democratic and socialist ideals. There was a very large demand for all forms of liberal and anti-traditionalist literature during the nineteen-twenties; for instance, during 1928, one Tokyo book-shop sold as many as 300,000 copies of Marx's *Das Kapital*. The depression and the consequent increase in the chronic under-employment of university graduates hit them hard and made them dissatisfied with the existing political situation. They suffered bitterly for their enthusiasm, many of them spending years in prison. A large number of liberals, including many professors and thousands of students,

proved their sincerity beyond doubt in this ordeal. Others recanted and received 'enlightenment' at the hands of the police; others again found their economic distress relieved by the military 'experiment' in Manchuria and were content to forget about their undergraduate enthusiasm for liberalism. Yet many must still, if they dare to think about politics at all, be liberals at heart. They represent the university graduates at present in the prime of life, and therefore of potential consequence.

The liberal element among business men is probably weak and certainly not pure. Nevertheless 'business' was a subject which the Japanese learnt largely from British and American models; like democracy itself it was to the Japanese largely a foreign thing. Further, many university graduates in Japan, as in the United States, entered business. But British and American influence had its heyday; greater integration and increased control from above brought the Japanese business man more into the authoritarian orbit. Resentment at military interference and habits acquired in democratic countries kept many anti-military rather than pro-democratic. Of the other elements, the liberalism of the civil servants is in essence rather broadmindedness and common sense than political fervour. Nevertheless the fact that many high-placed civil servants are open to the appeal of reason on Western premises is significant.

Persons in all the above categories may consider that the adoption of democratic forms would be beneficial to Japan: it is to be doubted whether they would wish to remould the whole of Japanese thought, which would be a prerequisite to the functioning of a real democracy in Japan. They would see in democracy an effective instrument for achieving the greater glory of Japan, rather than a philosophy of life for the Japanese people.

The vast majority of Japanese who flirted with democratic ideas were probably for a time convinced by the unimagined successes of Pearl Harbour and Singapore that other methods are more successful. Many too must have succumbed to the prevailing hatred of democratic ways induced by the war.

Nevertheless, taken by and large, the influence of the liberals still exists: the liberal politicians are now old men, but those who found liberalism attractive in their student days in the post-war decade must be many. They are to the present régime in Japan what Jews and communists are to Hitler's Germany—misfits and scapegoats.

In addition to the liberals there are many Japanese who wish to put a break upon military influence. They are inspired by the requisite devotion to the Throne, and they fear that the military may place the Emperor in the position of obscurity which he

occupied for so many centuries before 1868. Were that to happen, their own influence and position would disappear. Their fear of the machinations of their own military makes them sympathetic to the non-military outlook of the democracies. Many of them are pro-British, in so far as it is possible for a Japanese to be pro anything which is not Japanese. They appreciate the position occupied by the Throne in this country, although many were seriously shaken in this view by the abdication (which was a real disaster for British influence on this very important type of Japanese opinion). Those of them who are over fifty were brought up in the tradition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They number some of the Statesmen round the Throne, so often the butt of military sarcasm. They are in essence traditionalists and Imperialists and touch the liberal orbit only in that they distrust the military.

Similarly the communists may be presumed to share in the anti-military views of the above. It was reckoned that there were some 200,000 communists in Japan: they are largely to be found among the urban proletariat. They have been ruthlessly suppressed and driven entirely underground. The recent successes of Russia, coupled with Russian neutrality in the Pacific War, may be attracting many Japanese to view communism with greater favour. However, the sting was taken out of real communism by the advanced socialism of the military themselves. Similar considerations apply to socialist movements. Paternal methods, native to Japan, have in many instances brought about social improvements which socialist agitation failed to achieve.

Are any of these liberal elements likely to play an important role when Japan has been forced to unconditional surrender? The answer would seem to be yes, if the bodies controlling Japanese destinies (presumably the Emperor's personal advisers and the Statesmen round the Throne, since the High Command, whatever its views, will have been liquidated) see fit to use them. Their willingness to use them will depend to a large extent on the policies and method of approach adopted by the victorious nations, and on the degree of success which democracy will have achieved. It has been suggested that the committees which rule Japan and choose the trappings she will assume are composed of cynical, well-informed and worldly-wise statesmen. To their wisdom has been due Japan's swift rise. Animated by stark realism, success and failure are final arguments to them. Once they are convinced that Japan has failed, and once the United Nations prove that Japan's military aggression is the cause of that failure, they will surely try methods likely to be in tune with the times. Democracy will be one such method and the liberals a means of achieving it.

Democracy will not, however, be the only method: democracy and Russian communism will be in the ascendant in the world at large, and, therefore, also in Japan. Interest in both will be stimulated by the reaction against militarism, which defeat, war weariness, high casualties and bomb damage are bound to cause. In democracy's favour will be that it offers in its British form the possibility of retaining the Emperor—a factor of the highest importance. On the other hand, the Japanese, with their unique capacity for ignoring difficulties and reconciling opposites, might evolve a theocratic communism to their taste.

In either case it is highly probable that the Japanese will dress their window at least partially in democratic fashion. Liberal elements will be of use: they will be used. Their influence will not be as individuals, but as instruments. Once again this will not necessarily imply a change of heart, but only a change of dress. The frock coat will replace the military tunic, but the body will remain the same. None the less it is always possible that after defeat liberals may emerge in greater strength; liberalism has never before been permitted a real opportunity for development or expression: defeat may provide this.

Note: The group mentality of the Japanese tends to result in the members of the group accepting the ideas of their leader. Therefore, if it is possible to influence the leaders in Japanese life, it should be possible to influence their following more easily than it would be in countries where men are in the habit of thinking for themselves.

It is conceivable that if the leaders were convinced that Japan's salvation lay in democracy, the people might follow their example. But the result of thinking in groups could not in itself produce a democratic State: such thinking is the reverse of democratic. The best that could be hoped from the acceptance of democracy in this way is that conditions might be created in which individuals could develop an independent political outlook. Genuinely democratic institutions might ultimately emerge from this beginning.

CHAPTER VI

ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN POWERS

ANY attempt to estimate the probable course of Japanese foreign policy after the war must be extremely tentative and provisional because we do not yet know what nations will be in the Pacific War at the end, or what will be their respective attitudes towards Japan. The orientation of Japan's foreign policy—and the attitudes of such Japanese authorities as may exist under Allied military occupation—are likely to be highly opportunist and directed towards getting a mitigation of peace terms and conditions in any way possible. But for the long-term alignment of a defeated Japan in international affairs there are certain fundamental tendencies in Japanese sentiment towards foreign nations—or rather the sentiments of various sections of the Japanese people—which can be recognized and described.

Relationship with China

Up to the second half of the sixteenth century—and with only slight qualification up to 1853—there was for Japan only one great foreign nation, and that was China. Because of Japan's geographical position on the margin of Asia, China filled nearly the whole of the landscape when Japan looked at the world outside her own islands; apart from China there was only the relatively insignificant Korea—which was even more imitative of China than Japan herself—the Siberian mainland inhabited only by savage tribes, the empty spaces of the Pacific and some dimly-known islands to the south. India was known through the Buddhist religion, and one or two Japanese Buddhist monks actually went there, but on the whole it figured as a kind of fairyland rather than a real country. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ships of European nations—the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and English—reached Japan, and in the sequel certain Japanese reached Europe and reported on it, but Europe and America were so remote under the conditions of travel in that age that no close contacts were made between Japan and Western nations. With the Tokugawa isolation policy all intercourse and knowledge of the outer world was reduced to a minimum.

In addition to the natural pre-eminence of China in the Japanese outlook on the world, there was the immense cultural debt to China—a debt involving every aspect of Japanese life and thought. The Japanese have constantly modified and adapted in their own way

what they have received from China, so that the final result is very different from the parallel Chinese development, but Japanese originality has always worked on Chinese models and the Chinese influence is strong even in ideas and institutions which are regarded as specially Japanese. There has recently been a tendency in Britain and America for reasons of contemporary politics to minimize the common element in the heritage of the two nations, and to exaggerate their differences. But the cultural assimilation of Japan to China in the past has been very far-reaching, and the attitude to China was one of deep respect and admiration. When St. Francis Xavier first preached Christianity in Japan, he was constantly met with the objection that there could not be any value in this doctrine, as the Chinese, who were the wisest of men, did not accept it; hence, argued Xavier, it was necessary to convert China first in order to convert Japan. When subsequently Christianity spread widely in Japan and the Tokugawa administration decided to suppress it, it was from Confucianism that the arguments for the persecution were drawn.

The cultural attachment of Japan to China never involved political subjection, because the two countries were spatially too widely separated, and except for the expeditions of the Mongol Kublai Khan there was never any attempt by the Chinese to conquer Japan. A political conflict did arise, however, over the forms of diplomatic intercourse between Japan and China. The Emperor of China was in Chinese theory a world-ruler to whom other monarchs owed the homage of vassals; in Japan, however, it was felt that the dynasty of the Sun Goddess could not accept vassal status. The Japanese did not in early days claim a right of world-rule, as the Shintō myths dated from a time when the Japanese had no clear knowledge of any foreign lands at all; hence the *Kojiki* is concerned entirely with the rule of the Sun Goddess's descendants in the 'eight islands' of Japan, even the Hokkaido being then unknown. It was only at a later date that the question of relations with other countries arose. One early Japanese Emperor in a letter to a Chinese Emperor began: 'The king of the land where the sun rises sends greetings to the king of the land where it sets'. The protocol officials of the Chinese Court, however, considered such a style of address improper, and trouble over diplomatic forms continued throughout the history of Sino-Japanese relations down to the nineteenth century, so that no regular diplomatic intercourse was ever established. The Ashikaga Shōguns did actually accept a formal vassalage in order to get trade privileges from China—a concession for which they have been bitterly denounced by modern Japanese historians. Hideyoshi, on the other hand, attempted to conquer China; his

idea was to instal the Japanese Imperial House in Peking as Emperors of China, thus combining the two monarchies.

In the eighteenth century there arose the opposition of the *wagakusha* literary school against the ascendancy of Chinese learning in Japan. These men stood for the pure Japanese language and literature against the extreme adulation of things Chinese, and they championed the native Shintō against Confucianism and Buddhism. It is from this school that the Shintō revival of the Meiji Restoration and present-day Nipponism are derived. Nevertheless, these writers owed far more to Chinese ideas than they were willing to admit, and to the charge of his opponents that his philosophy was borrowed from Taoism, Motoori could only reply that, as Lao-tzū was 'born in a dirty country not under the special protection of the Sun Goddess' he could not really have known anything about Shintō.

Learning from the West

The effect of the spectacle of the defeats of China in the wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60, of the helplessness of Japan herself in the face of Perry's naval squadron of 1853, and of the sudden realization of the superior power and wealth of Western nations, was greatly to reduce the Japanese respect for, and sense of cultural solidarity with, China, and to cause Japan to 'go to school with the West' in order to master the economic, administrative, and military techniques of Western civilization. To some extent there was a genuine interest in, and enthusiasm for, Western institutions, ideas and ways of living for their own sake, even if only as a fashionable craze, but the dominant motive of the Meiji reformers was certainly to learn from the West the secrets of national power; it was because the Western nations were successful and powerful on the material plane that their culture was deemed worthy of imitation. At the same time the reformers needed something from the national tradition which could be used as a rallying point for nationalism, and this they found in Shintō and Emperor-worship. The Meiji Restoration was brought about by an alliance between the *wagakusha* and the 'Westernizers', both of which groups, though for different reasons, were contemptuous of China. The contempt for China increased as Japan by her self-modernization gained rank among the Western nations, while China remained weak, disorderly and ineffective.

The two nations of the West in which Japan was most interested in the decisive transition period 1868-90 were Britain and Germany. In Japan's view they were the two most powerful States in the world, Britain possessing undisputed naval supremacy and the largest territorial Empire, while Germany was reckoned

the strongest military power in Europe after her victory over France in 1870. Japan, therefore, got instructors for her Navy from Britain and for her Army from Germany. Before 1870 Japan had already engaged French army instructors, but changed over to Germans when she saw the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War. The political institutions of the two countries also served as models to the makers of the Meiji Constitution; the preferred example was Germany, because the German system was the more easily adapted to the existing political order in Japan, but British political institutions also had considerable influence. Army circles always admired Germany, but the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, though concluded because of Japan's material strategic interests, strengthened for a while the influence of British ideas. English, moreover, was the most widely learnt second language in Japan.

In the early Meiji period neither America nor Russia loomed as large in the Japanese world-view as Britain and Germany. America had indeed taken the initiative in opening Japan to foreign intercourse, but during the four decades after Perry's visit she was still absorbed in her own 'frontier', had no territorial base in the Far East, and little interest in world politics. As for Russia, she was recognized as a powerful State, but the Japanese knew that other European nations regarded her as 'backward', and 'backwardness' was what the Japanese modernizers particularly wanted to avoid. After the turn of the century, however, America became increasingly important for Japan in a variety of ways; on the one hand, there was great increase of trans-Pacific trade, while on the other there was constant friction arising out of the clash of policies in China and the agitation against Japanese immigrants in America. After 1918 America stood out as not only the strongest naval power in the Pacific, but as the world's leading exponent of the 'philosophy of business'. The financial and commercial classes in Japan, and those concerned with advertising, journalism, radio and the cinema were profoundly influenced by American standards and methods. There was also a widespread influence of 'Americanism', mainly in its Hollywood version, on the ways of living of the well-to-do; the *mobo* and *moga* were products of this. On the whole, in the field of ideas American influence reinforced the liberalism already emanating from Britain, but in the eyes of the Japanese America stood for a more uncompromisingly democratic, individualistic and anti-traditionalist conception of life than Britain did.

Russia after the Revolution became the centre of the world-wide propaganda of Marxism in its communist form, and this soon acquired a powerful influence on university students and on

peasant and labour organizations. This produced in turn fear and dislike of Russia among the propertied classes, and a reversal of policy towards Russia, with whom in 1916, just before the Revolution, Japan had concluded a secret treaty of military alliance directed against the United States of America. Moreover, for many years after the Revolution, Russia appeared weak and inefficient, and thus unimpressive to most Japanese, who were disposed to judge any system by its success in terms of material power. Since the success of Russia's planned industrialization, however, and especially since the Russian military successes at Nomonhan, and later over Germany, Japanese military and nationalist-industrial circles have had a great respect for Russian military capacity, economic planning methods and labour discipline. In contrast to the view now propagated in Britain and America, the Japanese speak of Russia as a completely authoritarian State and feel a certain kinship with it on that ground; this is, of course, an attitude to be distinguished from the idea of Russia as the worker's paradise which survives to an unknown extent among the masses.

Conflict with Western Ideas

After the early Meiji period, during which 'Westernization' was carried on with the full support of the Throne and the Sat-Cho oligarchy, an increasing tension developed between Japanese nationalism and the influence of imported Western ideas. It was discovered that these ideas carried a threat to the social and political order. In modern Japanese political writing, these 'dangerous thoughts' from the West are classified under the two heads of liberalism and Marxism, both of which—though opposed to each other—are held to have arisen from 'materialism' and resulting class-war in Western society, and to be incompatible with Japan's unique *kokutai* or 'national polity'. After the decade of the nineteen-twenties, when both liberalism and Marxism reached the zenith of their influence in Japan, the nationalist reaction drew strength not only from economic conditions produced by the world depression, but also from the example of Fascism and Nazism in Europe, which offered a similar opposition both to liberalism and to Marxism. Nazi ideas in particular had a strong influence in Japan because of the traditional admiration for Germany in army circles, an admiration which had been dispelled by the collapse of 1918, but was easily revived by the achievements of Hitler. Nevertheless, Nazi racial doctrine was naturally unacceptable to Japan, and Japan indeed was led to evolve a racialism of her own which in the long run was antagonistic to Nazi aims.

Even after they had become generally hostile to the influence of liberalism and Marxism within Japan, Japanese ruling circles remained 'Westerners' in the sense that they attached primary importance to relations with Western nations, and felt that they belonged to the company of Western Great Powers rather than to that of Asiatic countries, none of which had managed to achieve the material progress of Japan. Thus, as regards China, Japan was one of the Treaty Powers enjoying extra-territorial rights, and had a common interest with them; she joined the European and American forces in the suppression of the Boxer troubles in 1900. She considered her colonial rule in Korea and Formosa as parallel to the colonial régimes of Western nations in Malaya, the East Indies, Indo-China or the Philippines. After 1919 inclusion in the League of Nations as a permanent Council member gave her a new political link with the West. Nevertheless, from 1921 there were also factors tending to separate Japan from the West and throw her back on herself. First, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance isolated her diplomatically, for she found no substitute for it. Then the American Immigration Act of 1924 inflicted a wound on Japanese pride, the effect of which it would be difficult to exaggerate; Japan felt herself publicly classified as racially inferior. And finally in 1933 Japan's withdrawal—in fact expulsion—from the League accentuated the trend towards a self-centred, self-reliant nationalism. The moral the Japanese drew from the League's handling of the Manchuria crisis was that the world was against them, but that they could successfully defy the world.

Possibilities of Rapprochement with China

In 1937 Japan renewed her aggression against China and for more than four years China was the only country with which she was at war. The Japanese invasion was accompanied by all kinds of atrocities against the Chinese population. Nevertheless, there was a notable absence of national hatred towards China, and more and more Japanese propaganda developed the theme that the real enemy was 'Anglo-American imperialism', which was charged with setting China against Japan by cunning intrigues in order to exhaust both nations in mutual conflict and thus gain supremacy in the Far East. When Japan finally launched her war against Britain and the United States, propaganda was concentrated on the themes of Japan's task to liberate and defend 'East Asia' against Western imperialism and of the racial and cultural solidarity of the 'East Asiatic' peoples.

It has been widely assumed that all the talk of 'East Asia' is merely for the purpose of deluding the peoples whom Japan has

intended to conquer and that the Japanese themselves have no sense of a common cause beyond their own self-centred nationalism. Certainly the idea of 'East Asian' solidarity is no impediment in practice to Japan's treatment of her neighbours as objects of exploitation, and the arrogance, cruelty and greed of Japanese soldiers and officials in the occupied areas have thwarted Japanese hopes of winning over those peoples to acceptance of her proclaimed doctrine. But it would be unwise to assume that this intensively cultivated idealism has had no effect on the Japanese mind or that any effect it may have had will automatically disappear with Japan's defeat. Self-pity and self-exculpation may easily take the form of believing that Japan has failed, not in a war of aggression, but in a noble cause of liberation; this state of mind would be particularly likely to prevail if—as is unfortunately quite possible—China were to emerge from the war still weak and disunited, with a deep sense of frustration and strong grievances against her Western Allies, so that the political basis for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement would be present.

A certain parallelism can be discerned in recent tendencies of ideology in Japan and China. Although Japan's 'national polity' is claimed to be unique and the Shintō myth is used to support an exclusive self-centred Japanese nationalism, it is worthy of note that officially approved writings in defence of Nipponism, such as those of Chikao Fujisawa, constantly refer to Chinese authority and obviously draw their main inspiration from Chinese thought. The counter-offensive against the invasion of Western ideas has taken the form of setting 'Japanese and Oriental' political tradition against 'liberalism and Marxism', which are regarded as twin manifestations of Western 'materialism'. In China likewise there has been during the past few years a strong reaction against the enthusiastic 'Westernism' of thought characteristic of the early years of the Revolution; this reaction is manifest in Chiang Kai-shek's book, *China's Destiny*, which denounces liberalism and Marxism in terms very similar to those used by Fujisawa and calls on the Chinese to base their national life on their own past rather than on foreign models. If China continues thus to emphasize the continuity of the new régime with Chinese tradition, while Japan's spiritual self-sufficiency and arrogance are broken down by military defeat, it is quite possible that Japanese traditionalism would become a force promoting a new sense of cultural community with China—an attitude which would be an alternative to a new period of 'Westernization' under conditions much more humiliating than those of the Meiji epoch.

An orientation towards China would be reinforced by certain economic factors. It is the brutality and greed of Japanese

militarism which have frustrated the Sino-Japanese economic co-operation which Japanese leaders have professed to desire; if these features were removed or diminished, it would soon become obvious that such co-operation is very desirable from the point of view of both countries. Japan has the commercial advantage of geographical proximity and, unless Japanese industry is artificially restricted by the concerted policy of the Allies (including China), there is no reason why there should not be very considerable trade in future between Japan and China. China may in time surpass Japan in most branches of modern industry, but meanwhile in the period of her industrialization she will need great quantities of capital goods, and Japan is likely to be able (unless forcibly prevented) to compete in this field much more successfully than is at present generally expected in Britain and the United States. Because Japan *must* export in order to obtain essential imports, she may be expected to cut her prices as low as is necessary and China will not be averse to buying cheap. If, on the other hand, Japan's heavy industry is ruined by the war, there will be great numbers of Japanese engineers and skilled workers available for use in China's industrialization at salaries far below anything that a British or American technician would contemplate; there will probably be many of these in China in any case.

The principal factor operating against a Chinese orientation of Japanese policy and sentiment would be the probable weakness of China in relation to the 'Big Three' of the West. It is clear that China, even though formally one of the 'Big Four' of the United Nations, cannot be in the immediate post-war period comparable in industrial and military strength to the British Commonwealth, the United States or the U.S.S.R., and the Japanese admiration for power and success would therefore still make for imitation of, and attempted rapprochement with, one or more of the great Western Powers.

Future Relations with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the British Commonwealth

As the United States will, at the end of the war, be the country with the greatest productive capacity and the strongest naval and air power, as well as the nation which has taken the foremost part in defeating Japan, there will probably be a widespread envious admiration for America, combined with a hope that by good behaviour Japan can gain American forgiveness and even patronage. There must be a revival of 'Americanism', partly from a real enthusiasm for the 'American way of life', and partly from ulterior motives. This tendency will probably be strongest among the business and professional classes and among politicians

of the old Diet parties; it is likely to be more widespread if the Americans do not attempt any 're-education' in Japan than if they do, as it will then be less obviously identifiable with subservience to a foreign conqueror. There is, however, in any case, likely to be strong opposition to it, not only from the die-hard Nipponists and the Sinophiles, but also from the admirers and clients of the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. will certainly be able to compete with the United States as a pattern of power and success in the modern world for Japanese imitation. Her system and way of life will be less attractive than the Anglo-Saxon for the Japanese bourgeoisie, but it may well have greater merits in the eyes, not only of large sections of the politically awakened Japanese peasants and industrial workers, but also of a large part of the younger generation of all classes who will see in strong authoritarian government with a strictly planned economy and drastic controls the only salvation from chaos and depression and the only hope for an early revival of national strength. As for Russia, it may be taken for granted that she will wish to exert in the post-war period an influence not less than that of the United States in a country which lies off the Siberian, and not the American, coast of the Pacific Ocean. Such Russian influence need not be confined to communists and 'leftists', though these will play their part in promoting it; it may affect circles whose social outlook is definitely reactionary, just as in Germany after 1918 the 'Rapallo policy' found support from the extreme Right on nationalist grounds.

It thus appears probable that there will be, after the war, a certain rivalry between Anglo-Saxon, Russian and Chinese influences in Japan. The rivalry of influences is to be anticipated even if the Great Powers of the United Nations achieve close collaboration in the post-war period; in that case it would be kept within bounds and would be healthy rather than harmful in its effects. But if these Powers were to drift apart and begin to bid for the support of Japan or to back their particular factions for power within Japan, the way would soon be open for her to get rid of some at least of the disabilities imposed on her by the peace settlement. For, though Japan after defeat would certainly be less spiritually self-sufficient and more susceptible to foreign influences than she has been for many years, and though pro-British, pro-American, pro-Russian or pro-Chinese enthusiasms might be genuine preferences of individuals and groups, there would always be also the national impulse to align Japan with whichever of the victors gave most promise of mitigating for her the consequences of defeat.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION

THE Japanese people are still in that primitive state in which religion and politics are not separate. Centuries of isolation gave them a feeling of being a race apart; their religion became inseparably bound up with the business of being a Japanese. It cannot be said that the Japanese are an irreligious people; it can be said with some justice that circumstances, except for a brief moment in the sixteenth century and again in modern times, canalized their religious feelings into a narrow tribal mould.

In the earliest times the Japanese were given to animistic beliefs, such as may be discovered in many different cultures. They exulted in the beauties of their land and worshipped the divinities of its streams, mountains, cliffs, trees and stones. On to this was grafted a cult of the ruling dynasty and a mythology attributing divine origins to the land, people and rulers of Japan. In particular the ruling dynasty was said to have sprung from Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess. In the eighth century A.D. after the adoption of Chinese writing, the Japanese recorded these legends in two books, the *Kojiki* or Record of Ancient Events and the *Nihongi* or Chronicle of Japan. It is thought that these were probably written to raise the prestige of the ruling dynasty. They would scarcely possess more than academic interest now had the rulers of modern Japan not seen fit to take them out, dust them and give them almost the status of Sacred Writ.

From the sixth century onwards Buddhism made its appearance on the Japanese horizon from Korea and China. In order to distinguish it from Buddhism, the native cult came to be called Shintō or the Way of the Gods. Compared with Buddhism, it had little to offer other than a sense of tribal cohesion. It is not surprising therefore that, after a comparatively short initial struggle between the protagonists of Buddhism and those whose interests were bound up with Shintō, the Way of Buddha won the day.

In order to gauge the modern Japanese religious outlook, some account of Buddhism as it arrived and developed in Japan seems requisite. Buddhism as taught in India by Gautama had travelled far before it reached Japan, and in the process gathered a variety of extraneous elements into itself. The Buddhism which reached Japan is termed Mahayana or the Greater Vehicle, as opposed to the primitive Buddhism of Ceylon and Burma, which

is known as Hinayana or the Lesser Vehicle. Detachment from this world and living a pure life enable the individual, through a succession of rebirths, each on a higher plane, eventually to detach himself from this existence and (according to Mahayana teaching) attain Buddhahood, thus entering nirvana or oblivion. There is no God: the attainment of Buddhahood by the individual is the ideal. The personage to whom we usually refer as the Buddha (Gautama) is one of four Buddhas who have been: the fifth or messianic Buddha is yet to come.

The main contribution of Mahayana Buddhism lies in its stress on the fact that the world is an illusion, and in its institution of saints. Such saints, or *bodhisattvas* (a *bodhisattva* in Hinayana is a being in the stage previous to attaining nirvana) are persons who, having attained the right to enter nirvana, refrain from so doing in order to help suffering mankind. In practice these saints occupy the attention of the Buddhist faithful in Japan. Different sects of Buddhism devoted to different aspects of the faith came to Japan from China from the sixth century onwards.

Japanese Buddhist sects, all of which have their origins in China, can be divided roughly into three groups: the esoteric sects (*himitsu-kyo*), the Shin or Amidist sects and the meditative, or Zen, sect. They arose in that order. The first-named, comprising the Shingon and Tendai sects, are still numerically strong. Shingon supports a university at its headquarters at Koya-San, while Tendai has a similar seat of learning on Mount Hiei. The Shin sects are a more original Japanese contribution. The Amidist sects imported from China taught that by calling as frequently as possible upon the name of one saint, known as Amida—lord of the Western Paradise—the individual could go direct to that paradise on death. A Japanese, Shinran, improved on this by teaching that, simply by dying steadfast in the faith, the endless vista of rebirth could be avoided and the same desired result attained. He preached this out of compassion for the uneducated, for whom he considered Buddhist doctrines too complex. Salvation by faith, therefore, entered into Buddhist conceptions and the Amidist sects flourish exceedingly: numerically they are probably the strongest in Japan. They have devoted themselves particularly to humanitarian work among the urban poor, possibly following the Christian example.

The Zen sect of meditative Buddhism deserves special attention, since it exercises an influence out of all proportion to the numbers of its nominal adherents. Whereas the Amidist sects teach reliance on another (*tariki*)—that is to say on Amida—Zen teaches reliance on self (*jiriki*). It was introduced into Japan from China at the beginning of the thirteenth century. It does not place great

reliance on the scriptures; it teaches that salvation can only be obtained by the individual through his own efforts. It despises the intellect and exalts intuition and perception. It teaches that only through intuition can the paradoxes inherent in life be understood. Its devotees, after rigorous training, attain enlightenment (*satori*), a state in which the universe with all its contradictions falls into place. Having attained enlightenment, many return to the world and to their normal occupations. Perhaps because of its reliance on what may generally be termed 'character' as opposed to 'intellect', the Zen sect has exercised a profound hold over military men. It arose and flourished during the bloody years of the feudal régime. In China, it absorbed Taoist conceptions and owed much to Indian yoga; it is the chief channel through which both reached Japan. Its consequent cult of harmony with nature, of man having his place as an animal among animals, runs through all Japanese thought. Its artistic influence has permeated Japanese life. Asymetry, accidental objects produced by co-operation with nature, are exalted by it, and orthodox Japanese taste, which shuns the gaudy and prefers the 'astringent', is due to its influence. Everything, according to Zen theory, must have the perhaps contradictory qualities of 'rust' and 'freshness'.

To the influence of Shintō and Buddhism must be added that of Confucianism. Confucianism never attained the dignity of a religion in Japan, but its influence particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was profound. It served to inculcate principles of loyalty and filial piety, which grew into a cult in Japan during the centuries of military strife, and it strengthened the cohesion of the family group. It gave a notion of 'gentlemanly conduct' to which many Japanese aspire. A misinterpretation of Confucian views on the Kingly Way served to bolster up Japanese conceptions on the role of their Emperor.

Buddhism overlaid Shintō for centuries and various Shintō divinities were equated with *bodhisattvas*, canonized and placed in the Buddhist pantheon. Buddhism was outwardly triumphant: Shintō lived on as Court ceremonial and popular superstition. The Emperor was always regarded as the living representative of the heroes of the race and the living link with the age of the gods. Nevertheless, Emperors resigned and became Buddhist monks, and Buddhism became part of the Court paraphernalia. In the popular mind the two became inextricably confused. If Buddhism appeared to gain, underneath it began to lose; it became entangled in Japanese tribalism. This is best seen in the fervid nationalism of the monk, Nichiren, and the jingoistic sect of the same name, which he founded. It became moribund as a lively

faith when, in the Tokugawa period, adherence to the particular Buddhist sect in the parish in which a person happened to reside was made obligatory.

Further, during the middle ages in Japan chaos was the rule rather than the exception. The power of the Court declined, that of the territorial nobility increased. The territorial nobles were surrounded by their military retainers (samurai), and were engaged in incessant feuds. A military code of conduct, to which modern Japanese have given the name of Bushidō or the Way of the Warrior, grew up out of military necessity. It insisted on the paramount importance of loyalty. The samurai owed implicit obedience to his lord, in whose interests he must be prepared to sacrifice his life. This rigid, stern and oppressive code demanded the suppression of self and control of the emotions. It was, however, one-sided, in that chivalry had no part in it: loyalty was only to a superior, not to an equal or to an inferior. The samurai would cheerfully sacrifice wife or child in the interests of his lord, while the common people could be mowed down or used as material on which to practise swordsmanship at his whim.

The family system further developed in this period, during which family cohesion was a necessity. Loyalty was attached to the head of the family; the relation between the head of the family and its members was a reflection of that between the lord and his samurai. Confucianism, as has been mentioned, strengthened this. During the ascendancy of the Tokugawa, peace and centralized government came and Japan was organized in an orderly feudal manner; the family system was crystallized and Confucian ethics were dominant.

During the latter half of the Tokugawa era, a few scholars began studying the ancient chronicles of Japan; from these they discovered that the Emperor had once been actually, as well as theoretically, the head of the State. They chafed at the domination of the Tokugawa Shōgun and wished to 'restore' the Emperor. They disliked Buddhism, seeing in it one of the methods used to keep the Imperial family in the background. With the restoration of the Emperor in 1868, therefore, Buddhism suffered a further decline; it was even for a time proscribed. Shintō was extricated from Buddhism and was raised to its former eminence. Buddhism was considered too visionary and passive a creed for the world of action at the threshold of which Japan was standing.

Shintō, as a cohesive national force and a military code, was exploited by Japanese statesmen after the Restoration. The Emperor had been placed in the limelight: Emperor-worship came into its own. The whole apparatus of Bushidō and the

feudal system were concentrated on the person of the Emperor. Just as the head of the family commanded the undivided loyalty of all its members, so the Emperor received the selfless devotion of the whole nation: the nation was conceived to be a vast family of which the Emperor was the head and father. Shintō ritual was of the greatest use in fostering this concept: the Shintō myths were made the foundation of national morale.

A separation between State Shintō, or officially encouraged Emperor, race and State worship, and other Shintō cults, originating in primitive animistic beliefs common to many races, came about. State Shintō was declared not a religion but a part of the civic duties of the Japanese citizen. It was the birthright of every Japanese—part of the business of being a Japanese. Quite recently Buddhism, Christianity and Islam have been officially recognized as religions, but Japanese statesmen, especially during the past decade, have made it no secret that they consider State Shintō superior to any religion. From an official point of view, as long as the individual Japanese conforms to the demands of State Shintō, he may practise what religion he likes, but such religions are viewed as hobbies potentially useful to the State. Thus, in dealing with Christian countries, a sincere Japanese Christian or two may prove useful, while, when dealing with Buddhist countries, Japanese Buddhist scholars might be placed in the front of the stage.

After the restoration of the Emperor and of intercourse with the outside world, Japan once more came into contact with Christianity. Christian concepts of the inherent value of the individual, of the essential brotherhood of mankind and of the existence of universal, as opposed to tribal, standards of right and wrong were found to be in direct conflict with the Japanese conception of life. This had been discovered earlier, and Christian teaching had been denounced as 'dangerous thought' in the sixteenth century. At that time Portuguese and Spanish missionaries achieved a very considerable success in Japan; several of the territorial nobility were converted with all their samurai. It is interesting to note that Japanese Christians at that time showed themselves to be very sincere in their faith; thousands were martyred, while their descendants secretly clung to what they could retain of the faith down to modern times. Among the reasons which led the Tokugawa to forbid its teaching and to persecute its followers, was undoubtedly the fear that the whole Japanese system would be undermined by it. Nevertheless, in modern times the Japanese were obliged to allow foreign nations to send Christian missionaries to Japan, and Christian missions played a large part in educational and humanitarian work. The building up of State

Shintō was doubtless considered to be a sufficient check on its serious adoption. It can, however, be said that Christian principles have had a considerable influence on the upper middle-class in Japan and that in modern times their influence has been much wider than would be expected from the insignificant number of professed Christians (300,000 out of a population of 79 million).¹

In the face of this brief analysis, what can be considered to be the religious beliefs of the contemporary Japanese? Officially he worships his Emperor; he subscribes to the divine origin of his land and race and believes it to be unique. He bows before the Imperial palace: he bows in its direction when he is abroad. He attends ceremonies at the local Shintō shrine; he bows before the Imperial portrait in his school. All this is obligatory. He considers all officials in the light of priests, since their function is to serve the Emperor. He sees them report policies and events to the divinities at Isé. He hears of the Emperor informing his Imperial ancestors. If he is highly educated, he may well make mental reservations concerning the myths connected with divine origin. Nevertheless, he will believe in the all-importance to him as a Japanese of the Japanese race. To him its long unbroken history, the continuing line of the Imperial family, and the fact that his land has never been invaded successfully in historical times, will seem sufficient grounds for considering the Japanese as a race apart. The greater glory of the race and of the Emperor, in whom it has its embodiment, will be his aim and object. In fact the business of being a Japanese is to him a religion and a way of life.

The Japanese are extreme realists, and, in their anxiety to further the greater glory of their race, they are always willing to take over and harness to that end any system which seems to them successful. For a time after 1868 they seriously thought Christianity was at the base of material European success. It was doubtless for similar reasons that they adopted Buddhism. Buddhism was eventually subordinated to their tribal outlook; they have done their best to subdue Christianity in a similar manner.

Among the people, shreds of Buddhism cling as customary observances; thus a Buddhist priest is called in at the naming of a child; the child is then presented at the Shintō shrine; marriage is largely a Shintō affair, while death is generally the province of Buddhist priests. Every well-to-do house has a Buddhist shrine, in which are housed the tablets commemorating the names of

¹ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941 (The Far East Year Book Inc., Tokyo, 1941), p. 113.

departed members of the family and before which prayers and incense are offered. Every house has its Shintō *kamidana*, or god shelf. Their notions of life after death are a jumble of Shintō and Buddhist teaching. If they have deserved well, Shintō assures them they will be enshrined among the heroes of Japan. The military have exploited this for purposes of morale. The spirits of soldiers who have died for their Emperor are worshipped at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo: 'Meet you at Yasukuni' is said to be the parting greeting of Japanese soldiers at the moment. Many believe that by calling upon Amida or by dying full of faith in him, they will be reborn again in his vague Western Paradise. Others see an endless vista of rebirth. All view their lives as part of the stream of the nation and of the family. Their individual lives are mere drops, the sole function of which is to swell the stream. As long as the stream continues, that is all that matters.

In the face of such conflicting views it is not surprising that syncretic sects, strongly reminiscent of the later Roman Empire, have sprung up and flourished. Attempts have been made to equate Buddhism and Christianity and harness them to the worship of the Japanese State. They have not been unsuccessful.

What role may religion be expected to play in a defeated Japan? On the face of it, it would seem that Japanese tribalism must receive an almost mortal wound; on the other hand the Japanese exult in adversity. Nothing excites them to greater exaltation than playing the role of David against Goliath. By some twisted means, defeat may deepen their conviction that it is worth while being a Japanese, one of a little band of men against the world. Certainly they will cling round their Emperor, even though many of the legends concerning his divine nature may have been dispelled by defeat. They will feel it all the more necessary to conserve their Japanese essence intact. On the other hand, misery may lead many to Buddhist resignation. Those who have enthusiastically repudiated the West and proclaimed their kinship with Asia may find solace in it. The minute Christian minority will be stirred to greater efforts. Japanese realism will see that it is made use of in her relations with Christian countries. The international outlook of the Christians will be of use to Japan. At best the exaggerated emphasis on Shintō, which the Restoration of 1868 brought about, may be expected to be dissipated in time. The attitudes of the victorious nations will have much to do with this. If, by their conduct, they show themselves to be morally as well as militarily superior, they may win Japan over to a universal as opposed to a tribal outlook.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION UPON JAPANESE CHARACTER

The Educational System

JAPANESE national education in its modern form owes its inception to the group of shrewd and far-sighted statesmen who, in the name of the Emperor Meiji, guided the nation from feudalism to the status of a great Power in less than half a century. In order to achieve this object, it was held necessary to replace the Confucian element in the aristocratic educational system of feudal Japan by the native Shintō faith, and to instil into the minds of the people, and above all of the rising generation, belief in and loyalty to a divine Emperor and devotion to a divine national mission. This was the specific purpose for which the Japanese educational system was created, and which it has most effectively achieved. The system has also given Japan a standard of literacy which is the highest in Asia and compares favourably with that of many Western countries.

The fifth principle of the 'Charter Oath of Five Principles', offered by the Emperor in 1868 before the Sanctuary, declares that "knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world, so that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted".¹ Education was to be universal, its advantages were not to be monopolized by any one class; everyone was to receive elementary education at least, irrespective of class, occupation and sex; opportunity was to be given to all according to their capacity.

It was in 1872 that the first educational code was promulgated, and in October 1890 this was followed by the famous Imperial Rescript on Education,² which is regarded by the Japanese as one of the fundamental precepts for the guidance of the nation. Copies of the Rescript and of the portrait of the reigning Emperor are distributed to every school in the Empire. The Rescript must be read by the school principal, with every manifestation of ceremonial reverence, to the assembled staff and students on October 30th in each year and on certain other occasions. The slightest mistake in reading is regarded as a grave misdemeanour. As to the Imperial portrait, teachers and students are instructed

¹ H. Keenleyside and A. F. Thomas, *History of Japanese Education* (The Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1937), p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

that in case of natural disaster it must be saved before all else, and many have lost their lives in fulfilling this duty. The effect of all this upon young minds cannot easily be overestimated.

Every educational institution in Japan is subject to the direct or indirect control of the Department of Education, by which text books are issued or approved, curricula supervised, and teachers licensed. Schools are classified as follows: Government schools, public schools (those established by prefectures, cities, wards, towns or villages), and private schools. Government schools are under the direct control of the Department; public and private schools are partly under the control of the Department and partly under that of the local prefectural government.

Elementary schools are of two grades: the ordinary elementary schools with a six-year course, and the higher elementary schools with a two or three-year course, the system in both cases being co-educational. The first course is compulsory for all children of both sexes. These schools are established and maintained by the prefectural authorities with the assistance of central Government subsidies. There were 25,000 elementary schools, with 11,000,000 students throughout the Empire in 1933.¹

Secondary education is provided for boys in ordinary and technical schools under the direct control of the Department of Education; separate establishments are maintained for girls. In the ordinary school course of five years special emphasis is laid on the teaching of 'national morals'. Tuition in foreign languages, usually restricted to English, commences in the middle school grade. In 1935 there were 550 ordinary middle schools with about 300,000 students.² Special and technical middle schools (including those relating to agriculture, commerce, marine products, mercantile marine, etc.) are now twice as numerous as the ordinary middle schools and have a two to five-year course of study. Parallel with these boys' schools are girls' high schools, which are discussed in later paragraphs dealing with female education.

It is in the middle school that, in normal times, the student first undergoes organized military training. The Ministry of War provides officer instructors and the training occupies five hours a week. Not only squad drill and military operations are taught, but also rifle target practices and (for seniors) use of the machine-gun, bayonet and hand grenade. Courses of lectures are also given by military officers and there are three field days each term under conditions approximating to active service.

¹ Ibid., pp. 184 and 187.

² *The Far East Year Book*, 1941 (The Far East Year Book Inc. Tokyo, 1941), p. 123.

Once a year field exercises extending over ten days take place in conjunction with units of the army and in the presence of the Emperor.

Higher education is provided in institutions of two grades: high schools and technical high schools, and universities. The high school course is normally of three years and is designed as preparation for the university. In the technical category are colleges of medicine, pharmacy and dentistry, schools of foreign languages and fine arts, and an academy of music, to mention only a few. The course in these schools varies from three to five years.

Universities in Japan have one or more Faculties, and must provide for post-graduate study. They fall into four categories: Imperial, Government, public and private universities. Imperial Universities, six in number, are established by the Government under Imperial ordinance, and their high social and educational standing enables them to take their pick of staff and students. Government universities, thirteen in number, have only one Faculty each and comprise two universities of commerce, two of literature and science, seven of medicine and two of engineering. Public universities, of which there are only two, are those established by public bodies other than the Government. Private universities, twenty-five in all, are established by individuals or organizations approved by the Government (including foreign Missions). They vary greatly both in size and in standard of work, the most important of them being Waseda and Keio Universities in Tokyo.

As regards training of teachers, at least one ordinary normal school must be established in each prefecture, with an elementary school for class practice attached. The normal school course has two sections, of five and two years each, and a post-graduate course is also afforded. Discipline is very strict, and indicates how keenly the Government realizes the influence of the teaching profession. All students are obliged to live in the school dormitories, and are subject to strict supervision, especially in relation to outside activities and health. Tuition is free, though students whose means permit may contribute if they wish. Pupils are even given allowances in addition to free accommodation, board, text-books, etc. In this way they are placed under a sense of obligation, and in return are obliged to serve in an educational capacity for periods varying from two and a half to eight years according to the degree of State assistance accorded. It is noteworthy that normal education in Japan has always had a quasi-military character, and pupils are taught to look upon their future profession as a duty which they owe to the State. This nationalist regimentation of Japanese school-teachers is of high importance

because those trained under this system must obviously continue to instruct the youth of Japan after the war. Qualified observers feel, however, that defeat may break the mould into which the Japanese educational system has been forced, and that many teachers will not regret the end of a reactionary system to which they must have felt latent antagonism. Subdued by rigid training and economic pressure, they could not hitherto, even if they wished, evade the prevailing nationalism. Their latent antagonism has been caused partly by the idealistic outlook common to those whose work brings them into daily contact with the young; and partly by the starvation salaries paid to teachers, particularly in primary schools.

The description of women's education in Japan as it is frequently expressed by the Japanese is opportune here: "It is better for women that they should not be educated, since their lot through life must be in perfect obedience, obedience to a father when unmarried, to a husband after marriage and to a son when widowed." This was the conception of women's position in feudal Japan, and it has changed depressingly little in the intervening eighty years. The Meiji Empress took a personal interest in female education, and in 1871 the first Government school for girls was opened in Tokyo.¹ Once the feudal ice had been broken, other similar institutions followed rapidly (with active support from the Christian missions), but by contrast with the demand, the educational opportunities provided for women were entirely inadequate, and the general public remained apathetic. Feudal ideas about the subjection of women died hard.

By 1931 there were 975 girls' secondary schools and their students outnumbered those in boys' secondary schools.² This appears satisfactory on the surface, but the attitude of the authorities is revealed by the fact that, whereas the boys' secondary school is called a middle school, that for girls is called a high school, though the standard of the latter is lower. Furthermore, the central Government itself has not provided a single college for women though numerous universities and colleges have been established for men. Although some universities are now permitted to offer women full educational facilities, it is still true that the major part of the task of providing higher education for women has been left to private initiative. There are now three public women's colleges (founded by prefectural authorities) and about a dozen private ones (including colleges of medicine, dental surgery, pharmacy and physical education). Many foreign residents in Japan have formed the opinion that Japanese women

¹ *History of Japanese Education, op. cit.*, pp. 234-5.

² *The Far East Year Book, 1941, op. cit.*, p. 123.

are more intelligent and open-minded than their men; they also show a less accentuated sense of racial apartness. Perhaps the emancipation and liberal education of women might have done something to check the distortion of Japanese society and all its attendant evils.

Such is the outline of Japan's educational system up to 1940. Before going on to examine the practical application and results of that system and the lessons to be drawn for the future, the background may be completed by the following notes on the defects of the Japanese examination system and the modifications introduced into the machinery of education since the outbreak of war.

The influence of the examination system upon the character and well-being of Japanese students is so deplorable that a note on what is appropriately described as *Shiken jigoku* (Examination Hell) seems called for. This social evil arises firstly from the conception of education, and especially higher education, as a strictly utilitarian avenue to employment in the civil service, the professions and business; and, secondly, from the innate aristocratic prejudices of the Japanese. That is to say, the educational background of a student must conform to the career to which he aspires. None but graduates from a recognized hierarchy of schools and universities can hope to gain admittance to the best positions in the civil service and in business. The exclusive Imperial Universities will only accept graduates from a select range of schools, and the latter cannot, as a rule, accommodate more than a very small fraction of the candidates presenting themselves for entrance examination. A tremendous intellectual and physical strain is thus imposed upon the growing boy from the middle school period onwards, and endangers his whole development. It is an all too common cause of tuberculosis, mental collapse and even suicide. The evil is accentuated by the Japanese family system through the ramifications of which fair competition in examinations is unblushingly circumvented.

Dr. Washio, one of Japan's leading educationalists, wrote in 1930: "The report of the Musashino Higher School (one of the few private schools preparing students for the Imperial Universities) is an illustration of this hellish competition. The school had, in its first trial, the record success of 100 per cent; but, in order to attain this result, out of the 91 students enrolled by selective examination, 27 failed in class examinations, 19 were obliged to leave the school, and 7 died from over-study. Only 38 survived at the time of graduation."¹

¹ *Japan Advertiser*, September 3rd, 1930.

This grave social danger affects the best students all through their educational career and, as shown by the following interpellation in the Diet in March 1937, is aggravated by the situation confronting them after graduation: "The number of graduates turned out annually by universities and colleges is 30,000, and of that number 17,000 obtain employment. I note an increase in the number of graduates unable to get jobs. This is deplorable from the standpoint of national thought."

If this was the situation in 1937, when Japan was economically prosperous, what may it not become in the circumstances of extreme depression likely to arise in the interim period after the war? It was precisely the unemployment of qualified graduates which caused the intense social unrest (and to some extent the prevalence of 'dangerous thoughts') in the early nineteen-thirties. These conditions may reproduce themselves after this war when the mass of unemployed graduates would contribute to general social instability.

The incidence of war seems to have caused a drastic lowering of educational standards. Literature and arts courses have been abandoned to make time for technical studies; the additional compulsory two years of elementary education (introduced in 1940) have been shelved, all children being now obliged to leave school at the age of thirteen and do one year's labour service; the middle school course has been reduced by one year; girls graduating from elementary schools may not proceed to high schools, all of which are to be applied to technical purposes; entrances to boys' high schools are to be reduced to one-third of the 1943 total; the twelve higher commercial schools are to become economic technical schools, and 270 of the existing commercial middle schools are to become technical schools. Further militarization of all grades of education is contemplated. Recent Japanese announcements that summer and winter holidays have been suspended, and that all elementary and middle schools are to be utilized as factories may not be taken too literally, but no doubt have some factual foundation. The effective enforcement of these measures would imply a virtual suspension of all organized education from the age of thirteen onwards.

Militarist Influence upon Education

Since the impact of the strong nationalist revival, the educational and military authorities have believed it imperative to provide supplementary educational (perhaps 'indoctrinational' would be the correct term) opportunities for boys and girls going out into the world direct from the elementary schools. With this object, youth schools were organized in connection with the Young

Men's Association, which is itself an offshoot of the Young Men's Clubs of feudal days. This Association, with headquarters in Tokyo and branches throughout the country, is an allegedly spontaneous cultural organization of Japanese youth, and in 1937 claimed over 15,000 branches and 2,500,000 members. The youth schools afford a five-year course in cultural and technical subjects with special emphasis on 'morals' and physical training, Government control being ensured by means of subsidies. Such schools are now said to number over 16,000 with a membership of about 2,000,000. They are controlled by the Bureau of Social Education in the Department of Education, which is also responsible for itinerant and other libraries throughout the country. Through these libraries even the smallest villages are provided with literature officially considered suitable for the moral welfare of the peasants. Parallel to the youth schools are the youths' training schools, which are subsidized by the Army and provide a pre-conscriptional military course. The most extreme of Japan's youth organizations, however, is the Japan Youth Federation, directed by the notorious reactionary, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto. The tenets of this organization are frankly reactionary, militarist and anti-foreign.

As already stated, the Japanese educational system was created as an instrument of national policy. By its means the people were to be welded into a single unit round the central core of the Throne, each individual trained to think and act alike. The desired pattern of citizen was determined by the Government and mass-produced by the educational machine. It is interesting to note, however, that the pattern has not always been precisely the same. In the Taishō period of 1912-26, there was an almost naive attempt to inculcate pacific and pious sentiments in the mind of youth. Text-books abounded in verses about cherry-blossom, apostrophes to mother-love and the blessings of peace. The so-called Showa Restoration caused all this 'sob-stuff' to be expunged and replaced by biographies of ancient Japanese warriors, with their detestable distortion of 'loyalty' and 'obedience', and by the theme of Manchuria as a national life-line. Text and illustrations constitute an appeal to militant patriotism, with pictures of marching troops, children saluting the flag, aeroplanes, tanks, bombs and warships. Typical extracts are: "The Japanese must realize what Japan has bestowed upon the world. This will enable us to control the whole world after the overthrow of the proud and high-flown nations"; or again, "Some day, having swept away all rottenness and subjugated all arrogant and insolent countries, Japan shall be King of the World and Lord of the Universe."

This tone was even more pronounced in text-books devoted to 'national morals'. Nominally two hours weekly are assigned to this subject in all institutions, but in practice it pervades every subject. 'Morals', in Japanese terminology, are entirely divorced from religion, the teaching of which in schools is forbidden. But this does not apply to State Shintō, which has been officially pronounced above all religion, and thus exempt. The teaching of morals is, in fact, designed to produce not good men and women, but good Japanese imbued with the 'Japanese spirit'. The basis of the whole science of 'morals' is the Imperial Rescript on Education mentioned above, in which two virtues are enshrined as characteristic of the Japanese, loyalty and filial piety. For the rest, this famous document consists of a string of pious platitudes.

Throughout the feudal period, the doctrine of loyalty dominated Japanese thought, and its claims were so all-embracing that any base and treacherous act was justified if it advanced the cause of the feudal lord. After the Restoration, this doctrine, with its implication of slavish obedience to authority, was transferred to the person of the Emperor and his representatives down to the headman of the smallest village. In this path of abject obedience, in things practical, intellectual and spiritual, the Japanese student must tread. He must accept unquestioningly and enthusiastically the whole dogma propounded by authority. The Emperor is the direct descendant of the gods, and thus divine. The Japanese people share this divine character; they are the Children of the Gods, and their race is different and superior in kind to all others. In this plenum of divinity, the individual is only of value in so far as he fits into the pyramidal structure, of which the Emperor is the peak and loyalty the retaining cement.

In 1935, the Army openly assumed charge of the training of the nation's youth. The preceding five years had been notable for the campaign against 'dangerous thoughts', an expression not (as might be supposed) restricted to communist ideals, but extending to any intellectual deviation from the officially prescribed path. This grim period was yet, from another aspect, the brightest of contemporary Japan. The spirit of free enquiry blew like a fresh breeze through the high schools, universities and into society. Sales of what may be termed 'anti-traditionalist' literature assumed very large proportions. How many were stirred by this nascent liberation of thought is unknown; but the *Japan Times* reported in 1936 that more than 59,000 persons had been arrested during the preceding three years for various 'thought' offences. Only a minority of those arrested had been actually outspoken in unorthodox opinion; the attitude was generally one

of negative discontent with existing conditions and positive remedies were seldom advocated. That torture was often employed by the police to induce 'confession' is only too well authenticated. Some died under their sufferings. Many of the victims (professors, students and working men; women as well as men), knowing that they could expect no mercy from the police if arrested, worked undauntedly for a better state of society. Their names constitute Japan's unrecognized roll of honour, and their courage a hopeful sign for the future.

Army control of education was followed by a spate of organizations for control of thought. Thought supervisors and thought inspection commissions began to operate in the schools. The committee-mentality of Japan ran riot in a series of organizations such as the Committee for the Promotion of Japanese Learning, New Council on Innovation in Education and Learning, Committee for the Promotion of Students' Welfare. The object of all this ponderous machinery was to enmesh the student in the tentacles of tribalism.

Employment of Nationalist Propaganda

Simultaneously, the Departments of Education and War brought into play all the resources of propaganda. Pamphlets, in issues of a million or more, rolled from the Army printing presses with significant titles such as *Principles of National Defence and the Strategy of Economic War*, *How to Prepare for Long-term Hostilities*, and so forth. They were distributed not only in schools and colleges, but in every village throughout the land, and their sole object was to stimulate a desire for war. Officers toured the country, lecturing in schools, temples, village halls and factories. Motorized film units brought visual propaganda to every village, a typical production being entitled *Japan Stands Alone*, in which Japan was depicted as the protector of the Orient against Western aggression. In addition to the routine annual pilgrimages to the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines in Tokyo and that of the Sun Goddess at Isé, school principals were instructed to organize expeditions to local Shintō shrines. The plaza before the Imperial Palace was daily thronged with school children 'worshipping the Emperor from a distance'.

The Japanese are by nature a gregarious race and delight in groups, societies and clubs. In the task of youth indoctrination, the Ex-Servicemen's Association and the Japanese Women's Society for National Defence have both played outstanding parts. The former has been especially valuable to the authorities, since even the smallest village boasts a unit. Members take the lead in organizing patriotic festivals, lecturing school children on

loyalty, guiding the Boy Scouts, drilling the students of the youth schools and (most important of all) in supervising the 'thought atmosphere' of every household in their vicinity.

Within the schools themselves, especially those of higher grade, the Army became increasingly aggressive, much to the resentment of many of the school authorities. In every class students were encouraged to spy upon their fellows, and even upon the teachers. Frequently the appointed lecturer on 'morals' was constrained to make way for a young Army officer and, sitting among his pupils, to learn the correct methods of instruction. College libraries were scrutinized for evidence of un-Japanese thought; hundreds of volumes, hitherto thought harmless enough, were removed and replaced by others corresponding more closely to the prevalent ideology. In the field of sport, anything savouring of 'individualism' was eliminated, for this was considered the most insidious heresy with which Japanese youth had been infected by the West. The crowds at University Baseball League matches in Tokyo, sometimes numbering thirty or forty thousand, were forbidden to shout or cheer. A modest clapping was the only sign of approval permitted; and games began and ended by the teams lining up and all, spectators included, bowing solemnly in the direction of the Imperial Palace.

Emotional Instability of Japanese Youth

The youth against whom this tremendous paraphernalia of indoctrination is directed might well be pictured as an incipient rebel, impregnated with all the horrors of democracy. On the contrary he is, as a rule, a docile and well-behaved soul. This is due to his environment, for it may be doubted whether there exists any society in the world so patterned, so ritualized, as that of Japan. Undoubtedly the Japanese is abnormally emotional; and it is perhaps because of this fact that Japanese social life is so codified, for this provides the child with rules of correct behaviour in all circumstances. The effect on character development is disastrous, since it entails the repression of the child's emotional nature. The apparent stoicism of Japanese youth is a façade to a tumultuous soul which, when restraints break down, may express itself in terrible extremes, such as suicide and murder in the individual, and in panic savagery in the mass, as illustrated by the murder of Koreans after the earthquake of 1923. The Japanese student must thus be regarded as emotionally unstable and the innumerable repressions enforced upon him increase this weakness of character. The regulation of his home environment is merely a preparation for a more rigid school

career. Hemmed in by comprehensive rules of conduct, he lives in fear of breaking them. His phobia, and the punishment most dreaded in his school life, is ridicule. This makes him extremely sensitive, ever on the watch for fancied insults, and accounts for the gregarious instinct which is one of his most striking characteristics. He feels safe only in a crowd of similar pattern, and dreads the necessity for independent decision lest he be laughed at for making a mistake. In class-work, too, conformity to pattern is the objective, and originality, however brilliant, is discouraged and suppressed by ridicule.

In a society so well drilled to acceptance of authoritative dogma, this formidable barrage of indoctrination might appear superfluous. It must be remembered, however, that Western influence, with its emphasis on the value of the individual, had begun to make inroads into Japanese social thought. Moreover, the transfer of the feudal conception of loyalty to the person of the Emperor was in fact an innovation. Until the Restoration, the latter had remained a mystic conception, much less than a figurehead, and as such hardly afforded a *point d'appui* for so aggressive a virtue as loyalty. The Army also had in mind the years of their unpopularity in the nineteen-twenties when for various reasons they lost their hold upon the imagination of the people.

Conclusions

While the picture drawn above of the indoctrination of Japanese youth of both sexes indicates the existence of a formidable problem, it may also provide a clue to the method which might be employed for re-education. In Japan we have an educational machine geared up with the express purpose of producing a certain type of character and mentality. As such it is ruthlessly efficient, but its operation depends upon the directions given to the teaching staff. Given a different policy, it might perhaps run as efficiently in another direction. It would seem, therefore, that one might well consider retaining the machine and utilizing it for the production of another type. The very rigidity of Japanese society makes it clear that a sudden revolution in method and organization might be fraught with danger of confusion and grave unrest. The problem presented by Japanese youth in the post-war world could, of course, only be partially solved by this method. Although the younger age-groups in middle schools and below might be re-educated by these means, they would have much less chance of success with young men and women between the eighteen and twenty-eight age-groups who have been subjected to a fierce educational campaign at their

most impressionable age, and in whom convictions have hardened with maturity. Furthermore, although this typically Japanese machinery might be employed for a purpose directly opposite to that for which it was designed (and in fact produce individuals obedient to any system imposed from above), it could not educate for democracy, in which individuals must eventually think for themselves. It will be recollected that a somewhat similar conclusion was reached in the chapter relating to Japanese liberals; Japanese herd-mindedness, it was thought, might be favourable to the emergence of liberal ideas in the early stages, but would eventually prove a stumbling-block. In the cautious approach to re-education after the war, the existing machinery might with advantage be employed in the earlier stages; and it should not be impossible to find (perhaps among those 59,000 professors and students who suffered persecution for their 'dangerous thoughts' a decade or more ago) some capable engineers who will direct it to the production of healthy and stable youth.

CHAPTER IX

THE WOMEN OF JAPAN

Position of Women in Japan before the War

SPEAKING in very general terms, the position of women in Japan, prior to the outbreak of war in the Far East, had improved very little from either the social or domestic point of view. Women in the ranks of the aristocracy continued to be bound by the traditions, customs and rules of etiquette which have regulated the way of life of the Japanese from time immemorial. The lower classes continued to subscribe to the belief that this is a man-made world and that woman's place in it is to minister to man's needs, subscribe with blind faith to his ideas, obey his commands and give him children. It was only among the wives and daughters of leading men in the governmental, professional and commercial spheres, who came into contact with foreigners, that new ideas were beginning to creep in and women were coming to appreciate the possibilities of a different and freer life for the womanhood of Japan.

Gradually these ideas, in very restricted form, began to infiltrate into the home life of many Japanese in this class, often without much opposition from the male head of the family, who had also fallen under the spell of Western influence and ideas. Wives and daughters began to enjoy greater freedom of movement in their social activities. Foreign meals appeared in Japanese homes and frequently a section of the house was redecorated in the European or American style. Up to the outbreak of war, however, few foreigners were visitors in Japanese homes and they were usually entertained in public restaurants. The Japanese, on the other hand, were often quite willing to visit and be entertained in the private homes of foreigners.

There is little doubt that Japanese women in the upper middle-classes were beginning to enjoy this new order, such as it was, and there is equally little doubt that, but for the rupture of international relations, the movement towards a more democratic and less restricted way of life for women would have found growing expression in many Japanese homes as time went on. The idea that man was a superior being from another world was beginning to lose a lot of ground. It is not inconceivable that the aristocratic as well as the lower classes might eventually have succumbed in varying degrees to the spell of these ideas. The

latter, of course, received no understanding or sympathy from the militarists.

Only in the upper middle-classes were Japanese girls, generally speaking, given any say in the choice of husbands, and this, again, was undoubtedly due to the spread of Western ideas in this section of the community. To take an example, the parents would select a husband for their daughter but if she did not approve another choice would be made. Or again, if the daughter found someone she liked the parents would frequently give their consent if the prospective bridegroom was not ineligible in other respects. In all other sections of the community, again speaking in general terms, marriages were purely family arrangements. Usually the girl had no opportunity of meeting young men of her own age and, consequently, was rarely in a position to weigh up in her own mind the possible merits or demerits of a prospective husband. Neither the independence movements started by women in the nineteen-twenties nor the spread of Western ideas have had any effect in moderating the system of divorce whereby the husband can divorce the wife virtually at will, while the wife possesses no corresponding rights when she wishes to dispose of a husband. The legal term 'by mutual consent' employed to denote the termination of a marriage, was often an entirely meaningless one and a particularly cruel one as well, when the husband was almost invariably given the custody of any children should he desire it. Only in exceptional circumstances, when the husband was a criminal, for example, would the judge give the wife the custody of her children.

During the nineteen-twenties a number of feminist societies or committees were formed with the object of securing the emancipation of women, more or less on Western lines, with the right to vote, and so on. Recruits for the movement were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the younger upper middle-class women, who alone had either the time or the opportunity for indulging in such activities. To some extent the movement had the passive support of a cross section of the Westernized male elements, but it lacked vitality and never seemed to gain any appreciable momentum. Too often a girl ex-student who joined the cause with considerable enthusiasm after leaving school or college, quickly got married and subsequently lost all interest. Little assistance came from the older married women, although in some cases the movement had their sympathy and passive support.

Despite the lack of vitality the movement continued up to the outbreak of war and it had in fact succeeded in securing greater

freedom for women in their social and domestic life in a number of upper middle-class homes. But officially or publicly it appears to have achieved virtually nothing, partly, perhaps, because of the lack of any inspiring leadership. Against this there were signs that some male civilian elements, especially those who had established contacts with the Western world, were beginning to realize the inequality of woman's position in Japan and were tentatively considering a readjustment of their ideas in this respect.

During the late nineteen-twenties, a number of committees, composed of men and women, were formed secretly to propagate communistic ideas. Girl students and ex-students of the upper middle-class joined the movement but police activities prevented its spread on an extensive or impressive scale. At considerable risk to themselves, male and female communist orators gave talks to groups of workmen and others, while a number of purely feminine committees devoted their time to assisting male communist leaders in a variety of ways. By 1935, however, all these committees and organizations had been rounded up by the police and a number of men and women had been imprisoned.

Attitude of Women to the Military Régime and to the War

A large number of women of the upper classes, especially those who had contacts with foreigners, viewed with considerable alarm the activities of the militarists in shaping the destiny of Japan; these feelings were shared by many of the male civilians in this section of the community. The ever increasing spread of military influence in the schools, from the kindergarten upwards, was a sinister and terrifying factor for many mothers who saw the all-too-obvious end in view. On the other hand the teachings of the militarists, repeatedly and ruthlessly driven home, that war was Japan's inevitable destiny, had succeeded in convincing many who subsequently resigned themselves to this belief—unpalatable though it was to them. In any case there was nothing they could do about it.

In the schools and colleges the militarists had shown considerable skill—perhaps as much as the Nazis in Germany—in training the youthful mind to believe in Japan's 'divine' mission of setting the world in order through an unrestricted use of the sword. Fanatics were bred in Japanese schools just as surely as they have been bred in the schools and training camps of Germany. When these young fanatics returned home for their holidays they usually disseminated their fanatical ideas in their homes, with the result that a number of mothers and sisters became converts.

Whatever doubt or despondency may have existed prior to the war, it is clear from a variety of sources that when it eventually

came a wave of intense patriotism welded the nation, both men and women, into a composite whole. This was greatly reinforced by the outstanding successes gained by the Japanese armed forces during the first months of the conflict.

Now that the tide has turned, all the available evidence goes to show that the people of Japan of all classes are knit together in the face of imminent peril to their homeland and their Empire. Their boats have been burnt behind them, though it is improbable that many of them yet realize the full consequences of defeat.

There is no prospect that the women of Japan, whatever they may feel themselves, will do anything, even if they could, to hasten the end of the war. It is extremely unlikely that the privations of war, lack of food and clothing, heavy casualties in the field or even the destruction of their homes, villages or cities, will have any effect in this respect. Whatever they may say amongst themselves there will be no public complaints or protests. We are dealing not only with the Japanese people of today but with centuries of Japanese tradition and ideology. The Japanese—of both sexes—have from time immemorial made something of a fetish of tragedy. Their codes have been fixed as to the manner in which it should be faced, and they glory in meeting it in what is to them the correct way.

Reactions of Women to Defeat

It is immensely difficult to foresee how the Japanese—women as well as men—will react when the myth of their invincibility and their 'divine' mission to re-order the world has been irrevocably shattered. The masses have not as yet assimilated the idea of defeat or anticipated its consequences, and it is improbable that they themselves know how they would react. The idea is too cataclysmic—anyhow for the time being.

As far as women are concerned it is probable that in the face of overwhelming national catastrophe they will instinctively revert to an utterly subordinate role—even women in the upper middle-classes. Their influence in governmental affairs had taken no deep root prior to the war, if it had taken any root at all, and they will look to the male for leadership and decision in Japan's darkest hour. Their attitude, generally speaking, will be reflected in the attitude of their men.

If, through one cause or another, we find that we have to coerce an embittered people, obsessed with ideas of hatred and revenge, we can rely on finding the female elements of the population just as implacable and vindictive as the male.

If, on the other hand, and it is a remarkably big 'if', we find in the course of time a civilian government in power leading a willing people along the paths of democracy and world collaboration, the movement towards the emancipation of women will be reborn and will make surer and more confident strides. Ultimately their position in the social structure of a regenerated Japan will find its true level.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Economic Situation in 1936

BETWEEN the Restoration of 1868, and 1936, on the eve of the China war, Japan was transformed from a primitive agricultural country into one of the leading industrial countries of the world, and it was largely through industrialization and the expansion of foreign trade that an increase in her population from about thirty-three millions to over seventy millions during this period was possible.¹ By 1936 she had become the chief producer of cheap manufactured goods to meet the growing needs of Asia, and the cotton industry, the first to develop on a large scale, had outstripped that of Great Britain. In Korea and Formosa she had acquired valuable colonial territories and she was rapidly developing the resources and markets of Manchuria. The earlier stages in this process of rapid industrialization, though historically of great interest, are outside the scope of a survey concerned with the future rather than the past. It is, however, necessary to glance at the developments of the period immediately preceding 1936, because the great changes that occurred in those years are of significance for the appraisal of Japan's future. In 1929 her industry and export trade had been highly specialized to textiles, mainly raw silk and cotton. The prolonged depression, which began in 1930 in the traditional raw silk trade (and the consequent depression in agriculture) compelled her to find new manufactured exports in substitution for silk, and new sources of employment to take up the labour displaced from the farms and the reeling mills. So, by 1936, she had widely extended the range of her industries. Many trades which had been growing very slowly during the nineteen-twenties advanced rapidly in the next decade. In particular there was a marked growth in the heavy industries, partly under the influence of rearmament and the financial policy associated with it. Much of the economic development of the time can be attributed to the immense increase in technical efficiency achieved during the years of depression. This yielded striking results after 1931 when the handicap of an undervalued currency was removed and when the policy of reflation brought a stimulus to the economy as a whole.

¹ See p. 102.

Some of the changes deserve to be examined in some detail. By 1936 the index of industrial production had risen to 149, and by 1937 to 167 (monthly average, 1931-33=100).¹ The rise was largely associated with the expansion of the capital goods industries; whereas the index for consumer goods averaged 125 in 1936, and 137 in 1937, for capital goods it stood at 172 in 1936, and 198 in 1937.² Ingot steel production increased from about two million tons before the depression to between five and six million tons in 1936;³ and there was a marked expansion of the chemical (including rayon), engineering, metal goods, cement, glass and several other industries, hitherto of minor importance. In 1928-29 Japan imported about two-sevenths of the finished steel she required and hardly exported any. By 1936 her finished steel imports had fallen by about two-thirds, while her own output had more than doubled. She was then exporting, mainly to the colonies and Manchuria, about 900,000 tons, three times her import tonnage.⁴ Apart from special steels, she had become almost independent of foreign supplies. In most classes of machinery, with the exception of machine tools and boilers, she had become practically self-sufficient by 1936 and was a net exporter of electrical, textile and mining machinery, and of scientific instruments. Only in the manufacture of road vehicles was her progress slow. Nor was this striking progress limited to the heavy industries. Since 1929 Japan had become one of the world's greatest producers of continuous filament and staple fibre, and a larger exporter both of yarns and fabrics. By 1936 her output of woollen and worsted fabrics had greatly expanded and a large export trade had been worked up. The growth of the cotton industry continued and Japan far outstripped Great Britain in the quantity of her piece-goods exports. A host of minor industries also expanded and their products began to enter into the export trade in large amounts.

Japan's foreign trade figures reflect clearly these great changes in her economy. Exports had risen from about 2,000 million yen in 1929 to 2,700 million yen in 1936.⁵ By the latter year finished

¹ E. B. Schumpeter, 'Government Policy and Recovery in Japan', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, edited by E. B. Schumpeter (Macmillan, New York, 1940), footnote p. 27.

² E. B. Schumpeter, 'Industrial Development and Government Policy', in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 800.

³ G. C. Allen, 'Japanese Industry: Its Organization and Development to 1937', in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 597.

⁴ E. F. Penrose, 'Japan, 1920-1936', in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 260 and 261.

⁵ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, (The Far East Year Book Inc., Tokyo, 1941), p. 451.

manufactured goods made up three-fifths of her total exports compared with about two-fifths in 1928, while over 70 per cent of the imports now consisted of raw materials and foodstuffs.¹ Yet the advance of Japan's foreign trade, though striking, still left her with a relatively small share of world trade, and the rise in her proportion of that trade between 1929 and 1937 was much less than might be supposed. Thus, her proportion of total world exports grew from 2.94 per cent in 1929 to 3.46 per cent in 1937, and her proportion of total world imports from 2.80 per cent to 3.90 per cent. What created the impression of a country that was making dangerously rapid inroads into world markets was, first, the fact that the development occurred when world trade as a whole was stagnating and, secondly, the fact that her exports no longer consisted mainly of raw silk (a non-competitive and semi-manufactured product), but had changed to directions which brought her into conflict with the staple industries of the West. It is true that the low price of many Japanese exports created new markets in Asia, but some part of them undoubtedly affected Western manufacturers.

The development of the heavy industries owed much to State policy, to national expenditure on rearmament and to the very large Japanese investments in Manchuria. Yet too much should not be made of the temporary and 'artificial' character of this advance. These factors merely accelerated a natural trend. Thus, the industrial and commercial development of the period 1932-36 may be attributed to:

- (a) the improvement in technical efficiency during the preceding period of deflation;
- (b) the chronic depression in the silk trade which compelled a transference to manufacturing industries, and
- (c) the reflationary policy, associated with rearmament and heavy investment in Manchuria after 1932, which enabled Japan to achieve the 'full employment' of her resources.

Influence of Industrial Progress on Standard of Living

Before the world depression a rise in the standard of living was certainly taking place and in 1929 real wages in the cities were probably some 60 or 70 per cent above the pre-war level. During the depression itself money wages fell very steeply, but the cost of living declined even more. Consequently, those industrial workers who continued in full employment became better off. But the real incomes of the peasants and small tradesmen declined heavily. Reflation after 1931 failed to raise the general level of money wages appreciably because the continued depression in the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

agricultural and silk industries effectively countered the financial influences that were making for a rise in industrial wages. Marked disparities between movements in different industries did, however, make their appearance. For instance, money wages in the heavy industries rose steeply, while elsewhere they remained stationary or declined. In the meantime the cost of living increased, and so real wages, outside the metal and engineering group, were probably rather lower in 1937 than in 1931, or even than in 1929.

The failure of real incomes to rise over a large part of the community at a time when industrial production was growing rapidly cannot be explained solely by the influence of the agricultural depression on wages. Another reason is the fact that the rise in industrial output was substantial only in capital goods. Japan was building up equipment for war, for industrial use at home, and for investment in Manchuria and her colonies, rather than producing goods for immediate consumption. In the second place, Japan's terms of international trade deteriorated after 1931; she was thus obliged to offer an increasingly large quantity of exports for a given quantity of imports. Another cause was the rise in population from sixty-four millions in 1930 to well over seventy millions in 1936.¹ Finally, the rise in prices after 1931 meant a redistribution of the national income in favour of the profit-earner. For all these reasons, no significant improvement in the general standard of life among her working population accompanied the great industrial expansion of 1929-37, and since 1937 there has certainly been serious deterioration. We can conclude that, at any rate between the world depression and the China War, Japan added greatly to her war potential and capital equipment without bringing about a fall in the standard of life.

The War with China

The war that began in 1937 accentuated industrial trends already present. But that year marks another important dividing-line in Japanese economic history. Between 1931 and 1937 the progress of the heavy industries took place without any decline in the textile industries (except silk) and the miscellaneous consumption goods industries; for during these years Japan could draw upon still under-employed resources together with those freed from agriculture and the raw silk trade. By 1937, however, her resources were fully employed, and further development in the heavy industries could only be achieved at the expense of other trades. Restrictions were consequently imposed on the produc-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

tion and importation of goods regarded as inessential for the prosecution of the war. A striking change occurred in the destination of the exports of Japan Proper and in the sources of her imports, as the following table demonstrates.

	<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports¹</i>	
	<i>To Yen Bloc</i>	<i>To Foreign Countries</i>	<i>From Yen Bloc</i>	<i>From Foreign Countries</i>
1936	24.4%	75.6%	14.3%	85.7%
1939	48.8%	51.2%	23.4%	76.6%

(Yen Bloc includes Manchuria, Kwantung Leased Territory and Occupied China.)

The Greater East Asia War

After the outbreak of the Pacific War the pace of industrial mobilization increased, and there was a large-scale transference, as in other belligerent countries, from peace-time to war-time industries. The following tables (compiled from census and production statistics, employment indices and inferences drawn from these sources) sum up the results of the changes which have been described. The first table contains an estimate of the change in the occupational distribution of the population between 1930 and 1942. The second table contains an estimate of the distribution of the occupied population in the main manufacturing industries in 1930, 1937 and 1942.

Table I

					(in million persons)		
					(Census)	(Estimate)	(Estimate)
					1930	1937	1942
Agriculture and Forestry	..	..	..	..	14.14	14.00	13.70
Fishing	..	..	..	..	.55	.60	.60
Mining	..	..	..	..	.25	.35	.60
Manufacturing and Building	..	..	..	..	5.71	8.47	9.00
Commerce, Catering and Entertainment	..	..	..	..	4.48	5.80	3.60
Transport and Communications	..	..	..	..	1.11	1.40	1.30
Other Civil Occupations	..	..	..	..	3.15	3.30	3.40
Total	...	..	..	..	29.39	33.92	32.20

(The decline in the total between 1937 and 1942 is due to transference from civil occupations to the armed forces.)

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 456.

Table II

					(in million persons)		
					1930	1937	1942
Textiles	..	..	..	..	1.46	1.65	.70
Metals and Machinery	..	..	..	..	.86	1.79	4.00
Chemicals	..	..	..	..	.16	.40	.50
Ceramics	..	..	..	..	.17	.32	.18
Woodworking	..	..	..	..	.64	1.10	.90
Paper and Printing	..	..	..	..	.27	.27	.25
Food and Drink	..	..	..	..	.49	.65	.52
Clothing	..	..	..	..	.47	.60	.50
Gas and Electricity	..	..	..	..	.13	.20	.20
Building	..	..	..	..	.94	1.30	1.00
Others	..	..	..	..	.12	.19	.15
Total					5.71	8.47	8.90

Between 1930 and 1937 employment increased not merely in all the broad occupational classes (except agriculture), but also in all the main industries. After 1937 employment fell off in agriculture, in the 'service' industries and in other 'non-essential' trades. On the other hand, employment in the war industries increased enormously over the whole period. The diversion of man-power to the war industries has been accompanied by a corresponding diversion of factories and capital equipment to them. It is known for example that, as in this country, many textile mills have been converted to war production. Moreover, machinery has been transferred from the Japanese textile mills to occupied territories and further quantities have been scrapped. It is even possible that a high proportion of Japan's textile equipment has been disposed of in these ways, but this is a question in which the quality, rather than the quantity, of the equipment left in Japan would be of importance. One would expect the Japanese to send overseas or scrap the least up-to-date plant, and it might be premature to assume that their post-war manufacturing capacity will be seriously handicapped. Further, there have been controls over the extension and replacement of capital goods in the 'non-essential' industries ever since the war with China began, and it may be expected that by this time the equipment in such industries has been run down.

Recent changes in the age-and-sex composition of the labour force have future as well as immediate importance. In agriculture and 'non-essential' industrial groups (which have contributed a high proportion of their man-power to the forces) there has been a tendency for the average age of the workers to rise. The munitions trades (metals, machinery and chemicals), on the other

hand, have absorbed a very high proportion of the younger men exempted from military service. There has also been considerable extension in scope of the industrial employment undertaken by women, and since the war they have appeared in the metal and engineering industries in quite large numbers. In 1942, the occupied population of Japan included (it is estimated) 12.4 million women; excluding agriculture, the figure was 5.2 millions, and for manufacturing and building alone 1.7 millions. This low figure in 1942 for women's employment in manufacturing industry can be attributed, in part, to the steep decline during the war in the textile industries, which previously employed about three-fifths of all women in industrial pursuits. Young women who would formerly have been employed in textile mills have gone back to, or remained on the family farms, thus helping to fill the places of the young men called up. On balance, it is quite probable (because of the decline in textiles) that in 1942 there were actually fewer women employed in manufacturing industries than before the war, but it is believed that there has been a marked rise since then.

A fairly recent but important supply of cheap labour consists of Koreans, of whom there are now believed to be about a million temporarily or permanently resident in Japan. They are chiefly engaged in construction, mining and unskilled factory work, and much of the employment taken by them is seasonal in character.

The extension of control over large areas of the Asiatic continent had, even before Pearl Harbour, increased Japan's economic power substantially, especially in the 'strategic' industries. Manchuria and Occupied China had been linked to Japan in the yen bloc; and the great developments in Manchuria of the heavy industries had raised the productive capacity of such industries under Japan's control. She had also acquired their new agricultural and mineral resources. Since 1941 her conquests in Asia have provided her with raw materials essential both for war and peace—rubber, tin, iron ore, mineral oil, oil-seeds, bauxite and many others. While she controls these sources of supply, she can regard the loss of imports formerly obtained from the outside world with equanimity, with the exception, perhaps, of textile raw materials which, however, in war time she lacks the capacity to make up into finished goods.

Position after Defeat

We can now proceed to speculation about Japan's economic position after her defeat. In one sense, the problem of all belligerent countries will be similar when peace comes, for they will all be faced with a maldistribution of their resources far more

serious than after any previous war. Japan's munition industries will have been excessively enlarged, while the consumption goods trades will be far too small to satisfy peace-time demands. There will arise the problems of redistributing the labour force, restoring factories to peace-time uses and reconstituting the capital equipment of the consumption goods trades. These technical problems will be very difficult to solve even among the victorious Powers. They will be formidable, indeed, among the defeated, since it will not be within their power to take many fundamental decisions. To what extent, for example, will Japan's capital goods industries be called upon to provide equipment for the reconstruction of Eastern Asia—on the assumption that the plant of these industries survive aerial bombardment or reparations demands?

The provision of new capital equipment for countries that have suffered devastation during the war will be dependent upon the grant of large foreign loans. If Japan is to lose her overseas Empire and assets she will hardly be in a position to export capital for a long time. Indeed, the United States will probably be the only country able to invest abroad on a large scale for many years after the war. Is it likely that the Americans will provide China and other Asiatic countries with credits for use in the purchase of Japanese equipment at a time when their own heavy industries may be looking for new markets? No doubt the necessity for reconstruction in Japan will give her heavy industries temporary employment; but her long-term prospects in the export markets for capital goods are bleak and the readjustments required in her economy will be correspondingly great. If restrictions are imposed on the shipbuilding, metal and engineering industries in the interest of security, then the readjustments will be greater still.

Yet the need of Japan for large imports of raw materials will remain and the loss of present colonies may even oblige her to buy large quantities of foodstuffs from other currency areas. This will make great demands on her capacity to export. If she cannot export capital goods, she will have to revert to her former specialization in consumption goods, especially textiles. Given reasonable freedom in international trade, Japan should be able to recover most of her former markets in cotton, rayon and wool textiles and in other manufactured consumption goods once the technical problems of the reconversion of factories have been overcome. But, in order to maintain imports at the pre-war level, she will have to increase her exports of finished manufactured goods *above* the pre-war level; for her invisible exports may be much diminished (for instance, by the destruction of or restrictions placed on her shipping). Moreover, it is unlikely

that the raw silk trade will regain its pre-war dimensions, since the bulk of the fine-gauge, fully-fashioned hosiery trade will almost certainly go over to nylon. In any case, it will be some time before Japan can reconstitute her raw silk industry owing to the destruction of mulberry trees carried out during the war. As much as 600,000 acres of mulberry trees may have been diverted to other forms of cultivation. Thus, even in the most favourable circumstances, the structure of Japan's export trade will have to be profoundly modified, and the internal strains caused by these necessary economic adjustments will be extremely serious.

If the world returns to a restrictionist international trading policy (which will, of course, bear very hardly on the defeated Powers), or if Japan is excluded from the benefits of international agreements on monetary and commercial policy, then her prospects are very gloomy indeed. For a failure to gain access to export markets on good terms must clearly mean a serious fall in the standard of life. This is the long-term danger; but another, and immediate danger will arise once the war is over, and it will be difficult to avoid it if Japan's opportunities for economic recovery are restricted, either deliberately by outside agencies or by circumstances. That is the danger of inflation. This danger, the political implications of which need no emphasis, is discussed in the chapter relating to finance.

Economic Organization of Japan

These problems must be further explored, but first it is necessary to glance at certain prominent features of Japan's economic organization. On one side we have numerous extremely small firms and workshops in fierce competition, and on the other side not merely some very large technical units but also an extreme concentration of economic power in a few business groups, particularly those known as the *zaibatsu*.¹ This dichotomy is not difficult to explain. Japan is a country with a large and rapidly increasing labour supply; but her capital resources are relatively small and are not widely diffused. It has, therefore, paid her, when technical conditions permit, to

¹The term *zaibatsu* (literally 'money group') is sometimes applied loosely to many large business groups, and when thus used is perhaps roughly equivalent to 'plutocracy'. But, when used more precisely, the term can be employed to indicate four business groups—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda—though not necessarily in that order of relative importance. What distinguishes these groups from such business concerns as Okura, Ogawa, Asano, Tanaka, Furukawa and others is not merely their greater magnitude, but also the enormous range of their interests.

use processes that require a large proportion of labour and a small proportion of capital, and in many industries production in small units is the natural outcome of those conditions. But where, as in iron and steel and cotton spinning, technical conditions make production in large units essential, large plants comparable to those that exist in the West have been created. And, because of certain peculiar features in her recent economic development as well as the absence of a large investing class, the ownership of these great plants has been concentrated in a few hands. Even the independence of the numerous small producers in other trades is often only apparent; for many of them are in fact dependent on the zaibatsu for finance and marketing facilities. This association of a concentration of economic control at the centre, with numerous small technical units on the periphery, confers on the economy the advantage of flexibility and resilience, while providing the possibility of pursuing a coherent economic policy.

The importance of the zaibatsu in the economic development of Japan can hardly be exaggerated. What distinguishes them from other large capital-owning groups in Japan and elsewhere, is not merely the magnitude, but also the very wide scope, of their interests. Moreover, while the giant concerns of Western nations have come to acquire an international character and a political and economic outlook not necessarily always in conformity with that of the Governments of their respective countries, the zaibatsu, though possessing interests in foreign countries, have always been closely associated with the working out of Japan's economic policy. Each of them not only controls numerous undertakings in a very wide range of large-scale manufacturing and mining industries, but also occupies a leading place in banking, insurance, commerce and shipping. A concentration of economic power is to be expected whenever rapid industrial and commercial development occurs in a country with a relatively primitive economic organization, especially if that development is guided and stimulated by a purposeful central authority; but there have been special circumstances in Japan to account for the emergence of these powerful groups.

When Japan was launched on her career of Westernization, the Government found it convenient to use certain of the older banking and commercial families (especially those who had helped to finance political movements that led to the Restoration) as agents for the execution of its economic policy. There was at that time no large middle-class with financial resources and industrial and commercial experience. Introduction of Western methods could, therefore, best be achieved by centralizing the

process in a few great business families which had already considerable experience of large-scale organization. Close connections were established between leading statesmen and particular business families. From time to time Governments, when in financial difficulties, called on the zaibatsu for help, and in return the zaibatsu acquired Government properties, received valuable contracts and earned large profits from underwriting Government loans. Their purely financial interests thus extended *pari passu* with the expansion in their industrial scope. The several wars in which Japan took part enabled the zaibatsu to enlarge their sphere, often at the expense of other business families, and from each period of depression that followed the post-war booms they emerged stronger than before. They also played an important part in the development of colonial resources.

The zaibatsu were never merely passive agents of official economic policy, and as they grew in wealth and power, they were able to influence that policy to an increasing extent. They became an important group-interest, which might sometimes come into conflict with other groups which aimed at directing State policy. The growth in the power of the Diet during the nineteen-twenties gave them an opportunity, through their association with the political parties, to strengthen their influence, and Mitsui men and Mitsubishi men often occupied important ministerial offices. In this respect Japan was working to a political pattern familiar enough in the democracies, but this relationship between big business and politics seems to have been more frankly acknowledged in Japan. That the zaibatsu rendered great services to Japan cannot be denied. On balance, moreover, their political influence was probably beneficial, since it was often opposed to that of the militarists and since, on the whole, their interests lay in economic expansion rather than territorial aggression, and in the development of parliamentary government. They were not in the least inspired by democratic ideals; but their enlightened economic self-interest, even when ruthlessly pursued, probably provides a firmer basis for peaceful international relationships than the mysticism of their opponents.

The zaibatsu came under fire from many quarters—from the Army, which believed that the proper function of the zaibatsu was in acting as agents of Government policy not as independent pressure-groups; from traditionalists in general, who saw in the rise of the great capital-groups a threat to ancient loyalties and ways of life; from left-wing critics who were naturally antagonistic to powerful capital interests; and from small traders and industrialists, who suffered from their competition or became subordinate to their financial power. After 1931 the

zaibatsu suffered a serious setback. The policies with which they were associated came to grief during the depression and they were discredited; and the rise of military influence over the Government forced them into the background. Many of the controls over industry instituted after 1931 were calculated to diminish their power, and, under the pressure of public opinion, they withdrew from many spheres of activity, especially from those where they most obviously came into conflict with small-scale enterprise. In the development of Manchurian resources after 1932 they at first played a minor part, and large-scale enterprise there passed under the control of new groups, known as *shin-zaibatsu*,¹ whose capital basis was wider and whose interests were more obviously associated with those of the militarists. But the apparent retreat of the zaibatsu was regarded by Japanese observers as a ruse and they have as usual trimmed their sails to prevailing political winds. Since the military cannot dispense with the zaibatsu, they have been obliged to moderate their criticism; while the zaibatsu themselves have stood to gain by accommodating themselves to national policy since they cannot for the moment exercise an independent influence on it. The scope of their activities is so wide that they can survive any change in the direction of economic development. If they have to withdraw from some spheres of activity, and if some of their interests have been severely damaged by the war, they have found compensation in the growth of their heavy industries.

Influence of the Zaibatsu after Defeat

Defeat will presumably remove the militarists from the scene, but the zaibatsu, with the greater part of their properties, organization and highly efficient staffs, will remain. Defeat may render their international importance less than before, but their relative economic and political influence within Japan will be greater than ever. Just as the militarists have been constrained to utilize the resources and organizations of the zaibatsu in the prosecution of an aggressive policy, so a post-war régime, however constituted, will have to rely largely on them in the reconstruction of Japan. Indeed, these great business groups are likely, for a long time to come, to form an essential feature of Japan's economy, whatever her political complexion. Without them it is difficult to see how post-war reorganization could come about. With the decline in the war industries they will

¹ *shin-zaibatsu*—New zaibatsu. The most prominent member of this Group is the Nissan firm controlled by Mr. Yoshisuke Aikawa.

turn again to peace-time industries, commerce and finance. This will suit them well enough and it will coincide with the general interest of their country.

Eventually the zaibatsu may encounter opposition from the peasantry and the small traders, whose position is likely to deteriorate after defeat. But it is doubtful if any serious threat will come from those quarters for many years, for the zaibatsu will be necessary to Japan. Under their guidance, Japan may turn to economic expansion as her only salvation. In the absence of strong militarist rivals, the zaibatsu may carry Japan far along the path of modern industrial and commercial development, and the country's traditional way of life may steadily disintegrate as she makes this journey. If the world enjoys an expansionist régime after the war, and if international trade is relatively free, Japan may well become one of the main centres of 'high capitalism' of the American type. As long as the population continues to grow fast, capital will remain scarce in relation to labour-supply, and those who own the capital may be expected to retain very great power in the State; for organized opposition from labour is difficult to foster in these circumstances. The alternative may well be chaos and famine; successful revolution from the 'left', by destroying the zaibatsu, would destroy also much of Japan's capacity for large-scale economic organization and direction.

Sources of Economic Weakness and Strength

It may be useful at this point to review the main sources of weakness and strength in Japan's economic organization, since this may throw some light on her prospects. The zaibatsu, as we have seen, should be a source of strength, and much will depend on their survival as effective centres of economic power. Another advantage possessed by Japan is the high proportion of her population in the younger age-groups. During the next few decades, when the European and American populations will be ageing, she will have a relatively large proportion of her people in the more vigorous years of life, and her economy will possess a resilience denied to theirs. It should be much easier for her to effect transferences to new forms of economic activity and to avoid structural unemployment. This should have an important bearing on her capacity to recover from the effects of war.

There is other evidence of her economic virility. In spite of the concentration of power in the zaibatsu, and in spite of official controls over production, the Japanese economy before the war was highly competitive. This was true especially of the smaller

industrialists and traders; but it extended also to large-scale industry, and even the zaibatsu were fiercely competitive with one another. Japan had, moreover, remained on the whole aloof from international cartels and, when her industrialists joined them, it was usually because adherence to cartel restrictions was presented as being the only alternative to import restrictions in foreign markets. Thus, at a time when a rapidly growing section of world industry was passing under the control of monopolies, Japan still remained faithful in the main to the principle of price competition. For this reason her economic system remained resilient, and her entrepreneurs adventurous, at a time when their counterparts elsewhere were busily dividing up markets into exclusive spheres of influence, or were putting one industry after another into the strait-jacket of quotas, price agreements and restrictive patent arrangements. The labour market, also, retained its fluidity and there were no Trade Union rules to hinder the adoption of new and improved processes. Such rules, once made, are difficult to alter and can seriously hamper trade when they become inappropriate to changed economic conditions. The weakness of labour organization in Japan has its dark side, which critics have not been slow to point out; and it is possible that, after the war, pressure may be employed to induce Japan to adopt the provisions of the International Labour Office for working hours and minimum wage rates.

A capacity for co-operative action has been a traditional Japanese characteristic in many fields of economic and social activity. During the nineteen-thirties the Government encouraged the development of various types of association among small producers, exporters and traders. Most of these were originally established for the purpose of improving the efficiency of small-scale enterprises, but their extension after 1932 was due partly to their usefulness as a means for supporting the small man against the competition of large concerns, and partly to their value as instruments of official control. For instance, the Export Guilds were used in the nineteen-thirties to supervise the allocation of export quotas in industries of which the exports had been limited by agreement with foreign countries (e.g. cotton exports to India). During the war the Industrial Guilds have been largely employed as agencies for allocating scarce materials to the small manufacturers. These associations have rarely succeeded in mitigating the fierce price competition which was characteristic of so much of Japanese industry, but they may prove, in the difficult period after the war, a valuable instrument for the execution of official policy in a part of the economic structure not easily controlled from the

centre. Though the limited scope and size of their member firms would hardly permit them to exercise an independent influence upon national policy, they would be a source of strength, and in certain circumstances they might even prove an embarrassment to the zaibatsu.

One of the main weaknesses of Japan's economy, both for peace and war, lies in her huge and primitive agriculture.¹ The retention of this great army of agricultural workers has applied a powerful brake on her economic expansion. Although the population of Great Britain is only three-fifths that of Japan, the present occupied population in industry (excluding agriculture) and the armed forces does not greatly differ in the two countries. This is mainly because Japan has retained a traditional peasant agriculture, whereas Great Britain has chosen to develop a small, efficient agriculture. If reasonable opportunities for an expansion of Japan's foreign trade are allowed, we may expect that her agricultural population will steadily diminish. This should have important political advantages, since the peasantry are the main repository of the national myths which have led Japan astray, and it is to them that political and economic irrationalism makes its most effective appeal. If, however, these opportunities are denied to her, then she will be obliged to continue to maintain a large agriculture and to grow a large proportion of her food supply at home. Before the war, at a heavy cost in labour, she provided herself with about four-fifths of the rice, nearly nine-tenths of the wheat (allowing for exports of wheat flour) and an equally high proportion of the other grains that she required. Nearly all her rice imports were obtained from her colonies, while for wheat imports she relied mainly on Australia and Canada. Her production of fish rose steadily during the nineteen-thirties, and she not only met her own requirements but also built up a large export trade. Apart from rice, the principal imported foodstuffs were sugar and beans (procured from Formosa and Manchuria respectively). Thus, Japan, with her colonies and Manchuria, was largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, for imports from other countries were more than balanced by exports. This does not imply that she could provide herself with most of the foodstuffs required for a satisfactory national diet, but merely that she has

¹ It is sometimes claimed that the existence of a large agricultural population is of assistance in times of industrial depression, since unemployed factory workers who have rural connections can in such times return to the farms and be maintained by their relatives. It should be observed, however, that this practice merely shifts the burden of depression to the shoulders of those least able to bear it, and it is likely to add to the rural discontent which has been one of the causes of pro-militarist trends in Japanese politics.

been able to provide a large part of her present consumption. A rise in the standard of living, which would probably accompany further industrialization and the expansion of foreign trade, might well have the effect of reducing the numbers in agriculture and possibly even the amount of agricultural production at home, while it would raise the consumption of foodstuffs. Heavier imports of food would then be required. On the opposite assumption (that she is not allowed freedom to export), a fall in her consumption may be expected. Even then, it is probable that she would still have to import foodstuffs from her former colonies. Since she is to be deprived of these colonies, she will need foreign exchange to buy their foodstuffs, and the extent to which she will be able to continue to buy from them will depend (apart from the state of her balance of payments in general) on whether Koreans and Formosans still find it cheaper to obtain their imports from Japan than from other sources, and on whether they are able to find alternative markets for their agricultural products. In all probability there will be little permanent change in these respects for many years to come. Loss of fishing rights outside the waters near Japan would not affect so much her domestic supply of fish as her capacity to export it; the growing export trade of recent years has been based largely on catches in these waters.

Japan Proper produces a comparatively small proportion of the raw materials which her industry requires. If she loses her colonies and control over Manchuria, she will need foreign exchange for buying the greater part of her raw material requirements for the metal, textile (other than silk), rubber, vegetable oil and leather industries, as well as mineral oil for transport. She is better off for materials for heavy chemical manufacture, since she has supplies of sulphur, pyrites, limestone and coal; but she has to import phosphate ore, salt and potash. This reliance upon imports, however, will not constitute a serious weakness if she has access to export markets; indeed, in this respect she is in a position very similar to that of Great Britain.

For power supplies she is quite fortunately situated. Although her coal production and resources are comparatively small (her output in 1936 was only about one-sixth of the British output) she possesses ample hydro-electric power. Between 1920 and 1936 generating capacity increased about five and a half times, and eighty per cent of the production in 1936 was by water power. Japanese production of electricity was then only slightly below that of the United Kingdom and Canada, and it has grown greatly since then. With cheap hydro-electric power Japan should continue to possess important industrial advantages, especially

in the chemical industry and in those branches of metallurgy in which electric smelting and electrolysis are becoming increasingly important.

Japan's Interest in Economic Liberalism

The purely economic interests of Japan have in recent times resembled those of Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century. Those interests lay in maintaining conditions favourable to a general expansion of production and foreign commerce throughout the world; that is to say freedom in international exchange, vigorous price competition, both internal and external, and a high degree of mobility in the factors of production. But if, as has been said, Japan entered the political scene 'too late for Empire', she also entered the economic scene 'too late for economic liberalism'. For by the time Japan was ready to make her entry as a serious competitor, her chief rivals had lost their faith in economic liberalism. By the nineteen-thirties, industrialists and Governments in Europe, the British Empire and even the United States, were concerned with preserving the status quo in international trade, and they occupied themselves with devising schemes for the protection of established producers. Thus, the economic environment was far less favourable to Japan than to Great Britain on her emergence as a great industrial nation in the nineteenth century. In a less resilient world, moreover, the incidence of cyclical depression was more serious and more prolonged. Consequently a policy directed above all towards promoting economic expansion (the policy which alone could enable Japan to raise her general standard of welfare substantially) was less obviously in her interest than it would have been in a more favourable world environment. It was not difficult, therefore, for the militarists to show that a policy of aggression, designed to secure for Japan special privileges over large territories in Asia, was preferable. Japan could not pursue both policies with equal success simultaneously, because preparation for war meant the diversion of resources from peace-time export industries to the heavy trades. For a time this inconsistency was obscured by causes already explained; but by 1936 it at last became evident, and it then helped to produce the final struggle between the militarists and their opponents.

Once the militarists have been destroyed, the fundamental economic requirements of Japanese society may assert themselves. The raising of the standards of material welfare in a densely populated country where numbers are still growing rapidly and where natural resources are comparatively small, can be achieved only by further industrialization, greater technical efficiency and

a steady growth in manufactured exports. Progress in these directions would be impeded in a world dominated by a restrictionist economic philosophy. It would be easiest in a world where multilateral trading relationships and freedom of exchange were accepted as the goal of economic policy. For this reason the principles of economic liberalism may well commend themselves to the Japanese, once their traditional ideals have been engulfed in disaster, provided that the world environment is favourable and that the victorious Powers do not deliberately set themselves to thwart Japanese economic development. Much will depend, therefore, on the kind of world that exists after the war. If a rational system of international economic relationships is established, with a reasonably stable monetary system and reasonably free international trade, then the opportunities for Japan's industrial expansion would seem to be very considerable. In the long run, the countries of Asia are likely to provide enormous markets for both capital goods and the cheaper kinds of consumption goods. The industrialization of Japan will be to the interest of those countries, because she is probably better able than other countries to supply the cheap goods which they require. In the short run, Asia will badly need Japanese consumption goods to relieve the shortages caused by the war, for Western countries for some years will be busy removing their own scarcities.

This potential short-term demand from Asia for cheap goods which Japan would normally be in a position to supply is important, because mass unemployment, or under-employment in Japan during the critical transition period after the war might have lasting social and political consequences. Economic distress in the absence of opportunities for trade, is perhaps not very likely, because of institutional factors, to take the form of heavy mass unemployment in Japan, but it would certainly lead to the under-employment of large sections of the people, a steep fall in wages and perhaps famine conditions in some parts of the country. These dangers might be avoided if Japan were able and were permitted to meet the immediate post-hostilities demand for commodities from Asia, for she would then be able to absorb her people into productive employments and at the same time acquire means to purchase the necessary imports. Yet there are many difficulties to be overcome before such a result could be achieved. Although Japan might be the only producing country capable of supplying the Asiatic market at that time, she could not do so unless she had already created a stable government; and even if she had such a government, there would be many obstacles, such as shortage of shipping and raw materials; lack of foreign exchange or credit facilities; need to re-adjust her industry from

an armament to a consumer goods basis. The possibility that restrictions will be imposed by the victor Powers must also not be ignored. Opposition to Japan's supplying Asia with commodities which could be furnished by the industries of the United Nations (even if on terms less acceptable to the consumers) might also be raised by her pre-war competitors; although this opposition might be offset by the desire of other interests to rehabilitate the Japanese markets for raw wool and cotton. If China should require Japan to supply consumption goods in part settlement of reparations, the result might be to accentuate the latter's long-term difficulties by increasing the latent tendency to inflation; but, in the short-term, it would provide immediate work for some of those unemployed through the closing down of munitions factories and demobilization.

Conclusions

The speculation in the preceding paragraphs has proceeded on the assumption that a relatively free and multilateral exchange and trading system will be established over the greater part of the world. Much lip service has been paid to this system of late; but he would be an optimist who considers that its establishment is highly probable. Should the world revert to an autarchical system, the prospects for Japan will be black indeed. It is difficult to see how, in these circumstances, she could avoid a period of economic chaos and a steep fall in her standard of life. From this condition she would presumably attempt, sooner or later, to rescue herself by joining any 'bloc' of dissatisfied nations which seemed likely successfully to oppose the countries responsible for maintaining her economic disabilities. It is possible that she might experiment with communism, but it does not seem that this would be a likely way out of her economic difficulties, nor that she would make such a choice, as long as alternative possibilities exist. It seems certain that such liberal elements as may still exist after the war are only likely to be permanently strengthened, and the people reconciled to the abandonment of their political ambitions, if Japan is given reasonable opportunities for economic expansion. Furthermore, in the present stage of Japan's development, such opportunities could scarcely be utilized except through the medium of those groups (notably the *zaibatsu*) which alone have the capacity for reorganizing the economic life of the country when its foundations have been shaken by defeat and the loss of overseas possessions.

A NOTE ON TRADE UNIONS

It seems improbable that Trade Unions will occupy for some time to come any very prominent or influential place in Japan's

economic system. The number of Japanese Trade Unionists in proportion to her industrially occupied population was very small before the war, and such Trade Unions as existed seem, for the most part, to have had very little power. For instance, it was not possible for them to obtain recognition of the principle of collective bargaining, nor to establish standard rates of pay throughout their trades; these have been among the most important early achievements of Trade Unions elsewhere. This weakness is the result not only of an unfavourable political atmosphere but also of the underlying economic conditions. The former may change after the war, but the latter will presumably remain for some time to come. The relevant economic conditions which are hostile to the development of strong Trade Unions are:

(1) The large proportion of Japanese industry conducted in small units and the large influx into the industrial labour market from the over-populated countryside.

(2) The paternalism of employers, which probably makes the Japanese worker less inclined than the workers of other countries to join a Trade Union for the promotion of the common interests of his fellows.

(3) The extent to which the labour supply in some of the older large scale industries is only temporarily attached to the industries, as in the case of girls employed in the cotton mills.

It might perhaps be expected that the Trade Unions after the war would become more important in transport (land and water) and perhaps in coal-mining, but it seems probable that, over the greater part of manufacturing industry, Trade Union development even under favourable political conditions, will be slow.

There is a further point that should be made. Trade Unionism, as we have known it, develops best in conditions of considerable social and political stability, when workers are prepared to accept the prevailing economic system, and are mainly concerned with obtaining from their employers as high a proportion of the products of industry as they can. Trade Unions are not likely to have much scope in a time of revolutionary change or economic chaos, such as may occur in Japan after defeat.

CHAPTER XI

PUBLIC FINANCE

Preparations for War

BY the end of 1931 Japan had exhausted the financial expedients available to her in an attempt to meet the conditions of the world depression by 'orthodox' methods. The continued disequilibrium in the balance of payments, the steep reduction in the gold reserve, and the social and political disturbances for which deflation was to some extent responsible, all discredited those methods; and when Great Britain left the gold standard in September 1931, Japan soon followed her example and sought new means of escape from her financial difficulties. From 1932 to 1936 a policy of reflation, associated with the name of the Finance Minister, Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi, was pursued. This meant, in practice, an increase in Governmental expenditure (financed largely through borrowing), easy credit conditions and a reduction in the exchange value of the yen. Takahashi seems to have anticipated that, after several years of reflation, it would be possible to return to a system of balanced budgets; but the demands of the military for still further increases in the expenditure on armaments proved too strong for him. His resistance to their demands led to his assassination and the deficits continued.

Takahashi's policy, viewed from a purely financial standpoint, was very successful as long as he was there to administer it. It certainly assisted in the economic recovery of Japan from depression, while at the same time both cumulative inflation and vexatious controls over economic processes were avoided. State expenditure rose from 1.5 thousand million yen in 1931-32 to 2.3 thousand million yen in 1936-37, and the annual budgetary deficit, financed by loans, ran between 600 and 750 million yen during this period. The internal national debt rose from 4.5 thousand million yen in 1930 to 9.3 thousand million yen in 1937;¹ but this increase was not serious in view of the simultaneous rise in the national income and as the initial debt figure was proportionally small. The upward movement of wages and prices during the period was quite moderate.

¹ See *The Financial and Economic Annual of Japan* (1931-1937), compiled by the Department of Finance, and printed by the Government Printing Office, Tokyo.

The bond issues of the Government were absorbed for the most part by the commercial banks and the savings banks. The banks had little difficulty in taking up the bonds, because the high industrial profits led industrial borrowers to pay off outstanding bank loans (or to raise share or debenture capital to finance their extensions) and so the banks were left with idle resources for investment in Government bonds. The foreign exchange rate remained stable between 1932 and 1936. There seems no reason for believing that it was deliberately undervalued (as has been said) during these years. If the rate failed to rise in spite of the bouyant export trade, this can be largely attributed to heavy investment in Manchuria.

The elimination of Takahashi in 1936 meant the abandonment of his cautious and enlightened policy, which was, of course, inconsistent with the ambitious aims of the Army. Armament expenditure increased and with it the budgetary deficits. The result was that prices took a sharp upward turn at the end of 1936, while the yen showed signs of weakness. In the early months of 1937 it was necessary to impose tighter controls over exchange dealings and over imports. There is no doubt that 1936 was a critical year, from an economic no less than from a political point of view. When Takahashi began his reflationary policy a large proportion of Japan's resources were unemployed or under-employed. It was therefore possible, by increasing State expenditure, to draw these resources back into employment without provoking a rise in wages and so in prices. By 1936, however, this process had been completed and further increases in Government expenditure, financed by loans, meant a real danger of inflation, which could only be countered by the imposition of controls over the disposition of resources.

War Finance

Since the war with China began, Government expenditure has enormously increased and, as the table below shows, a large part of it has been financed by bond issues.

<i>State Expenditure</i>		<i>Tax Revenue</i> (1,000 million yen)	<i>Bond Issues</i>
1936-7	2.3	1.8	0.6
1939-40	9.4	3.2	5.9
1942-43	24.0	8.0	16.0
1943-44	31.0	10.0	21.0
1944-45 (budget)	43.0	14.0	29.0

The national debt has risen in consequence. Excluding the external debt, which is very small, we get the following:

(1,000 million yen)

January 1936	..	..	..	8.2
March 1937	..	..	..	9.3
March 1940	..	..	..	21.6
October 1943	..	..	..	71.5

According to official Japanese estimates, Governmental expenditure represented 53 per cent of the national income in 1942-43, 62 per cent in 1943-44 and 70 per cent in 1944-45. For the United Kingdom the corresponding proportion for 1943 was 61 per cent. The proportion of the Japanese Government's expenditure covered by tax revenue in 1942-45 (average of three financial years, including estimates for the present one) was 33 per cent; for the United Kingdom the proportion was nearly 50 per cent in 1943. Japan's national debt in 1943 was nearly 50 per cent greater than the current national income; the British national debt in that year was well over twice the national income.¹

The expansion of State expenditure, revenue, bond issues and national debt, has been very steep in Japan. It should be remembered, that before 1937 (compared with the position in the United Kingdom), they were very small in proportion to the national income which, moreover, was growing rapidly. Thus *before the war* the national debt of the United Kingdom bore about the same relation to the British national income as the Japanese national debt does *now* to the Japanese national income. There was, therefore, great scope for increasing the State expenditure in Japan without producing unwieldy finances although, of course, in a country with a low standard of life, there is not the same possibility of transferring resources to the State in time of war as there is in a rich country—at any rate without producing serious social distress. From the figures available it would seem that the decline in the consumption of the Japanese people has been steep and that a further decline is anticipated this year. The financial evidence would indeed suggest that the standard of life has fallen very low; but more direct evidence is needed to confirm this.

In the early years of the Sino-Japanese war commercial and savings banks continued to take up large quantities of bonds, but the Treasury Deposits Bureau was called upon to absorb

¹ It must not be assumed that the figures of national income and expenditure for Japan and the United Kingdom respectively are strictly comparable.

a steadily growing quantity. The resources of the Bureau are obtained largely from private savings—as distinct from institutional savings. No satisfactory evidence is available to show how the bonds have been absorbed in recent years. It is clear, however, that private savings have been stimulated to an extent sufficient to avoid serious inflationary symptoms. Not all these savings have been voluntary, for there has been a good deal of forced saving (e.g. there are compulsory deductions from wages which are placed in savings deposits, and certain dividends on shares have been compulsorily applied to special deposits). Thus, it seems probable that the gap between State expenditure and tax revenue has been substantially bridged so far by the real savings of the people; but more evidence is needed to enable us to measure the size of the gap which remains.

Prospects after Defeat

When peace comes, all the belligerent countries will be faced with similar financial problems. State expenditure is bound to remain large during the transitional period, while it will be necessary to allow the revival of private investment for the reconstruction of civilian industries. Restrictions in personal consumption expenditure will, therefore, have to be maintained, if inflation is to be avoided. To damp down this expenditure will require the maintenance of high taxation, a large volume of savings, direct controls over consumption (as by rationing), and a refusal by the State to release to individuals their accumulated financial claims. In no country will this be easy, since personal stocks will have run down, and people will be reluctant to postpone their purchases, for which they will have the necessary money. Inflation can only be avoided in countries with Governments strong enough to resist the pressure that will be brought against them, and with economic systems capable of being converted swiftly to meet peace-time demands.

Will these conditions be fulfilled in a defeated Japan? The cessation of military expenditure (which has placed a severe strain upon the national resources ever since the Restoration) might place her in an advantageous competitive position when economic reorganization has been achieved. But this is looking too far into an uncertain future. In the short term it will merely reduce the dangers of run-away inflation. A huge mass of obligations in the form of deposits and Government loans will be outstanding. It seems unlikely that the Government, which will then exist by the grace of the victorious Powers, will have the strength and prestige necessary to maintain, much less to raise, the present levels of taxation; to preserve the existing controls

over consumption and to persuade the people to continue their present rate of saving. To some extent the answer will depend on what the future seems to offer to the Japanese. If they lose hope, then the Government will be powerless to pursue the policy needed to preserve the country from financial disaster. The speed with which the Japanese can effect a transference to peacetime production also has a bearing on the outcome, and this will depend to a great extent upon the policy of the Allies.

Some inflation is likely to occur even in the least unfavourable circumstances; and in Japan it would have effects possibly even more harmful than in Western countries, because the industrial organization of labour might hinder the adjustment of wages to the price level. This inflation will alter the distribution of the national income and cause unrest among the classes affected. During the war the banking system has probably become much more highly centralized than formerly. This may make it a more effective instrument of national policy than hitherto; but it may also be expected to increase the financial power of the great business groups at the expense of their smaller competitors. The financial difficulties confronting Japan after the war will be great indeed; but the task of surmounting them will be easier if she can call upon the services of financiers of the same high ability as those who have served her national interests so well since the Restoration.

CHAPTER XII

POPULATION PROBLEMS

The Basis of the Problem

AT the time of the Restoration in 1868 the population of Japan numbered thirty-three millions,¹ and the records of the Tokugawa Shōgunate indicate that agrarian distress had prevented more than a moderate increase during the two preceding centuries. Under the Meiji Emperor, however, improved public health and agrarian conditions, combined with the process of industrialization, brought about an increase, and the population numbered forty-five millions at the end of the century.² By 1919 imports of foreign rice had reached considerable proportions, and concern began to be felt regarding the national food supply. The 'Rice Riots' of that year, though caused by maldistribution rather than actual shortage, stimulated official plans for expansion of farmlands and emigration, but by 1924 it had been generally recognized that a remedy must be sought in industrialization. This policy, combined with the exploitation of colonial resources, has been adhered to ever since; and before her resort to war in 1937 and 1941, Japan seemed to have succeeded in creating an economic basis for the support of her population with a reasonable prospect of improvement of living standards and a margin for future expansion.

With a ratio of 1,163 persons per square kilometre of arable land (compared with 1,141 in England and Wales, 828 in the Netherlands and 785 in Belgium), Japan has, on the basis of cultivable land (constituting only 15 per cent of her total area), the highest population density of any of the leading industrial nations.³ For this handicap she is compensated to some extent by climate and rainfall, permitting intensive cultivation and a two-crop system, as well as by a long coastline and abundant fisheries.

In spite of this congestion in her homeland, Japan had been generally successful in employing and feeding her rapidly expanding population and in raising the standard of life, until

¹ Ryoichi Ishii, *Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan* (P. S. King, London, 1937), p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³ E. B. Schumpeter, 'The Population of the Japanese Empire', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, edited by E. B. Schumpeter (Macmillan, New York, 1940), p. 75.

the impact of depression in 1930. It is true that distress remained endemic in her unwieldy agriculture but, in a peasant and small industry economy, the influence of the family system caused that distress to manifest itself in under-employment, rather than in unemployment. After 1932, preparation for war and the development of the Manchurian dependency brought full employment, probably for the first time in Japanese history. The general standard of life, however, did not improve, and since the outbreak of the Pacific War it has deteriorated, perhaps seriously. Although Japan had reached self-sufficiency in rice supply by 1936, she had only accomplished this by supplementing her own resources with the products of Korea and Formosa. In 1938, for instance, Korea provided 53 million bushels (10,703,000 koku) and Formosa 24 million bushels (4,801,000 koku),¹ both colonies having been compelled to grow a variety of rice acceptable to the Japanese palate. After her defeat, the rice supplies of these colonies will presumably be no longer under Japan's control; and she may be obliged to find foreign exchange for such supplies as she can procure. It seems probable that Japan will be faced with an annual deficit of about 100 million bushels in her staple foodstuff after the war. In other cereals Japan is self-sufficient. She must rely upon Manchuria for soya beans and upon Formosa for sugar, and here again peace conditions are likely to prejudice her position. Fish is the only animal food in general consumption and of this she has a plentiful supply in home waters and in the Kamchatka fisheries at present leased from Russia.

The Japanese birth-rate (quinquennial average) reached the peak of 34.6 per 1,000 in the period 1921-25 when the death-rate, though declining, was still high at 21.9.² Since then, birth and death rates have fallen in about equal proportions. This implies a constant annual excess of between 900,000 and 950,000 births over deaths for the past twenty years. While any increase in population has an immediate effect so far as food, clothes and housing are concerned, its reaction upon the labour market is only noticeable after between fifteen and twenty years. Thus, since the Japanese occupational census for 1930 showed 46 per cent of the population as employed,³ it may be assumed (subject to war casualties, demilitarization, post-war attrition and the possible abolition of conscription) that between 400,000 and 450,000

¹ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941 (The Far East Year Book, Inc., Tokyo, 1941), pp. 522 and 542.

² Ishii, *op. cit.*, pp. 107 and 114.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

additional persons will be entering the labour market annually in the two decades following the present war.

The increase in total employment was 2,359,000 between 1920 and 1930 and 2,742,000 in the following six years.¹ That is to say, in a period of rising prosperity the labour market was just able to absorb an annual addition of 450,000 persons. The numbers engaged in agriculture remained very large and almost stationary from 1920 to 1936, but, relatively, agricultural employment declined from 52.41 per cent in 1920 to 43.7 per cent in 1936.² Except in the Hokkaido (where an additional two or three million people might be settled in the course of time) Japan probably could not employ greater numbers on the land than she did in 1936. Her agriculture is, in fact, already uneconomic and largely responsible for the existing low standard of living.

Industrial employment rose comparatively little between 1920 and 1930, but very sharply after 1932; and, of course, the China Incident and the Pacific War have revolutionized this branch of employment since 1936. Between 1930 and 1936 the proportion of total industrial employment provided by the textile industries fell from 50 per cent to 38 per cent,³ and, for reasons explained in the chapter on the *Economic Outlook*, there has been an even more drastic decline in these trades since the outbreak of the Pacific War. By contrast, employment in heavy industries rose from 26 per cent to 39 per cent between 1930 and 1936⁴ and has expanded much more during the war period. The outlook for industrial employment after the war must depend largely upon the policy of the Allies and the character of the world economic structure.

Out of a total increase in population of some thirteen millions between 1920 and 1935, no less than ten millions were absorbed by the urban districts⁵ and the process was proportionately most marked in the larger cities. This concentration of population in the cities, by bringing higher living standards and later marriages, will tend to check the growth of population; rates of increase in 1930 being 15 per 1,000 in Japan Proper and 10 per 1,000 in the great cities.⁶ It must also hasten the disintegration of the family system (with its origins in fading Confucian ethics); and, it may be hoped, produce in due course a more sophisticated

¹ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*

³ G. C. Allen, 'Japanese Industry: Its Organization and Development to 1937', in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 45.

⁶ Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

political outlook which will weaken the hold of the tribal myth upon the Japanese emotions.

Emigration and Colonization

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, there were about 642,000 civilian residents in foreign countries,¹ and nearly two million in the colonies and dependencies (including Manchuria and the Mandated Islands).² Since then the Japanese civilian communities within the Empire and in the occupied areas of continental and South East Asia are known to have expanded enormously. The fragmentary evidence available suggests that it might not be unreasonable to estimate the total increase at one and a half millions. On this basis, we should have well over four million Japanese at present overseas of whom three and a half million (exclusive of troops) would be on the Asiatic continent and in the islands of South East Asia. By contrast, foreign residents in Japan were few, except Koreans, of whom there may now be as many as one million. The ebb and flow of the movement of Koreans between the two countries after the war would depend upon the economic conditions prevailing in each country.

Generally speaking, Japanese emigrants have not been welcome in countries with a higher standard of living, while in Asiatic countries they have either found difficulty in competing with the native inhabitants, or have disliked the environment and climate. Emigration to the United States and Hawaii has ceased entirely since 1924, and a moderate influx of Japanese to Brazil (where the Japanese colony now numbers 170,000)³ has been checked by a quota restriction since 1934. In their own colonies and dependencies (already occupied by large native populations with lower standards of living), the Japanese have gone to official and professional occupations and to positions with industrial enterprises rather than as settlers. Ambitious official schemes for placing Japanese agricultural settlers in Manchuria gave only qualified prospect of success up to 1941. Japanese emigration to Asiatic countries has been the indirect outcome of the policy of the Government. Without the special protection, privileges and official and commercial opportunities procured by powerful Government support, the Japanese communities in Asia would have been very different in character and perhaps much smaller in size. It is noteworthy also that, in contrast to the Chinese, very few Japanese have settled permanently in the areas to which they have migrated, and fewer still have married natives. The

¹ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 510, 534, 555, 569.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

intention of the vast majority is to return to Japan as soon as they have saved enough money. On the whole, it must be recognized that emigration, whether to dependencies or foreign countries, has not been sufficiently massive to afford direct relief to population pressure in Japan in the past. The outlook for the future (assuming that Japan is to lose her overseas dependencies after the war) is still less promising.

It is, however, not merely as outlets for surplus population and sources of food supply that Japan has developed Manchuria, Korea and Formosa. These areas have been of value to her also by reason of the incomes earned by the large numbers of Japanese official and unofficial residents, and the dividends earned on her capital investments. They have also provided an outlet for her shipping, insurance and other services; and, most important of all, monopolistic markets for her manufactures and secure sources of raw materials for her industries. After defeat all these advantages (which have contributed materially to the support of the home population and to the advance of their standard of living) may either be forfeited entirely by Japan or much curtailed.

Repatriation of Overseas Japanese

To what extent will repatriation of civilian Japanese in the present dependencies, occupied China and South East Asia (estimated above at about three and a half millions), become inevitable after the war? In the confusion and political and economic reorganization likely to ensue in Asia, and the atmosphere of antagonism towards the Japanese at least temporarily engendered, no other course than wholesale repatriation would now seem feasible. This enormous influx into Japan (in addition to troops returning for demobilization) must aggravate her domestic problems at a time when political, social and economic institutions will already be under severe strain. Looked upon from another aspect, the operation of loosing Japan's hold upon the liberated countries without damaging their economic life must prove very delicate. Cases in point will be the Japanese industrial establishments in Manchuria, Korea and Formosa. It would be difficult in the more important industries equipped with highly complicated modern machinery, to dispense for some time with the experienced Japanese management and technicians and the mass of Japanese skilled workers. Assuming, however, that this mass repatriation of Japanese must take place, it may still happen that, when normal conditions return to Asiatic lands and the hatreds born of war subside, many will return once more to the scene of their former activities. Throughout Eastern Asia, the Japanese will have acquired local experience, linguistic knowledge

and personal connections, which their natural energy and organizing ability may enable them to employ, at some later stage, in their own interests and in those of the countries concerned.

Outlook for the Future

Statistics seem to show that, although Japanese women are bearing fewer children than they did twenty years ago, their mortality rate has also fallen, hence the rate of increase has fallen much less than the gross reproduction rate. Since the absolute number of women of child-bearing age is much greater now than twenty years ago and since it was still increasing up to the war, a large absolute number of births would be expected to continue for a long time, even if the tendency for Japanese women to bear fewer children should persist. Similarly, the mortality rate (which is still very high by Western standards: the expectation of life at one year of age was forty-eight years in 1935-36)¹ might be expected to continue to decline from its present level of 17 per 1,000.² Under normal conditions, therefore, the expansion of the Japanese population would in all probability have continued, possibly at an even faster rate than before.

To what extent will these tendencies be modified by a disastrous war? In the short term, it seems that the prolonged absence of many thousands of the younger men in the forces overseas, and war casualties must inevitably slow down the rate of increase for some years. Attrition of population, malnutrition and the prevalence of tuberculosis and other diseases arising from the immediate social and economic consequence of defeat, may be still more powerful influences. It may be assumed that attrition would take the largest toll of the old, the weakly and young children. These consequences may, indeed, be extremely serious and have lasting political effects, if very prompt means cannot be found to re-establish order in Japan and restore the national economy to a peace-time basis. As to the long term, it has been indicated in Chapter X, entitled 'The Economic Outlook', that the population trend will depend upon the nature of the future world economic structure. If a policy of economic liberalism is adopted, the population of Japan may be expected to resume its expansion after the disruption caused by war has been adjusted. On the contrary assumption of a restrictionist international policy economic pressure within the limited area of the Japanese homeland will be increased by the loss of industrial and colonial outlets

¹*Ibid.*, p. 153.

²*Ibid.*, p. 46.

and supplies; and this pressure may be heightened by the repatriation of some three and a half million Japanese now overseas. The result would be a serious fall in the already inadequate standard of living, a higher death-rate and a lower birth-rate. For if it was true before the war that Japan could only hope to support her dense population by industrialization and manufactured exports, this will be even more patent in the far worse predicament which will face her after defeat. A measure, and possibly a substantial measure of future alleviation of population pressure could be secured by abandonment of the nationalist creed that large families are a patriotic duty, but the increase in population of forty-five million since the Restoration, and of thirty-three million since 1900, is a solid fact which must be taken into account. So also is the large proportion of the population in the lower age groups, and the future flooding of the labour market with over 400,000 new workers each year would be a fruitful source of unrest during prolonged industrial depression. Japan's immediate problem may be described as that of dealing with an expanded population when the conditions which provided the basis for that expansion have ceased to exist.

From all this, the conclusion seems to emerge that the direct and indirect cost of the war to Japan in terms of human life may be heavy enough to leave lasting embitterment and desire for revenge, but not sufficiently large to render her permanently incapable of national resurgence, either by her own efforts or in co-operation with another Power. If past experience can be accepted as a guide, post-war distress in Japan, when it has reached a certain stage, may bring into play Anglo-American humanitarianism and international assistance will then no doubt be forthcoming to help her feed her population and reconstruct her economic position.

CHAPTER XIII

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PEASANT

The Agrarian Background

IN this survey the population of Japan in 1945 has been assumed to be about seventy-nine millions¹ and more than two-fifths of the occupied population is engaged in agriculture.² Large though this figure is, it is significant that it has remained stationary (or even declined) since 1930, notwithstanding the rapid growth of the total population. Thus, whereas the total employed population increased from 29.39 millions in 1930 to 32.20 millions in 1942, the number of persons engaged in agriculture and forestry fell from 14.14 millions to 13.70 millions in the same interval.³ The predominantly agrarian character of Japan's economy has, in fact, been changing and the increase in the number of workers has been absorbed in industrial, commercial and other non-agricultural pursuits. Up to the outbreak of war, this gradual reduction in the relative importance of Japan's agriculture was a sign of growing economic strength, and placed her in a different category from other Asiatic countries in which the continuous growth of the agricultural populations kept the standard of living at a low level.

The fourteen million men and women engaged solely in agriculture live on an area of some fifteen million acres of arable land,⁴ ranging from the warm and very fertile plains of Kyūshū through the cold and unproductive regions of the Tohoku to the open fields of the Hokkaido. They are divided into some 5,150,000 households,⁵ each consisting of two to three workers (though the family, including aged and children, is usually larger). In 1938 there were 5,441,000 farms, of which 3,475,000 were of less than 23 acres in area.⁶ More than half the total acreage of arable land is under rice cultivation;⁷ the methods are intensive

¹ See p. 10.

² E. B. Schumpeter, 'The Population of the Japanese Empire', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, edited by E. B. Schumpeter (Macmillan, New York, 1940), p. 76.

³ See p. 81.

⁴ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941 (The Far East Year Book, Inc., Tokyo, 1941), p. 284.

⁶ E. F. Penrose, 'Characteristics of Japanese Agriculture', in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁷ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 287.

and therefore wasteful of manpower, mechanization is virtually non-existent, and the lack of suitable crop rotation causes a great strain on the land, and makes heavy and frequent fertilizing imperative. Almost half the total arable acreage is owned by landlords who are not themselves agriculturists (business men, descendants of the old noble families, money lenders and fertilizer manufacturers into whose hands the land has fallen by the farmers' bankruptcy). These farms are worked by peasants who are almost all share-croppers to a greater or lesser degree, that is, they pay all, or a portion, of their rent in kind. It was recently estimated that twenty-six per cent of the total agricultural families in Japan are wholly on the share-cropping basis.

The other fifty per cent of the arable land is owned by the peasants themselves, but, up to the outbreak of the present war, they were so deeply in debt and their farms so heavily mortgaged that many of them remained owners in name alone. Since 1937 they have been receiving inflated prices for their crops and have been subjected to a good deal of official exhortation to use their surplus money to pay off their debts. There is reason to believe that many have done so, and that mortgages on farms have been greatly reduced.

As the growing of rice, and indeed of most other foodstuffs, is a seasonal occupation, there are certain definite times in the year when the agricultural population is very busy and when the farmer finds it necessary to call in outside help. The number of workers engaged in farming as a subsidiary occupation is large, but the seasons of their agricultural employment, mainly planting and reaping, are short, and for all but about two months in the year the farmer is self-sufficient within his family as regards labour. In fact, there are long spells, especially in the winter, when there is little for him and his family to do on the land. Before the outbreak of the war in China in 1937 seasonal unemployment among agricultural workers was a major problem in Japan. What is more, a seasonal crop means seasonal returns and the farmer found himself very short of ready cash during the winter months. To meet this seasonal distress, various cottage industries developed and a mixture of agriculture and industry has been a characteristic of Japanese economic life since very early times. Sericulture is by far the most important subsidiary occupation of the farming community, but it has never recovered from the world depression, and the development of nylon makes its future unpromising. This has been a heavy blow to the farmers and is responsible for an important part of the steady drift of labour from the country to the towns.

After the outbreak of war with China, the increased demand for man power for war purposes, both at the front and in the factories, ended agricultural unemployment, and indeed before long there was a serious shortage of labour. The solution of mechanization by which other countries, such as Great Britain, have made good their agricultural labour shortage was for various reasons not practicable, and the Japanese peasant found himself an exceedingly busy man. He also found himself much better off, since his children in the factories were sending home a good portion of their wages and he himself was getting considerably more for his rice and other crops than hitherto. The Fukagawa market price of rice in August 1938 was yen 7.0 per bushel (yen 34.9 per koku); in August 1938 it was raised to yen 7.6 per bushel (yen 37.7 per koku),¹ and now the ex-farm price is yen 12.6 per bushel (yen 62.5 per koku). The influx of ready cash made it possible for the farmers to hoard their rice and thus force up the price. In the regions near the towns there was a flourishing black market in such commodities as eggs, chickens and green vegetables, and though a large percentage of the profits went into the pockets of the brokers and middlemen, the farmer usually contrived to get a good deal more than the controlled price.

By December 1941, when Japan declared war on Great Britain and the United States, the financial position of the Japanese peasants was much improved. While the more enlightened of them may have realized that their relative prosperity was based upon temporary and partially fortuitous circumstances, there was, and no doubt still is to-day, a feeling of security among the peasant classes not shared by workers in industry and commerce. Whether she wins or loses Japan must eat, and agriculture will remain her most important industry. It is worth noting that the Greater East Asia Plan, while calling for increased industrial expansion, also called for increased agricultural output. The Japanese had made a careful study of the history of industrialization in Europe, and they hoped to avoid the agricultural depression which had kept pace with industrial expansion in Western countries. In the interests both of national security and of a low cost of living, the Japanese have made it a cardinal point of their policy to maintain their agricultural output. The authors of the Co-Prosperity Plan had made definite provision for the role of the farmer in that plan. He was to continue to provide cheap food for the industrial worker, who would provide cheap goods. The figures quoted above, showing an increase in the price of rice of yen 5.67 per bushel since 1938, indicate that this policy was

¹ Penrose, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

doomed to failure, but there is no doubt that until recently the authorities had high hopes of making it a success.

The method used to popularize the Greater East Asia Plan among the agricultural communities is interesting. The official propaganda was never based on promises of greater material prosperity—the appeals were always to patriotism and sacrifice. The peasants are therefore aware that success in this war is not intended to bring them any direct material advantage, though they no doubt expect that their general situation will be improved through the increased prosperity of their country as a whole. At the same time, they know that the role which they are playing, and are intended to continue to play, is one to which the authorities attach a great importance.

The Peasant in Defeat

We have now outlined the position of the peasant as it has developed up to the present time; it remains to be seen how he will be affected by defeat. Before discussing this point it is necessary to make the following assumptions: that even if the landing of large Allied forces in Japanese home territory becomes necessary, the topographical features of the country will prevent devastation of agricultural land except in comparatively restricted areas; that the Cairo Declaration will be implemented, and Korea, Formosa, the Mandated Islands and Manchuria removed from Japanese domination; and that the agricultural population will return to something like its 1936 level, that is to say that Japanese formerly engaged in agriculture, and absorbed by military or industrial mobilization, will return to the land after the war. The number of casualties sustained during the course of hostilities will affect the position considerably, but as this number cannot be predicted this factor must be omitted from the discussion.

The food situation in Japan Proper is likely to become acute after the war. Japan will be faced with the problem of feeding some seventy-nine million people on fifteen million acres of arable land. The rice of Korea, the rice and sugar of Formosa, the soya beans of Manchuria will all be outside her political control, and any food which she may be obliged to import will have to be paid for in foreign exchange. Even if the most liberal policy is adopted towards her foreign trade by the United Nations, it must still be some time before she acquires the necessary exchange for food purchases abroad. Temporarily, at least, she will be forced to rely on home-grown produce to a greater extent than ever before. In normal times, when supplementary food is available, the Japanese eat on an average 5.45 bushels (1.1 koku) of rice

per person per annum. There will therefore be a demand for at least 420 million bushels (85 million koku), and as the average annual production in Japan Proper from 1930-39 was only 312 million bushels (63 million koku),¹ Japan will be faced with a deficit of 100 million bushels or more, which might be increased if economic demobilization decreed by the Allies should be extended to the nitrogen producing factories upon which she is dependent for 1½ million tons of fertilizer annually.

The autonomous character of the rural communities, where self-government through elected representatives of the villagers has long been in operation, may prove of value both for stability and for the gradual development of democracy in Japan after the war. Since the outbreak of the war in China, and particularly since the advent of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, several efforts have been made by the authorities to bring the agricultural communities more directly under central control, but they seem to have had little success. The Japanese peasant lacks nothing of the stubbornness traditionally associated with his class, and the authorities seem to be well aware of the danger of pushing him too far.

Economic Influences

The attitude of the peasantry towards the post-war situation will be affected by both agricultural-economic considerations, and ideological or patriotic motives. On the material side, the peasant will not be confronted by any immediate economic emergency. His products will continue to find a ready market, he will not be deprived of his dwelling, his occupation, or his livelihood, and in general he will suffer less material disillusionment than other classes in the nation. Even the silk industry should revive temporarily during restocking. The interests of the peasant are by no means identical with those of the urban proletariat. If, as seems very probable, shortage of food after the war leads to social unrest, the farmers—who will to that extent constitute a vested interest—will tend to side either with the forces of order, or (if those forces have been hopelessly weakened) with whatever factions hold out promises of protecting the agrarian interest in the prevailing chaos. There is, even at the present time, much criticism of the peasants by the urban lower-middle and industrial classes, who maintain that, while they are sacrificing all for the national cause, the only concern of the peasants is to 'keep their bellies filled'. As the situation deteriorates, this antagonism will increase.

¹ *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 287.

Relationship to the Dynasty and the Army

Economically, therefore, the peasantry should be, on the whole, a source of stability in the interim period after the war. This tendency will be reinforced by peasant conservatism, in so far as the peasant's stake in permanency and his sentimental attachment to the soil will remain unshaken when the superimposed modern structure of Japan is in dissolution. But progress and change are, in the ultimate analysis, of far greater moment to Japan than stability. The devotion of the peasant to the dynasty, and his primitive and unquestioning acquiescence in Emperor worship and animist Shintō cults (which has been strengthened by high-powered nationalist indoctrination during recent years) render him a traditional bigot and a passive reactionary. An anti-dynastic revolution, whether arising spontaneously or imposed through external pressure, or an incautious approach to the rationalization of the dynasty, might convert this passive attitude of reaction to one of active and stubborn resistance to change.

Owing to the special relationship of the Army with the rural community from which its best elements (among both officers and men) are recruited, the peasantry cannot fail to be affected, even more profoundly than other classes, by the enormous battle casualties which must be sustained. The ties of family affection are very strong in Japan, and there will be few peasant homes that have not lost one of their members in the 'holy war'. The close integration of village life ensures that each death in action will be a communal sorrow and a communal honour; wounded heroes will bring to their villages stories of the forlorn resistance of the Imperial Army against overwhelming material odds, creating an atmosphere of emotion which will be exploited by the machinery of official propaganda. With this fervent patriotic background, it would be wiser to assume that, far from being destroyed by defeat, the prestige of the Army in rural Japan will be heightened, and attempts by the victors to destroy it will be bitterly resented.

Effects of Demobilization

The immediate result of the return of many thousands of demobilized soldiers and discharged industrial workers to the villages will be to lighten the task of domestic agriculture in meeting the increased demand for food by relieving the war-time shortage of labour. But the psychological influence of this mass return to the land may be much more important. The horizons of those returning will have been widened by service overseas or by life in the cities under stress of war; and

their consciousness of the futility of Japan's ambitions and of the implications of her utter defeat will be much more vivid than that of their stay-at-home families. Indoctrination while in the Army, and the difficulty of readjustment to rural life will make these people a possible source of political disturbance, but in the long run their influence should be salutary in undermining the traditional prejudices of the peasants.

Returning for a moment to the economic aspect, the solution of one of Japan's main economic problems lies in an increased ability, through industrialization, to import foodstuffs, and the consequent reduction of her agriculture to dimensions which do not lead to a waste of labour upon unproductive and ill-paid work. This would have an incidental political advantage in restricting the field of bigotry presented by the peasantry. In the immediate post-war period, however, the peasants are likely to be the only large section of the population which will remain relatively undisturbed. The nature of their occupation makes it highly probable that, unless they come within the actual theatre of operations, they will stay in their villages and continue to till their fields. In the inevitable turmoil of this period there will be some advantage in having a stable element among the population.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS

THE misappraisal of Japan by the world at large, which persisted until she hoisted her true colours in Manchuria in 1931, is not difficult to explain. Her self-imposed seclusion did not end with the Meiji Restoration. It was extended in practice into the present century by geographical isolation, by the barrier presented to international understanding by the Japanese language and script, and by the insistence of the Japanese upon their racial uniqueness, and their refusal to merge it in international fellowship. Many of the Japanese who came into contact with the West were intent upon presenting a propagandist picture of their country, designed to promote her national interests and conceal her true designs. The number of foreigners with sufficient knowledge of spoken and written Japanese to enable them to interpret Japanese psychology was so limited as to prevent the application of a disinterested corrective to what often amounted to deliberate distortion of facts. The opinions of foreign observers were, indeed, too often characterized by a lack of balance, and alternated between adulation and unreasoned criticism.

It was natural that Western nations, absorbed during the past forty years in the increasing gravity of their own problems, should have been only too willing to accept a distant and baffling people at their own valuation. To this easy-going appraisal, the material success of the Japanese in peace and war, their highly developed aesthetic sense and their engaging originalities, all contributed. Extreme nationalism and Emperor worship were either ignored or identified with patriotism in its Western sense. It was assumed that Japan had achieved the impossible, and had overcome in a generation or two the disabilities inseparable from a recent feudal past, which, in fact, had been perpetuated both by restricted international associations and by calculated official policy. Too much, in fact, was expected of an immature and emotionally unstable people.

The qualities of the Japanese, often over-estimated in the past, have now been obscured by barbaric elements in the national character of which the world has become aware. Aesthetic appreciation, generally in eclipse elsewhere in Asia, is still evident in Japanese national life and industry. Physical courage,

kindness, good manners and personal cleanliness, though all subject to qualifications, must in justice be placed to the national credit. Loyalty in its present form is often a distorted feudal survival rather than a virtue, but may yet serve a better purpose. Most valuable of all, perhaps, is the Japanese capacity for sustained effort, organization and the acceptance of discipline. It is true that these are by-products of the herd-mentality of Japan, but they give her an advantage over other Asiatic races, in whom they are deficient.

With these natural endowments and a highly developed economic organization, Japan has a contribution of great value to make to the welfare of Asia. Proof of this is afforded by her colonial record, which has now entered its final phase. Just as Western opinion before the war failed to recognize that the Japanese national ideology, and the proximity of her own feudal past, disqualified her for trusteeship of dependent peoples, so now, opinion ignores the indisputable material benefits which she brought to her colonies. Since the hatreds bred of the war will not permanently outweigh material interests in Asia, a time is likely to come when this contribution will be recognized as indispensable by the Asiatic races themselves. Before Japan can make this contribution in an acceptable form, however, her own national regeneration must be accomplished.

At the end of hostilities, if not earlier, it seems certain that Japan will be confronted by an internal crisis of major dimensions. Much will depend upon the course of military operations and whether they take place on a large scale within the main islands of Japan, but it is reasonable to expect wholesale disruption of communications, industries and public utilities through bombing and very heavy war casualties, both military and civilian. Little of the merchant marine may remain afloat. Domestic crop shortages, interruption of colonial food supplies and disorganization of the fishing industry may produce famine conditions in the cities. Malnutrition, destruction of houses, and breakdowns in public utilities and health services will breed epidemics and increase such endemic diseases as tuberculosis. Mortality from all these causes will be very heavy, especially among old and weakly people and children. Destruction of industrial equipment and suspension of war production must bring widespread unemployment in the towns, which will be increased as time goes on by demobilization and repatriation of Japanese from overseas. Successive shifts of responsibility from one Cabinet to another as the outlook darkens will weaken the central authority, and in the last stages before surrender organized government may practically cease.

A chaotic interlude of this kind may be beyond any power to prevent, and its consequences must inevitably be serious. If these are to be kept within bounds, immediate steps will be necessary to create some strong central authority acceptable to the Japanese people; and to expedite a changeover from war-time to peace-time production, designed to prevent unemployment, remove domestic scarcities and provide for the resumption of foreign trade on which an adequate supply of foodstuffs and raw materials must depend.

It is improbable that this crisis could be surmounted without foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Japan. But to the extent that Japan retains responsibility for internal administration she will be obliged to fall back upon the institutions and forces which have preserved her equilibrium in the past, provided they are still intact. In so far as prediction is possible about a situation of which nearly all aspects are speculative, a crisis of this nature seems likely to assail Japan in the last stages of the war. Her long-term reactions will be modified by its duration and outcome.

It would seem that the Japanese have not only succeeded in convincing themselves that they are a race apart, but have also to some considerable extent induced others to accept the thesis that their institutions, national character and social and political systems are in many respects peculiar. This conception seems very important indeed in relation to the future of Japan. It is a component in the belief in a divine racial mission which has made them resist assimilation in international society and stimulated their career of aggression in Asia. But is this conviction founded upon fact, except in so far as every nation is to some extent unique? It is true that Japanese reactions to events and interpretations of their own motives are often most unexpected to us. It is true also that Japan's religion, political system and social attitude are very different from those of modern Western nations. But most of them fall within well-recognized historical categories. They may be anachronistic but they are certainly not unique in the sense of raising a real barrier between Japan and other nations.

An important element in the conversion of the Japanese into good neighbours after the war will be to bring home to them the conviction that their institutions and ways are not nearly so peculiar as they suppose. This may help them to recognize their common humanity.

There are few features of their national structure which the Japanese do not profess to regard as unique, but the conception is crystallized in the tribal myths regarding the divinity of the

Emperor and the divine racial mission. Though the disillusion of defeat may be expected to undermine popular belief in these myths, they are deep-seated, particularly among the peasantry and in the Army, which is mainly of peasant origin; and their eventual destruction will be brought about by internal disintegration, rather than external pressure. The most effective agency, no doubt, will be the liberation of thought, but this can only operate gradually in a society which has hitherto been kept in mental blinkers. In order to take advantage of the short-cut to superficial reform provided by the peculiar herd-structure of Japan, and at the same time to build on solid foundations, national regeneration should begin at both ends of the social scale. If accepted leaders of groups discard a philosophy which has failed to pay dividends, the obedient herd will make gestures of conformity. But conformity must remain superficial until it is based upon re-education; and this should begin with the peasantry, who are the main repository of the national myths. This would be important, not only on account of the peasant connections with the Army, but also because Japan's economy is still largely agrarian and the peasantry has a position of prestige which is unlikely to be impaired unless increased opportunities for foreign trade should lessen the present reliance upon home-grown supplies of food. The high standard of peasant literacy should assist the process of re-education, but its results are only likely to be perceptible in the rising generation. In the case of the more sophisticated population of the towns an atmosphere favourable to enlightenment will most readily be created by improvement in economic conditions and the emancipation of women.

The present generation of peasants cannot be expected to understand or support with conviction any other than a monarchical régime. Indeed, in the Japanese people as a whole, the political energy which breeds successful revolutionaries has hitherto been lacking. Bewildered by defeat and encircled by a hostile world, they are likely to coalesce round the refuge of the Throne. No alternative to a monarchical system, under the present Emperor or some other member of his family, is likely to provide that focus of stability which will be essential if the State is not to dissolve into chaos in the impending crisis.

Reasons have been given for a belief that, under favourable conditions, the Throne might survive a formal reorientation of its position in popular estimation. One of these conditions would be the emergence of a group of statesmen sufficiently enlightened and influential to create and maintain a constitutional régime. Just as the great upheaval of the Restoration brought to the front

an astonishing array of statesmen and administrators, so it is possible that after the war Japan will find hidden resources of reformist ability on which to rely. But unless history repeats itself in this way, it seems probable that the influence of the upper middle-class in the administration will continue; and that constitutional statesmen will be recruited from the bureaucracy, the zaibatsu, 'advanced' politicians, 'moderate' generals and admirals, with a sprinkling of liberals. Japanese respect for age might show itself in a preference for elderly reformers. If this looks suspiciously like a resuscitation of the 'old gang', the answer is that a more advanced democratic administration could, for the present at least, scarcely maintain itself without foreign support. Native Japanese resources seem to afford no alternative to political confusion except reliance upon personalities whose democratic convictions are qualified and opportunist. The retention of the Throne itself is open to the objection that it would almost certainly be manipulated by men of this type.

Another condition of this second Imperial Restoration would be the abolition of the present Constitution, or its revision and re-interpretation in such a way as to reduce the influence of the armed forces to appropriate dimensions, and permit the Diet to exercise real authority, particularly over finance. The extra-constitutional powers acquired by the Privy Council would also need curtailment. On the supposition that the dissatisfaction with the Constitution sometimes expressed before 1930 is still latent, these reforms might not prove too difficult to introduce. What is more doubtful is whether the Diet would prove fit to be entrusted with the extended authority which the reforms would bring. The past history of the Diet has justified misgivings regarding Japanese ability to operate democratic institutions, and there is little reason to expect immediate improvement after the war.

It is not intended to suggest that a constitutional régime would necessarily succeed. The scales would be heavily weighted against it, and the continuance of a state of political confusion (in which the Throne might either disappear or change its basis and character in an agrarian-communist revolution) seems equally probable.

In any event, liberalism cannot be numbered among those elements of stability upon which Japan must rely in the impending disaster. It is true that the instinct of the bewildered Japanese will be to discard a system which has failed them and to adopt, outwardly at least, that which has the prestige of success. Whether democracy or communism will possess that prestige in Japanese estimation will depend upon future political and military events,

but it is quite possible that the window will be dressed with more or less ersatz democratic goods. In fact the committee-mind may be put to work to evolve a Japanese variant of democracy, but beneath the surface more atavistic ideals will persist for some time to come.

But such a window-display would not warrant the inference that enthusiastic and intelligent appreciation of democratic ideals extends beyond very limited circles. This would be too much to expect from a nation which has been taught to regard aspirations for individual freedom as reprehensible, and whose thought is patterned by tradition and official admonition. There are, it is true, liberals in Japan (professors, students and some labour leaders) who were willing not many years ago to suffer for their political convictions. Their courage is a hopeful sign for a future which they may yet help to mould, but true democracy in Japan can only be expected to develop gradually in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom and economic security.

The balance of power in the Far East and the attitude of Russia in the Pacific War may persuade this realist nation that their salvation lies, not in democracy (which they might argue had failed them in the decade following the last war) but in communism. In that case also, the brand of communism adopted would be clearly marked 'Made in Japan', and it is possible to conceive a species of theocratic communism which would permit the retention of the Emperor, without necessarily stripping him of his divine attributes. Such a system would be likely to have an agrarian basis and to find its leaders among demobilized officers and nationalist societies. These might get control of the Emperor and win popular support by a programme similar to that of the 'Showa Restoration' in the early nineteen-thirties. For the Japanese people as a whole, 'Nipponized communism' would have few revolutionary terrors, since it would represent a continuance, with more or less formal changes, of the strong authoritarian government and planned economy to which they have been accustomed. The adoption of communism as an alternative to chaos would imply that the moderate factions (which might be expected to support a constitutional régime) had either been overwhelmed in the post-war crisis, or had lost faith in orthodox solutions of economic difficulties.

In turning to the economic outlook, we at least leave a welter of uncertainties for a region in which the contours are much more clearly defined. Economically, Japan has burnt her boats since the beginning of the century. The thirty-three millions by which she has increased her population since 1900 owe their existence mainly to industrialization, and can only be provided with a

tolerable standard of life by the same means. Owing to the large proportion of the population in the lower age groups, the birth rate will remain high; and unless there is a rapid rise in the death rate (particularly among infants) because of economic distress, famine and the breakdown of public health services, it seems probable that the population will continue to expand, even if at a lower rate. Japan will thus be faced with a formidable task in providing her people with the essentials of life under the conditions contemplated in the Cairo Declaration; and the solution of the problems will not be entirely within her own control. Her industrial recovery will depend to a great extent upon the adoption of an international policy of economic liberalism and (at least as a temporary expedient) upon the utilization of the zaibatsu to enable her to profit by its opportunities. In Japan, organizing ability, experience and financial power are concentrated in the great business families which comprise the zaibatsu to a degree unknown in other industrial countries. As institutions, these families are open to criticism and even condemnation on grounds which have been mentioned before, but they were largely responsible for Japan's rapid accession to industrial power, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they would be even more indispensable in adversity than in prosperity. Economic improvisation would be no less precarious than political improvisation in the post-war crisis, and the sudden disappearance of the zaibatsu would involve economic confusion which could hardly fail to impede the rapid industrial recovery upon which the welfare of both the Japanese and other Asiatic peoples will depend.

If the world should revert to a restrictionist economic philosophy, or if the Allied Powers should seek to obstruct her industrial expansion, the consequences for Japan would be grave. Nor would they be confined to her alone. The denial of reasonable economic opportunities to this dynamic nation of eighty millions would prejudice Far Eastern security by checking the growth of liberal ideals upon which her disposition to co-operate in international society will depend. Furthermore, it is as difficult to visualize the Japanese in quarantine, and supporting a diminishing population on rice-farming and fishing, as it is to picture Asia without the Japanese. For the economies of the Asiatic countries, which have come to depend upon her as a supplier of cheap consumption goods and a purchaser of their raw materials, are bound up with the industrial welfare of Japan. Especially is this true of the Japanese dependencies for which the surgical operation of liberation will be of doubtful benefit if it leaves the patients as economic cripples.

On the other hand, the dangers inherent in Japan's premature economic revival cannot be ignored. A constitutionally governed Japan, unburdened by the armaments which have absorbed a large part of her imports and national expenditure in the past, and with ensured access to the enormous potential markets of Asia, could hardly fail to become once more a power in that continent, even if not a military power, within a couple of decades. This interval might be too short to give time for democracy to take root and militarism to wither. Under a Nipponized communist régime the dangers would be even greater if (as suggested above) it involved a revival of the principles of the 'Showa Restoration'.

This brings us to the difficult question of the disposal of the armed forces. The naval aspect will presumably be settled once and for all by the destruction of Japan's fighting ships in action, or their surrender to the Allies. In any case, the popular influence of the Navy is much more localized than that of the Army, owing to the restricted classes and areas from which it is recruited. The liquidation of the Army, on the other hand, will involve fundamental material and moral problems. In spite of war casualties, surrender or isolation of overseas garrisons, and patriotic suicides, a large part of the Army will presumably remain in being at the moment of capitulation. Militarism will retain its hold upon the imagination of the nation, which will continue to extol the valour of Japanese arms and to admire the resistance they have maintained against desperate odds. The Japanese Army is at once the Emperor's Army and the people's Army; the mass of peasant soldiers give it roots in the soil of Japan, and make it an integral part of the national structure. Family, as well as patriotic, bonds unite the common people to the tutelary spirits of the heroes fallen in this and other wars which are enshrined in the military pantheon of Yasukuni. Lonely acts of self-sacrifice on remote tropical islands, 'self-explosion' of aircraft on the decks of hostile aircraft carriers, mass suicide of garrisons reduced by starvation, all this must create a new military saga. To us, these exploits may often appear as purposeless fanaticism; but they will become part of the national heritage of a race which has traditionally made a cult of tragedy.

If a repetition of the present catastrophe is to be prevented Japanese militarism must be destroyed, in spirit and in deed; and an essential preliminary to this destruction will be the relegation of the armed forces to their appropriate influence in the State through constitutional reform. But it is very doubtful if the militarist obsession of the Japanese imagination can be removed by external pressure, since this is a symptom of a national disease which demands pathological, rather than surgical treat-

ment. Once again, the most effective antidote will be the liberation of thought and the re-education of the younger generation, in an atmosphere of social and economic security.

Notwithstanding the insubordination and terrorism for which military and naval officers were responsible between 1932 and 1936, it remains true that, in internal emergencies, the armed forces have shown themselves to be a stable element in the State. Their allegiance is feudal in character and attaches to their military leaders and through them to the Emperor. By contrast, their attitude to representative institutions is one of opposition, and to the civil powers, of aloofness. They regard themselves as the Emperor's forces having their roots in the people, who are his children. Yet, in spite of these limitations, they embody a spirit of discipline without which the Japanese might find few resources of character with which to check the disruption of society in the post-war confusion. Whatever difficulties and disadvantages may be entailed, events may compel the allied Governments to set up a foreign administration in Japan. But, if the Japanese are to remain responsible for their own destinies, in a situation demanding, above all, maintenance of authority and discipline, the co-operation of some strong, organized military force will be indispensable. If the Army refuses its support to whatever régime is established, military factions may join forces with extremist groups with serious results which might by no means be confined to Japan. Even under the most favourable conditions, since disarmament and mass demobilization must naturally follow capitulation, many thousands of unemployed officers will constitute a leaven of unrest which could only be reduced by military authority. The thesis presented above is that, unless the victorious Allies are prepared to undertake internal administration and maintenance of order (which would involve the presence of an army of occupation for an indefinite period), the complete and immediate liquidation of the Japanese Army would invite chaos.

Although over two-fifths of the occupied population are still engaged in agriculture, the predominantly agrarian character of the Japanese economy has been steadily decreasing during the last half century and the increased number of workers has been absorbed by industrial, commercial and other non-agricultural pursuits. This gradual reduction in the relative importance of Japanese agriculture is a sign of growing economic strength. The effects of governmental policy on this development are not easy to assess. Nationalism has assisted the process by its emphasis on industrialization, but has at the same time retarded it by insistence on self-sufficiency in food supplies. If, after the war, Japanese industrial expansion is obstructed, she will have to

rely to an even greater extent than in the past on home-grown food, and a large proportion of her population will continue to be occupied in producing it. If, on the other hand, her export trade is allowed to expand freely, she will be in a position to replace home-grown by imported foodstuffs, and the relative size of the agricultural population (and perhaps even its absolute size) may be expected to continue to diminish.

These, however, are long-term conditions which will not come into operation until some time after the end of hostilities. An attempt has been made in the preceding paragraphs to analyse the ideological attitude of the peasantry to the dynasty and the Army. In the material respect, the national distress and confusion accompanying the defeat should be relieved by the fact that the enormous farming community will be protected by occupation and environment from the full force of the post-war storm, unless military occupation results in extensive devastation of agricultural land. The peasantry have not been encouraged to expect material benefit from the Co-Prosperity Plan, and its failure will not in itself worsen their economic position. Yet this comparative security of the agricultural population may breed its own dangers. It is possible to foresee a situation in which the peasantry, with social security relatively intact and control over national food supplies, would stand in opposition to the destitute urban proletariat. In such a clash of interests, the ideology and social origins of demobilized officers and men would dispose them to make common cause with the country against the towns. It has been suggested in this survey that failure to achieve the reconstruction of Japan's industry and foreign trade within a reasonable period might result in the appearance of a socialist State with monarchical and nationalist trimmings of characteristic Japanese design.

Though the immediate crisis will be too urgent to admit of political improvization, progress, as opposed to stability, will entail social revolution. It may be hoped that an important feature of this revolution will be the emancipation of Japanese women from their feudal subjection. It is true that nothing can be expected of them in the immediate post-war period. Such faint stirrings of feminism as had been perceptible before the war were confined to a small section of the upper middle-class and had no popular roots. These manifestations were naturally looked upon with profound disapproval by the militarists as subversive of the 'national polity', and they must have been quickly submerged in the fanatical patriotism evoked by the war. In the face of imminent peril to their homeland and Empire, the attitude of the women of Japan will be one of passive

subordination, and they will look to their men for leadership and decision. It is extremely unlikely that either privations of war, heavy casualties or the devastation of their homes will affect their fortitude, for we are dealing not only with the Japanese of to-day, but with centuries of tradition and ideology. If the Allies have to coerce an embittered people, they must expect to find the women no less implacable than the men.

Happily, the future, in this respect at least, may be much brighter. Japanese women often possess the qualities of their race without the corresponding defects. They have a less pronounced sense of racial apartness than the men, and are more receptive of novel ideas; subjection has engendered in them a cheerful unselfishness, which is the essence of true loyalty and discipline. No feature of Japanese life has contributed so much to reaction as this denial of opportunities and privileges to women, who have everything to gain from the dissolution of the old order, though they may not yet be aware of it.

The plight of Japanese youth as the result of nationalist indoctrination and social environment has been described in Chapter VIII. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most depressing symptoms of the Japanese racial disease, but the future outlook is relieved by memories of the not distant past, when the universities and high schools were swept by a nascent liberation of thought. Those intellectual enthusiasms must be still dormant in many Japanese now in the prime of life, and every effort should be made to awaken them. One method would be re-printing of books and articles on political economy, history, etc., published during the nineteen-twenties by advanced Japanese thinkers. Modern Japan is the product of nationalist mass-education. It has been suggested in this survey that, in the early stages of re-education, the herd-mentality of the Japanese may make it desirable to retain the efficient, though ruthless educational machine and apply it to a democratic, instead of a reactionary, purpose. At a later stage, when capacity for individual thinking has taken root, the machine itself could be reformed or abolished.

The religious beliefs of the Japanese reflect the national genius for compromise, and have been traditionally subordinated to temporal loyalties. They will offer only bleak spiritual refuge in adversity. State Shintō is not so much a religion as the birthright of the Japanese (which they are now about to forfeit), and its lack of all moral content must make it a source of discouragement, rather than of strength, when the foundations upon which it rests have been destroyed. Sectarian Shintō is an anachronism which can be left to the disintegrating influence

of liberal education. Buddhism, subconsciously rather than consciously, will continue to permeate Japanese life as it has for centuries past, and the more militant sects may derive new strength from a tendency of many Japanese to repudiate the West and proclaim kinship with Asia. The family system, in which Confucian ethics have been perpetuated, has been weakened by industrialization and city life, but will still help to preserve social unity and mitigate distress. On the whole, however, if spiritual forces are to assist the process of regeneration, it seems that they must be sought in Christianity. The Christians are a tiny minority of the population, but they already exercise an unobtrusive influence far out of proportion to their numbers; and adherents of Protestant denominations belong mainly to the upper middle-class, which (unless it is overwhelmed in social confusion) may well control the destiny of post-war Japan. Hitherto Christians, like liberals, have been pushed into the background as misfits in the national structure, but the disappearance of militarism and regimentation of thought might bring the hitherto secluded Christian way of life into the open, even although no large-scale conversion to the Christian faith should take place. In this, as in so many other aspects of the future of Japan, much will depend upon the attitudes of the victorious nations. Hitherto the Japanese have not associated Christianity with material success, and this fact has discredited it in their realist estimation. But if, by their conduct, the Western Powers prove to the Japanese that their civilization is both morally and militarily superior, Christianity may become a major influence in winning over the nation to a new universal outlook.

The Japanese are realists, aloof from international society, and their foreign policy has been dictated by opportunism and respect for material success. Their inclination after the war will be to solicit the patronage, or copy the institutions of those States which they conceive to be most successful, or whose policies they believe will help them to escape the consequences of defeat. It is safe to assume that they will neglect no opportunity offered to them of exploiting signs of international disunity.

Had the Showa militarists been farseeing enough to repeat the tactics of their predecessors in 1914, and throw in their country's lot with the democracies, instead of with the Axis, the Meiji statesmen's design of establishing Japanese hegemony in Asia without arousing international hostility might have been accomplished. In the event, exaggerated and mistimed ambitions will have destroyed the Meiji legacy of an Empire built upon Western

models. The Japanese may now remember their cultural debt to China, and decide that partnership may succeed where domination failed. Interpreted in terms of genuine Sino-Japanese co-operation, 'East Asian Co-Prosperity' has a solid economic basis. Many Japanese have always realized this, and they may hope to restore the economic prosperity of their country by sharing in the vast opportunities of Chinese development, and, at some later stage, to retrieve its political position through East Asian unity.

Inferences regarding the inherent power potential of Japan lie behind so many aspects of this survey that it seems worth while to sum up the situation in these concluding paragraphs, even at the risk of repetition. In a material sense, Japan appears to be an inherently weak Power, in that she is equipped by nature with few of the essential physical elements which constitute a great military and economic State. She has, it is true, the advantages of a large and disciplined population and of a geographical position which facilitates maritime expansion, but she has very little space, inadequate supplies of raw materials, and her large and expanding population cannot be fed without drawing upon supplies from abroad. On this material plane, her rise to power during the last sixty years has been due, in the main, to the weakness of China and the resulting unstable political and economic situation in the Far East; to the preoccupation of the European Powers in Europe and of the United States in the development of the American continent; to the naval and military weakness of all the Western Powers in the Pacific; and, at a critical stage in her Imperial career, to alliance with Great Britain.

On the moral side, however, the Japanese possess qualities and national characteristics which are proportionately the more valuable because they are often those with which other Asiatic peoples are least well endowed. These have already been discussed at some length in their appropriate context, and do not need repetition here.

After the defeat of Japan and the implementation of the terms of the Cairo Declaration depriving her of colonies and dependencies, it seems probable that she will be not only crippled for purposes of offence and defence, but that she may be unable, without assistance, to maintain her present population. The only hope she can have of re-emergence as a strong Power will lie in a failure of vigilance or unity on the part of other Powers in the Pacific; or in the formation of an alliance with one or more such Powers. The fact that Eastern Asia, in the nature of things, may continue for some time after the war in a state of flux, makes these dangers more real than they would be under conditions of

continental stability. In fact, Japan's hopes must rest in the re-creation of conditions very similar to those which have enabled her to reach her present position of power. In such an event, Japan's national characteristics, and experience of the embitterment of defeat, might enable her to exploit her second opportunity more successfully than her first.

It has been impossible to present this picture of one of the great national tragedies of history in other than dark colours. The Japanese must now learn the moral lessons of civilization which their primitive realism has hitherto caused them to ignore, and they must learn the hard way through humiliation and distress, perhaps through violent revolution, though even the will to progress politically is something they have yet to acquire. Those responsible for atrocities in China or ill-treatment of prisoners must be punished with the utmost severity, but this survey will have failed in one of its main purposes if it has not demonstrated that these brutalities do not warrant the condemnation of the Japanese as a race of brutish sub-humans. Every foreigner who has lived in Japan can recall innumerable instances of Japanese kindness, loyalty and honesty; he knows too that they are friendly and hospitable to foreigners, and that anti-foreign demonstrations have been the outcome of artificial stimulation. The Japanese are primitive and emotionally repressed; above all, they are the victims of their own past and of indoctrination through a pernicious system of education. They have yet to develop a moral sense in the Christian interpretation. The cure for what amounts to racial disease lies in re-education and liberation of thought; the process will be painfully slow and must be carried out with extreme caution and mainly through native agencies. The responsibilities of the victorious Allies, heavy under any circumstances, will tax their magnanimity and resources to the utmost if they are obliged to take control of the administration. In the end, however, justice and restraint may find their reward in the conversion of an international outlaw to willing membership in the society of nations.

GLOSSARY

BAKUFU	The Shōgunate. Government by a military leader in the name of the Emperor.
BUSHIDŌ	The way of the warrior. Chivalry.
CHOKUNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed by the Emperor through his advisers. The second of the four principal grades of officials.
CHŌSHŪ	Nagato, one of the old Provinces; equivalent to the present Prefecture of Yamaguchi, the Westernmost Prefecture on the main island.
CHŪGOKU	The South-western part of the main island of Japan.
DAIMYŌ	A major feudal lord, holding a revenue of 10,000 koku of rice.
GENRŌ	An elder statesman. A member of the Genrōin (Council of Elder Statesmen), established by the Meiji Emperor in 1875, and remaining in existence until 1891.
GUNBATSU	The military. Service circles.
HAKKŌ ICHIU	Government of the whole world (or of the whole of Asia) under one leadership. (<i>Lit.</i> 'the whole world under one roof.')
HANNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed at the discretion of his superior. The lowest of the four principal grades of officials.
KAMIDANA	Domestic shelf for Shintō tablets. (<i>Lit.</i> 'god-shelf.')
KŌDŌ	The Imperial way. The way of the Divine Emperor.
KŌGUN	The Imperial Armed Forces. The armed forces under divine leadership.
KŌGYŌ KUMIAI	Industrial associations. Technical unions.
KOJIKI	Records of Old Events. Records of Antiquities. (The oldest Japanese historical record, officially dated at 713 A.D.)

KOKU	Measure of capacity, equivalent to 4.96 bushels, or 180 litres.
KUGE	The nobility of the Imperial Court. The top three grades of the Court Nobles.
MOBO	Short for 'modern boy'. A term used contemptuously of young Japanese men who ape western manners.
MOGA	Short for 'modern girl'. The female counterpart of the 'Mobo'.
NIHONGI	Records of Japan. (Officially dated in the eighth century A.D.)
OTOKODATE	A gallant, a chivalrous man. Feudal retainers.
RŌNIN	A masterless Samurai, a wanderer. (<i>Lit.</i> 'wave man.')
SAMURAI	The retainer of a feudal lord. A member of the social grade superior to the common people, and entitled in feudal times to bear arms. (<i>Lit.</i> 'one who serves.')
SANGYŌ KUMIAI	Industrial associations. Industrial unions.
SATSUMA	One of the old Provinces, equivalent to the present Prefecture of Kagoshima, the Southernmost Prefecture on the southern island (Kyūshū).
SHINNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is directly appointed by the Emperor. The highest of the four principal grades of officials.
SHINZAIBATSU	The new Zaibatsu. Especially applied to undertakings set up with military collaboration.
SHŌGYŌ KUMIAI	Commercial associations. Commercial unions.
SŌNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed by his superior with the approval of the Emperor. The third of the four principal grades of officials.
SŌSHI	A bravo. A bully. A political bodyguard.
TŌHOKU	The north-east part of the main island.
WAGAKUSHA	A scholar of the pure Japanese, as opposed to the Sino-Japanese school.

- YASUKUNI** The Shintō shrine of the armed forces, in Tokyo, where the spirits of men who fall in battle are enshrined. (*Lit.* 'shrine of national tranquility.')
- YUSHUTSU KUMIAI** Export associations. Unions of exporters.
- ZAIBATSU** Finance. Financial circles. The great commercial and industrial firms.

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THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS PRESENTS the United Nations with problems of unusual difficulty. In Japan it will produce a situation which has no parallel in that country's history. Modern Japan has had to face no predicament comparable to that which is now in store for her. The probable reaction of her people can be gauged only by those who can base intelligent guesswork on an intimate knowledge of Japanese psychology and institutions. An attempt to forecast the effect upon Japan of total defeat is made in the present volume, which is the product of a group of experts all of whom have long and first-hand experience of the country. Its presentation to the public should do much to throw light on one of the darkest corners of the contemporary world.

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